d76bf2be67addcdd1c39536cb8ffcfd1cea4792e
110
Commits
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0e6c6fc6d1 |
feat(artifacts): publish the completed PR review to the collaborative editor
Implements docs/prds/artifact-sender.md (Approved). archie-core now sends generated artifacts to the offloaded.dev collaborative editor, whose POST /api/artifacts route, bearer service token, PocketBase-backed versions and idempotency semantics are the receiving contract. - [artifacts] config section: base_url + token SecretRef with a token_env fallback naming WORKSPACE_INGEST_TOKEN. An empty base_url disables the sender entirely; a base_url with an unresolvable token disables it with a warning, because a missing credential disables a capability rather than stopping the daemon. - internal/infrastructure/artifactsync: one-method Publish seam in the Courier posture, full source per publish (versions of record are snapshots), 503 retried three times with backoff, 401/400 surfaced immediately with the field reason, deterministic request ids (artifact:pr-review:<owner>/<repo>#<n>). - ReviewReport gains a pure markdown renderer in internal/domain/workflow: summary, one subsection per finding with the failure scenario and disposition when present, verified properties as a checked-clean list. - The daemon's PR reviewer publishes after a completed review when the sender is configured, records the editor deep link on the result, and degrades a failed publish to a log line -- publishing never fails the producing work. |
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6703cc77cf |
refactor(indexing): delete the workspace codesearch indexer
The index built google/codesearch over the chat workspace on every daemon start, for the process lifetime, through a child-process helper and a SQLite metadata DB -- and grep consulted it only for searches confined to the workspace root, which the analysed sessions showed was a small fraction of searches. The compute was continuous; the benefit was not. Removes internal/indexing, the workspace-codesearch helper subcommand, the [indexing] config section, and the GrepIndex accelerator seam from the grep tool, which returns to its direct walk. google/codesearch leaves go.mod with it. |
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500b00cf02 |
feat(curator): definition-driven engine with tool-carrying passes
Phase 1 of dynamic curator definitions (archie-core-trnd.1): - ToolBuilder implementation resolves declared tool names from the daemon's process-wide tool registry, returning exactly the declared set and failing closed on an unknown name. - curatorLLMRunner now carries ChatRequest.Tools and MaxSteps into core.GenerateOptions and widens ChatResult with the executed tool calls so a pass can attribute its actions. - One generic DefinitionEngine interprets a Definition (Manifest + name/enabled/instructions): its pass composes instructions with the built declared tool set, runs the model loop, and records an action per tool invocation. - [[curators]] config definitions carry the Manifest shape verbatim plus name/enabled/instructions; a definition missing interval is refused, never defaulted. - Idle curators are observable: the runtime logs a debug line when Check reports not-due. |
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369ae695d4 |
feat(webui): verify a provider credential on a request path
The verifier was a library nothing called. A request now carries a credential or is refused: webui.Server.Authenticate resolves a presented bearer token to the identity that may act, and requireIdentity attaches it to the request context. With a provider configured that check replaces the shared token, so every request resolves to a named identity or is refused; with none, the shared-token gate stays for a loopback instance. Nothing about the caller is read from the request. The subject comes from the credential the provider signed and the identity is the record that subject is bound to, which is what makes attribution possible at all: a caller cannot assert who it is, it can only present what the provider gave it. A test sends an X-Archie-Identity header and an actor field in the body alongside a valid token and asserts the resolved identity is still the credential's. Refusals follow HTTP's own distinction: absent or unverifiable credentials are 401 and name the scheme, while a credential that verified for an identity that may not act is 403. Each is covered, because a refusal path with no test is a path nobody has watched refuse. The two state-store RPCs the dashboard needs to resolve a subject exist: ResolveIdentitySubject and BindIdentitySubject, with the client implementing identity.SubjectBinding (a narrower contract than Repository, so the administrative facade keeps its shape) and the server answering Unavailable rather than pretending when a process has no binding store. chat.proto carries the actor for the next step: actor_id, actor_kind and principal_id on ApplyOperatorTaskActionRequest, regenerated here. The transport can now carry an attribution and nothing fills it yet, which is why the dashboard still records task_approved rather than a human attribution. Not wired in production yet, and worth stating plainly: dep.Authenticate is a seam nothing sets, because the dashboard is served only by the UI process and that process is documented to take endpoint references only -- there is deliberately no config.Config in it. OIDC settings must therefore arrive as flags there, which is an existing design boundary I did not want to cross unilaterally. config.Oidc exists so the daemon-side wiring has somewhere to read from. Verified: task check exit 0 after this commit; focused webui run records the resolution and all four refusals. |
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dc5d567ec9 | fix(eda): authoritative module ids and stricter action load errors | ||
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bd41643d36 |
docs(config): point rate_limit at the Channel settings resource
The rate-limit budget's runtime owner is the channel-settings control-plane resource, which the Web UI edits and which boot.loadRuntimeConfig layers over the file before boot.startRateLimiter reads it. [chat.rate_limit] is that resource's seed, not its authority. 18cca53b's comments and commit message described the file key as the thing that documents a webhook's per-route budget, which is the pre-migration framing. Cite the resource and the layering instead, and say plainly that editing the file does not change a stored value. |
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18cca53bab |
fix(webhook): keep a route path out of the sender identity
A webhook set SenderID to its configured route path. The turn path reads that field through a per-channel resolver which refuses webhook, but the session curator derives its participant from the raw field with no channel filter, so a webhook session with exactly one distinct sender and one extracted fact wrote agent-user memory addressed to User: "/hooks/...". Nothing reads it, and every pass added more, because the facts are identical strings with no dedup. docs/prds/memory-engine-unification.md criterion 7 requires that a route path never become a user identity. Clear it at the producer rather than teaching every consumer which channels are lying: a route path is a source, not a person, so it no longer enters SenderID. It still keys the inbound rate limit, where it is the documented per-source budget for webhooks (config.RateLimitConfig), so it travels in the new transport-only Inbound.BudgetKey -- carried on the wire beside Page, never persisted, and never read as an identity. pb.Message gains budget_key (field 9) for the same reason page (field 7) exists: transport context that rides with an inbound message and is deliberately absent from storedProto's rendering of a canonical record. The curator needs no change. An empty SenderID already fails closed as an unidentified user message, which is the path a dashboard session takes, and sessionParticipant's existing skip covers it; the test name now says so. |
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b54f01065c |
feat(tools): add per-server parallel_tool_calls to the MCP client
MCPServer gains ParallelToolCalls (default false). The client's per-server callMu is now nil for a server that opted in, so CallTool stops serializing that server's calls and the caller's own concurrency decides; every other server keeps exactly one tools/call in flight. The flag is threaded from config through the provider constructor - the only place MCPServer configs become Client instances - into NewClient, in both the daemon and the agent worker. |
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295f8d697f |
refactor(config): delete the runtime config overlay
The control plane replaces this, rather than extending it (docs/prds/runtime-control-plane.md, "First implementation"). Until now both paths existed: overlay kept dashboard edits in its own SQLite file beside archie.db and layered them over the file config at boot and on every reload, which is the duplicate configuration authority the PRD set out to remove. Gone with it: the --no-config-overlay flag and ARCHIE_SKIP_CONFIG_OVERLAY recovery hatch, which existed because a bad overlay row could brick the boot; ReloadStatus.OverlayUnavailable; and the reload controller's overlay source. The -config-overlay file overlay is a different thing and stays. The dashboard's three write seams went too. UpdateConfig, ResetConfig and UpdateRepoField were assigned only in internal/webui's own tests, so in production they answered 503 and ConfigView.Editable was permanently false (archie-core-j28m). Removing Editable would otherwise have flipped the SPA's controls on, since configEditable read a missing field as true, so the config pages become what they already were in practice: a read of what each process is running with. Configuration is written through the control plane. apply.go survives this deliberately; archie-core-xrux carries the question of whether its map merge is still guarding the file overlay path. |
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16e3b84048 |
fix: address the Greptile findings on the merged PRs (#902)
* fix: address the Greptile findings on the merged PRs Four valid review findings from PRs #892, #893, #898 and #899, which were merged without the comments being read. - Config.Clone left the new diff-cap pointers aliased (#899, mine). Clone deep-copies every reference field, including the *bool beside it, so a clone could write the cap through to the published snapshot. Both the top-level field and the identity overrides are copied, with the clone test extended to cover them. - providerOutcomeRecorder.record could report an older call as the latest (#892). The completion time is taken before the lock, so two concurrent calls can reach the lock in the opposite order to their completion and the unconditional store overwrote the newer outcome. It now keeps the newer, via a recordAt seam that makes the reordering testable. - Curator model calls bypassed the recorder (#892). curatorLLMRunner calls the runtime directly, so a daemon whose only recent model traffic was curator work reported "no calls attempted yet" while the provider was demonstrably reachable. It records at its own adapter, and sendChatTurn's "single choke point" comment is corrected to say there are two. - A provider error reached /status raw (#892), unlike channel details, so a multiline or oversized error broke the one-line-per-fact layout. Both now share one bounded formatter. Found while fixing the curator path: agentexec.NewRuntime returns nil when no provider is configured, and a nil *runtime.Runtime panics on its first method call, so a curator asking for a completion took the daemon down. It now returns an error, and records nothing -- a local misconfiguration is not a provider call. Not fixed, filed instead: the shared lastPollAt masking a stuck identity, the container max-uptime callback resurrecting teardown bookkeeping, the dashboard dropping a served-only status filter on cold load, and the route registry test's line-by-line parser. * fix(build): drop goimports from the gate's formatter set `task check` spent 136 of its 167 seconds in `task fmt`, and 134 of those 136 in one formatter: goimports alone over the tree. golangci-lint's goimports formatter calls imports.Process once per file, which builds a fresh x/tools ProcessEnv each time, so internal/imports.getFixesWithSource re-reads modindex.Read($GOMODCACHE) per file. On this machine that index is 62.7 MiB / 2,081,070 lines (an 11 GiB module cache), and modindex's in-process memo does not take effect: 3 files read 187.9 MiB back, 15 files open the payload 15 times. That is ~53 GiB of I/O and CSV parsing per run, and it is linear at ~155 ms per file (122 files -> 18.8s, 864 -> 133.8s). Pointing the index cache elsewhere drops the same command to 3.9s. The same analyzer runs under `golangci-lint run`, so a cold cache pays it again: 169s cold with goimports, 31s without -- which is what CI and archied's own PR gate see, since only `fmt` never caches locally. Removing it costs no enforcement. gofumpt and gci remain, `task lint` still reports formatter drift as an issue, and the whole-tree fmt is now 2.2s with the tree byte-identical. What is given up is goimports' convenience of adding and removing import lines, which compile errors already cover. The examples/secret-engines exclusion stays: gofumpt and gci leave those Yaegi programs alone today, but the exclusion is the stated invariant that a formatter must not rewrite the imports of files it cannot type-check, and TestFormattersExcludeInterpretedSecretEngines holds it. Its comment no longer pins the reason to the formatter that was dropped. * fix(gateway): stop /status promising and mis-reporting health it cannot see Two findings from the cloud review of #892. Title generation no longer records chat-model health. It runs detached after a first turn under its own 30s bound and its error is swallowed by the caller, but it shared the process-wide outcome recorder, so a title that merely timed out overwrote the health line with "failed" -- reporting a broken provider on the strength of a call no user was waiting for. The /status command description no longer claims "workers" and "channels". Neither can render: newStatusHealth reads the container pool and the poll loop from boot, but the only production router.Health assignment is in setupGatewayChat, which runs solely in the archie-gateway process, where neither exists; channels is nil since the Messaging Service took the front-ends. Only the broker and chat-model lines actually appear, so that is what the help text now says. The underlying split -- daemon owns the facts, Gateway owns the Router -- is filed rather than patched here: it needs either a cross-process health contract or a ratified two-section /status, not a quick wire-up. |
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40a35c9c52 |
feat(messaging): Messaging Service operator surface, chat report rendering, and the diff-cap config fix (#899)
* feat(workflow): post line-anchored review comments with suggested fixes Bead archie-core-q9au (docs/prds/inline-review.md). A review's findings reached the operator only as a flat list in the PR body, so the author had to map every finding back to its line by hand and apply mechanical fixes by hand. Now the line-anchored findings are also posted as inline review comments, carrying a one-click suggestion when the reviewer could state the fix. Domain (internal/domain/workflow): - ReviewFinding gains Suggestion; Validate rejects one on anything but a confirmed finding, so the agent's record_finding call is refused with something it can act on. Validate splits into validateAnchor / validateClassification / validateDisposition, which also brings it back under the cyclop limit the gate enforces. - StagePostReviewComments runs after StageOpenPR in the implement workflow. It posts only line-anchored findings (Line > 0); a whole-file finding has no line to attach to and stays in the body list, which remains the complete record. It is best-effort: the PR is open and the body already lists every finding, so a failed comment is logged, never a park -- the same reasoning as OpenPR's existing best-effort LinkBranch call. - The suggestion fence is gated on Verdict == confirmed where the fence is written, because it is a one-click apply: a wrong suggestion breaks the code and the author has to notice. Forge (internal/forge): ReviewCommentWriter + GitHub/Gitea implementations, type-asserted like PullRequestReader so a forge that cannot is skipped rather than faked (NoopForge is pinned as not satisfying it). GitHub loops one CreateComment per comment and joins the failures, so one refused anchor cannot drop the rest; Gitea carries them on a single COMMENT-state review. Two deliberate departures from the PRD's sketch, both recorded in it: - The interface is batch (CreateReviewComments), not one call per comment: Gitea's only inline shape is one submitted review, and the set then crosses NATS once instead of once per finding. - The head SHA is resolved inside each forge implementation rather than by the caller. The stage runs in archie-agent, which holds no forge credentials and has no PullRequestReader; the daemon-side forgerpc handler is the only place that does. Transport (internal/forgerpc): workflow.Forger gains the method, so the agent reaches the daemon over the new create_review_comments subject; the server type-asserts the writer and answers an incapable forge with an error the stage logs. This is the one proxied method whose absence on an image skew does not park a task. The reviewer prompt and record_finding schema ask for a suggestion on a confirmed, mechanically fixable defect only. Regenerating the wfextract symbol table -- the documented way a new exported workflow symbol reaches interpreted stage plugins -- also picked up symbols that were missing from the committed table (the Status* and Source* constants, ReviewCheck, Store, Task, and the _Store wrapper). Nil-guards were re-applied to every wrapper afterwards, as that file's header requires. Evidence: task check exit 0 (incl. 229 UI tests). Three mutations of the new stage logic each fail a test that names the behaviour -- dropping the confirmed-only gate, dropping the Line > 0 filter, and letting a posting failure escape -- so the tests discriminate rather than passing vacuously. * fix(build): drop the Dockerfile pin assertion The guard fetched golangci-lint's go.mod at image build time to fail the build when GOLANGCI_LINT_VERSION and GOFUMPT_VERSION disagreed. It only ever tripped on self-inflicted pin drift, but it added a network fetch and a new failure mode to the release build, which is not where that belongs. The pins stay correct (golangci-lint 2.13.2, whose vendored gofumpt v0.11.0 equals GOFUMPT_VERSION) and the comment above them still states the invariant, so the reasoning survives without the build-time machinery. The pin change itself reaches the agent image through the normal release path: CI rebuilds and pushes archie-agent on an archie/vX.Y.Z release, and a gateway-only release deliberately does not. * feat(workflow): add the remediate workflow for PR review remediation Implements step 5 of docs/prds/pr-review-remediation.md: a remediate workflow that resumes the task's existing worktree onto its PR branch (worktree.Manager.Resume, not Prepare's refresh), runs a builder agent against the review's actionable comments, commits and pushes to the same branch, and replies via the forge's ReplyToReview. Task.RetryCount doubles as the remediation round counter, capped by the repo's max_retries; the round-cap stage parks the task and posts one comment when it's hit. Task gains a ReviewPayload field (JSON-encoded review unit) with full store/proto/staterpc plumbing. workflow.Forger gains Comment and ReplyToReview, proxied to archie-agent via a new forgerpc RPC. Resume and its Dir lookup are added as an unexported optional Trees capability rather than widening the exported interface, which is already at golangci-lint's interfacebloat cap and is projected into wfextract's Yaegi symbol table for repository-authored stage plugins. The daemon-side reaction consumer that dispatches into this workflow (subscribing ARCHIE_REACTIONS, grouping comments by review, enforcing per-task serialization) is tracked separately in archie-core-8li9.4. * feat(messaging): extract standalone messaging service binary and process composition * feat(messaging): adapt channel frontends to consume Gateway ChatContract * feat(messaging): remove in-process channels and Router from daemon bootstrap Telegram, email and webhook now run only in the Messaging Service, which reaches this process through the Gateway's ChatContract. The daemon builds no channel and no gateway.Router, so the wiring that existed only to serve them goes with it: setupGateways, setupEmailGateway, setupWebhookGateway, setupTelegramGateway, buildTelegramRouter, makeTelegramReload and the release-announcement path helper. The seams those paths owned move to where they can still be honoured: - Channel ValidateConfig runs in archiemessaging.compose, which now returns an error, so a configured-but-invalid front-end fails the service rather than being dropped silently. - The inbound rate limiter moves to the Gateway process, which owns the only Router and therefore the only place a per-sender budget applies to every channel's turns. - The daemon's gateway readiness probe becomes a ContractProbe against the Gateway. It cannot observe a channel lifecycle it no longer runs, and a channel-count probe would have reported every daemon degraded. - telegramSetup is now chatSetup (in chat_setup.go), trimmed to the fields a chat turn runner actually reads. Telegram operator features that were wired only in the daemon (/update, release announcements, version reporting, SIGHUP reload) are not yet wired in the Messaging Service: archie-core-8cda.6.6. Channel lifecycle reporting: archie-core-8cda.6.8. The Gateway process builds no worktree manager, so review_pr is unadvertised on every channel: archie-core-8cda.6.7. * feat(messaging): re-wire the Telegram operator surface in the Messaging Service setupTelegramGateway satisfied eight telegram.Gateway seams from the daemon's own process. Each is resolved by where the fact it needs is owned, not by where it used to be built; the decision table is in docs/architecture/migration-decisions.md. Wired here: /update (built from this service's own [chat.telegram] check and install commands), the update-report relay (same sha256(bot_user)[:8] path the daemon wrote, so a pending report is found rather than written afresh), show_tool_calls, and /restart's config reload, which re-resolves the token and allowlist from this service's own file and refuses a reload that resolves to an empty token. /version is sourced from the Gateway: ChatSnapshot gains a Version field carrying the Gateway's rendered build block, read per call and bounded by the dependency timeout. cmd/archie-messaging deliberately takes no version ldflags, so it cannot report a partial upgrade as a matched one. RunningVersions and ReleaseAnnouncements stay nil. Both need a component's real running version, and the only versions this process can obtain are a different binary's stamps -- reporting them would manufacture exactly the false success the update check exists to catch, and the announcer without parseable versions is a no-op that reads as configured. archie-core-8cda.6.9 carries the contract that unblocks them. Dangerous stays nil: no composition has ever supplied a command authority. Enrich is dropped from the update service: componentInstallTypeEnricher read [nats], which this service must not decode, so the check command's own reported install type stands. * fix(workflow): guard inline review comments against head drift Two findings from the review of q9au. A comment's line numbers describe exactly one revision of the branch, but the forge resolved the pull request's head at posting time -- after the review had already read the worktree. A push in that window (a collaborator, a retry) meant the findings were anchored to whatever now occupied those lines, mislabelling instead of failing. The revision the review measured now travels with the comment set: OpenPR records it from the same worktree read it already performs (TaskContext.ReviewedHeadSHA), StagePostReviewComments threads it through Forger to forgerpc, and the forge refuses the whole set once the head it reads has moved off it -- which the best-effort stage logs, the PR body remaining the record. An unmeasured revision posts unverified rather than dropping every finding, so a worktree that cannot report one degrades instead of regressing. Suggestion was documented single-line only, because GitHub applies a suggestion fence up to its first line and a multi-line replacement would silently corrupt the file. Only the verdict was validated, so a multi-line suggestion reached the renderer and posted as that truncated fence. Validate now rejects an embedded newline, which makes record_finding refuse it with feedback the model can act on instead of the reviewer discovering the corruption later. * fix(gateway): render chat reports as lines, not one run-on paragraph /status and /tasks are line-oriented reports, but their newlines were plain "\n" -- CommonMark's soft wrap. The Telegram rich-block renderer space-joins soft-wrapped lines, by design: a Telegram paragraph renders an embedded newline as nothing at all, so a space is the only separator that survives. The reports therefore arrived as one line each: "Runtime Provider: DeepSeek Model: deepseek/deepseek-flash", and every task's title, state and park reason jammed together. The renderer now implements CommonMark's hard line break (two trailing spaces, or a trailing backslash): the line closes its own block and the next one hugs it, so a stanza keeps its lines without the spacer paragraph that separates unrelated blocks. Ordinary prose is untouched -- a model's wrapped paragraph still joins with a space. The producers mark their report lines with it. Two report fixes alongside: - A park reason is capped to its first line at 160 runes. It carries whatever the failing stage reported, which for a lint gate is the whole tool log; unbounded, one parked task pushed every other task out of the reply. The full reason is still on the task. - /status loses its "Runtime" sub-header. A section header over two fields made a four-fact report read like a document. * fix(config): let diff_cap_lines = 0 actually switch the cap off Config.DiffCapLines was a plain int, so the defaults pass could not tell an absent key from an explicit 0 and rewrote both to 400. The dashboard schema said "0 means unlimited" and StageDiffCap treated <= 0 as unlimited, but 0 never reached the step: the documented way to switch the cap off was unreachable through config. Same root cause, worse instance: configForIdentity assigned root.DiffCapLines = identity.DiffCapLines unconditionally, so an identity that simply omitted the key overwrote the shared cap with the zero value and silently disabled the safety rail for that identity. DiffCapLines is now *int on both Config and IdentityConfig -- nil is absent, 0 is no cap -- read through Config.DiffCap(). Defaults fill only nil, and an identity overrides only when it set the key. TaskConfig keeps a resolved int, so the daemon/agent wire format is unchanged and a version-skewed agent cannot misread a null. The park reason changes too. It told the operator to "approve manually", but a parked task's actions are retry, abandon and reject (internal/taskstate): there is no approve path out of diff-cap, so it sent them looking for a button that does not exist. It now names the two things that work. * feat(config): make the daemon's readiness dependency timeout configurable The daemon's gateway probe bounded its call with a hardcoded 5s constant, while every other NewContractProbe call site (archie-ui, archie-messaging) passes the service's configured DependencyTimeout. It was the only magic number among them. [health].dependency_timeout carries it, defaulting to the same 5s the extracted services' -dependency-timeout flag defaults to, so every process bounds a probe into a dependency the same way out of the box. It is not added to the dashboard config schema or the reloadable set: [health] appears in neither today, health.listen included, and a probe assembled at boot would not observe a reload anyway. |
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4c4848878f |
chore(memory): delete internal/memory (unification slice 5) (#889)
Deletes internal/memory (Manager, builtin.Provider, memory_edit tool) now
that slices 2-4 built the CRUD engine family and its per-turn read/write
seams. Also deletes internal/infrastructure/memory/builtin/provider.go (the
memory_edit adapter over the old package -- its markdown store already
relocated in slice 2), internal/tools/provider/memory (the old tool
registration, redundant with slice 4's memory_create/update/delete/list),
config.Memory.{Provider,ProviderConfig} and the validateMemory rejection
that existed only to complain about Provider, and webui.MemoryStatus/
MemoryProviderHandle plus its dashboard page -- never wired in production
(s.Memory was always nil), confirmed by /api/capabilities always reporting
"memory": false.
Rewrites ARCHITECTURE.md's "Memory engine family" section to describe the
current engine (internal/domain/memory contract, internal/infrastructure/
memory builtin engine + its builtin/ markdown store, the per-turn read seam
in gateway/turn_memory.go, the per-turn write tools in
gateway/turn_memory_tool.go) instead of the deleted Manager. Fixes two
docs/architecture/configuration.md rows that described the deleted
manager's literals and SaveConfig mechanism.
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c4349deaac |
fix(config): clone the Services map so an overlay cannot mutate the published snapshot
Config.Clone deep-copies every reference-type field except Services, which became a
map[string]ServiceConnection. A value copy shares the map header, and yaml.Unmarshal
writes keys into whatever map it is handed -- so Loader.ApplyOverlay, which clones
precisely so it cannot corrupt the base document, rewrote the published snapshot in
place:
ApplyOverlay(doc, {"services": {"state": {"target": "10.0.0.5:9090"}}})
left doc.Config.Services["state"].Target changed
That defeats the reason Clone exists: a failed or partial overlay must not alter the
configuration still being served.
Red: TestConfigCloneDeepCopiesReferenceFields failed with "Services map is shared"
after the case was added; green with the one-line clone.
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42bfd35514 |
fix(config): enforce the service context at registration
ServiceSpec.Context documented which addresses a service must end up with, but nothing read it, so a typo'd context was accepted and meant nothing. Review caught it as scaffolding that looked load-bearing. RegisterService now validates it: an unknown context, or a hosted (server/both) service registered with no default listen address, panics. Registrations come from this repository's own init(), never from operator input, so an invalid one is a programming error with no caller positioned to handle an error return, and failing at process start beats a service binding where nobody dials. Services.RequireTarget replaces the same check and message hand-written in composeStateStoreClient and composeChatContract. An empty registered default target is what declares a target operator-supplied, so the requirement belongs to the registry rather than to each consumer. It stays a lazy check at composition time rather than becoming load-time validation: a process that never dials a service must still load a configuration that omits it. The review's stated failure mode does not occur. A hosted service with an empty listen does not reach net.Listen as an ephemeral port; resolveServiceListen returns "no listen address" and archied refuses to start. The defect was the inert field, not a silent bind. Refs: archie-core-u23g |
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5aedc28aae |
feat(config): key services by name through a registry
Services was a struct with one field per service, so each service's name was stated three times: the field, the loader's defaulting branch, and every consumer's field access. Adding one meant editing all three, and nothing stopped them disagreeing. The drift was already there: stateStoreResolvedToken and gatewayResolvedToken were identical apart from the env var each hard-coded. Services becomes map[string]ServiceConnection, and RegisterService declares a service once with the five fields it has. Everything that differs between services is now an argument rather than a branch elsewhere: an empty registered target means the operator must supply one, which is how services.state.target stays required while the gateway's is defaulted, and the registered token env var replaces the two copied resolvers with Services.ResolvedToken. Defaulting iterates the registry, so a new service needs no loader edit. Consumers read Services.Get(name). Keeping a typo'd section reported took explicit work. [services.gatway] used to land in toml.MetaData.Undecoded() because the struct had no such field; a map decodes any section, so it would have loaded silently and left the daemon dialing the default. unregisteredServiceKeys asks the registry which names are real, and the test for it fails with an empty UnknownKeys when that check is removed. The TOML shape is unchanged, so no deployment profile, config.example.toml or install.sh edit is needed. Refs: archie-core-u23g |
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095284678a |
feat(config): let the State Store and Gateway listen addresses be configured
Both gRPC listeners took their bind address from a -listen flag default alone, with no config key. The port a service binds and the port its clients dial were therefore two separate facts -- the flag default, and [services.<name>].target -- with nothing keeping them in step. On a host that already owned the default the effect read as a code fault rather than a port collision: the store died with "bind: address already in use" while every client reported "state store: connection error ... error reading server preface: EOF". Cockpit binds 9090 by default, so this is not hypothetical. Verifying the dashboard on such a host needed a hand-written overlay plus a matching -listen, two things to keep in step by hand. - [services.state].listen and [services.gateway].listen now name the bind address. Precedence is -listen, then config, then a default applied by the loader. An empty result is a startup ERROR, never a fallback: net.Listen reads "" as "any free port", so defaulting there would bind the service somewhere no client looks and still report success. - Both flag defaults become "" so configuration can win, mirroring how archie-ui already prefers [web].listen over its flag. - Gateway listen defaults to the same constant as the gateway target, so a default deployment's client and server cannot drift onto different ports. [services.state].target still has no default: an empty target stays a startup error in the daemon and gateway, which no longer serve a local store. - ServiceConnection gains the field. Its doc now says clients read only Target and TargetToken, and Listen belongs to the process that owns the service -- the previous wording claimed the struct starts no listeners while carrying one. - deployments/dev.toml states each port once, beside the target it must match, so `task dev` is retargetable on a host that owns 9090 by editing one overlay. Tests. Unit: config defaults, explicit values, and precedence. Process: the existing real-process smoke test now takes its listen from configuration instead of -listen, so the end-to-end wiring is proven by the test that already starts the binary, with no extra process. Both were verified load-bearing by mutation -- inverting the precedence fails the unit test, and making the app layer ignore config fails the process test with "state: no listen address". Verified: task check exit 0. Also documented in config.example.toml, the configuration architecture table, and the `task dev` summary. |
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aa62d1aca5 |
refactor(config): delete the two decoded-but-unread policy fields
MemoryConfig.SessionTTL and ToolPolicy.ParallelExecution were decoded by config loading and read nowhere, so setting either silently did nothing. Removing them routes both keys into the unknown-key detector, which names them in a boot warning instead. A live-looking knob wired to nothing is the worse state, and the sibling memory.provider already earned a loud load-time rejection for exactly this. Also drops the config.example.toml line that shipped session_ttl into every first-run config.toml via configtemplate.go, and the commented-out dir_test.go assertions that would have re-created both fields under that file's "make these pass without modifying them" header. |
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49da68fb25 | Merge branch 'crew/cluster1' into crew-integration | ||
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6951125415 |
feat(channels): wire chat.webhook route config through to the gateway
internal/channels/webhook's RouteConfig implements and tests HMAC
signature validation, payload template extraction, and reply delivery,
but setupWebhookGateway built []webhook.RouteConfig{{Path: "/webhook"}}
literally -- no config field could reach Secret/Template/DeliverTo, so
the gateway accepted any unsigned POST despite its package doc claiming
signature validation.
Adds config.ChatConfig.Webhook (WebhookRoute: path, secret as the
existing SecretRef pattern, template, deliver_to) and webhookRoutes(),
the pure translation into []webhook.RouteConfig that
setupWebhookGateway now calls. A secret ref that fails to resolve logs
and falls back to no validation rather than refusing to start, since
signature validation stays opt-in (an empty secret is documented,
valid config) unlike the mandatory forge webhook secret.
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d7b809e61b |
fix(agentworker): wire configured tool-result policy into worker's LoopRunner
TaskConfig now carries the daemon's ToolPolicy (MaxResultChars/SpillDir) via ForTask/ToConfig, and runTask applies it to the constructed LoopRunner. Previously the worker always built the agent loop with a zero-value ToolLimits, so tool results in every task's agent stage were never capped or spilled despite the configured 50k default (agentexec-1, tools-core-11). |
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ce4f43dd8d |
fix(config): deep-copy Image.Hosted/Image.Local in Config.Clone
Clone's own doc comment promises mutating the clone cannot touch memory shared with the original, but Image.Hosted/Image.Local were left as a shallow map copy -- a runtime overlay or dashboard PATCH decoding into the clone could mutate the published config's image provider maps. |
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db18d2675a |
feat(ratelimit): wire per-identity inbound rate limiting into the gateway
internal/ratelimit was fully built (sliding-window limiter, ticker-driven eviction) but had no consumer, leaving multi-identity deployments with no inbound request budget on any channel (archie-core-6wxb / GH #797). Adds Message.SenderID (Telegram numeric user ID, SMTP from address, or webhook route path -- the closest thing webhook has to a caller identity), threads it into Router.Route/RouteStream via a shared checkRateLimit, and wires an opt-in [chat.rate_limit] config section through bootstrap with the documented EvictStale ticker. |
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73aa86181e |
fix(webui): count every chat front-end in the published projection
GitHub #821 reported two dashboard behaviours degrading in the extracted UI
process because webui.Server.Cfg is nil there. Half of it was already closed:
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a00c578cb7 |
refactor(ui): sever the archie-ui binary from every daemon runtime package
Completes the objective deletion gate for the UI Service (archie-core-8cda.5.6): go list -deps ./cmd/archie-ui now links zero banned packages -- no modernc.org/sqlite, no internal/store, gateway, channels, memory, secret, agentexec, tools, skill, yaegiutil, curator, or the workflow engine. The closure shrinks from 68 to 26 archie-core packages. Each cut is a producer-side move; no consumer-side defensive shims. - Store contracts (TaskStore family, value types, sentinels) moved from internal/store to internal/domain/storecontract -- the approved contract location per state-store-contract rev. 2d, and NOT internal/contracts: that tree is buf generate output and tools/proto.sh check deletes hand-written files there. internal/store keeps aliases; sentinel message strings are byte-identical and remain the wire contract. - Chat contracts (ChatContract, sessions, turns, streaming, commands) moved from internal/gateway to internal/domain/messaging; gateway keeps aliases. ToolCallEvent rendering helpers become gateway functions (methods cannot live on alias types). - Task vocabulary (Task, statuses, mid-run Store, Definition) split into internal/domain/workflow/task; the pipeline engine stays in package workflow with aliases, so daemon-side callers are unchanged. - overlay.DeniedKeys moved to internal/infrastructure/configuration: webui referenced the constant and that dragged the overlay SQLite store in. - webui.Server's concrete runtime handles become webui-owned view interfaces with daemon-side bootstrap adapters: channel lifecycle (internal/channels/status), MemoryStatus, CuratorStatus, and a SkillCatalog seam replacing the direct skill.DefaultRoots/CatalogRoots calls. Each degrades to an empty page when unwired. - config.SecretRef moved into internal/config (config vocabulary); internal/secret keeps an alias and Registry.Resolve absorbs the zero-value short-circuit. Docs: state-store-contract rev. 2d relocation record; ui-service-boundary deletion gate marked satisfied; ARCHITECTURE.md package map rows. |
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6048c8ba91 |
feat(archied): serve the daemon's own health endpoint
The update watchdog verifies archied's restart, so archied has to be what answers. It was probing the dashboard's /healthz, which belongs to the dashboard: switch [web] off and nothing answers, and in the extracted UI topology that endpoint reports a different process entirely, which would confirm a release while the daemon it was meant to verify is down. [health].listen (127.0.0.1:8485, defaulted, always on) serves /healthz, /health and /health/detailed for the life of the process. Liveness answers 503 until the daemon reaches its run loop: the listener binds before the subsystems do, so an unconditional 200 would tell the watchdog a half-booted release came up. Failing to bind is fatal, because a daemon nothing can probe gets every update rolled back. The State Store's readiness surface now shares the listener plumbing, keeping its log and error text verbatim. Closes archie-core-exbz, which asked which of two bad options to take when the dashboard is off. Neither: the daemon owns its own liveness. Also deletes TestInstallUpdateDetachesInstallerFromCallbackContext. It has failed intermittently under load more than once, racing its fake bot server's multipart parse against the cancellation it induces. |
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69a71d032f |
fix(archieui): resolve service tokens from env and correct the stale State Store config comment
D1: the UI read [services.*].target_token verbatim, but the config loader does not expand environment variables. A deployment that presents the gateway and state tokens by env (as config.example.toml documents for remote consumers) would leave archie-ui with an empty token, and staterpc.Dial then refuses a non-loopback start. Mirror the daemon's stateStoreResolvedToken / gatewayResolvedToken: explicit key, then GATEWAY_TOKEN / STATE_STORE_TOKEN. D5: internal/config/services.go claimed the State Store service 'is not yet extracted into its own process' and that target_token 'remains dead configuration', both false since the daemon made an empty services.state.target a hard startup error. State current truth. D3: document that Web.Listen = 'off' is read with opposite meanings by the dsaemon (disables the dashboard) and the UI process (falls through to the default listener), pinning it as the one overloaded key an operator preparing the split would set. |
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a59505816a | feat(state-store): stand up archie-state-store binary and own archie.db (archie-core-8cda.4.3) (#771) | ||
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576e22b554 |
feat(state-store): generalize storerpc as the State Store gRPC contract (archie-core-8cda.4.2) (#770)
* feat(state-store): generalize storerpc as the State Store gRPC contract Implements archie-core-8cda.4.2 against docs/prds/state-store-contract.md rev. 2c: generate protobuf/gRPC client and server adapters for every ratified store contract (proto/state/v1/state.proto, 40 RPCs, one StateStoreService), add internal/infrastructure/staterpc with a bufconn conformance suite exercising both local and remote adapters, serve the service in-process (bridge address + mandatory per-task bearer token when agent containers exist, loopback-only otherwise), and flip archie-agent's workflow.Store to a long-lived gRPC client when the daemon injects STATE_STORE_URL/STATE_STORE_TOKEN (falling back to the legacy NATS storerpc path otherwise -- one agent process is never both). Also drops the *sql.Tx parameter from store.BindingDispatcher.RecordDispatch (a required wire-blocker fix: a transaction cannot cross a gRPC boundary, and production always passed nil). fix(store): drop RecordDispatch's unusable *sql.Tx parameter feat(config): add services.state contract-adapter selector * fix(state-store): apply no-mistakes review decisions - Drop StreamTokenInterceptor (unused; the State Store service has no streaming RPCs and nothing calls it). - Make StateStoreTokens.Validate compare tokens in constant time (crypto/subtle) per the auto-fix hardening.ing finding. - Amend config.example.toml / config.Services.State doc text so it frames [services.state].target as the ratified surface consumed by the upcoming standalone archie-state-store binary (.4.3), not active today. |
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14e5b542bf |
fix(gateway): drop services.gateway.mode, remote is the only transport
Mode had exactly one legal value after the previous commit deleted the in-process path, which made it dead config surface that could only confuse an operator into thinking there was still a real choice. ServiceConnection is now just a target address; composeChatContract only checks it's non-blank, defaulting to 127.0.0.1:8585. |
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c0a91c011c | feat(contracts): add gateway service seams and protobuf toolchain | ||
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c75ed44721 | feat(telegram): support secret refs for bot tokens (#705) | ||
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c6be68816e |
feat(eda): playbook document + event coordinator, single-action workflow-kind dispatch
Seventh slice of docs/prds/eda-playbook-engine.md (t2db.15), consuming
t2db.14's expr package: the rich trigger+actions playbook document and
the coordinator that dispatches it.
- internal/domain/eda/playbook: Load(dir) reads *.yaml/*.yml playbook
documents (trigger + exactly one workflow-kind action + optional CEL
when), validating the HARD BOUNDARY at load: a playbook with 2+ actions
or a non-workflow action position is a reported load failure --
multi-action and Module/Channel/Forge actions stay blocked on the
unresolved execution-time gaps. Any malformed YAML, invalid trigger,
missing workflow name, or when compile failure fails the WHOLE load
(reject-at-load, same shape as routing collisions); a missing dir is an
empty store. Trigger reuses the existing workintake kind/label
vocabulary (no second label-matching mechanism). Dispatch matches
trigger, evaluates when (CEL, event context with actions: {} -- no
prior actions in single-action playbooks), and returns the named
workflow from the registry via the same lookup Route() uses -- no
duplicated dispatch logic. when eval error follows the resolved doc's
J3: false, skip, caller logs.
- Store.Dispatch(reg, DispatchInput) is the coordinator entrypoint; input
carries Labels/Kind/Event. Production task intake wiring
(daemon.go/pollNATS/publishTask) is explicitly NOT in this ticket -- a
follow-up; proven end to end via direct tests plus the shipped example
(examples/eda-playbooks/bug-tdd.yaml) loaded and dispatched through the
real path.
- Config: EDAPlaybookDir (eda_playbook_dir), documented as DISTINCT from
PlaybookDirs (flat binding files) -- a reader cannot confuse the two.
- Bootstrap: playbook.Load wired in loadWorkflows, log-and-abort on
failure matching every prior slice; nonexistent dir is an empty store.
- workflow.Route(), workflowForLabels, and the t2db.9-.12 binding loaders
are UNTOUCHED (verified: their full test suites pass, zero regressions).
Also carries small lint cleanups on t2db.13/.14 code flagged by the gate
run: expr Eval no longer type-asserts to ref.Val (Eval returns ref.Val
directly in v0.32.0; cel-go's own Eval wraps evaluation in recover --
verified in source); module decodeLogArgs extracted to clear the nestif
finding. golangci-lint: 0 issues.
Tests (10): single-action round trip, when-false skip, 2-action load
failure, non-workflow position load failure, when compile failure drops
playbook, empty trigger load failure, trigger mismatch skip, no-when
match, one-invalid-file fails whole load, missing dir empty store, plus
the shipped example load+dispatch. task check clean (113/113 UI, exit 0).
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7ef7d696f3 |
feat(eda): Module position first slice -- registry + side-effect-free log kind
Fifth slice of docs/prds/eda-playbook-engine.md (t2db.13), implementing docs/prds/module-position.md's recommended first slice: prove schema -> go:generate -> Yaegi load -> ModuleRegistry end to end with a side-effect-free action kind, before any kind with a real external effect (notify, image-gen, forge writes) -- those stay blocked on the parent doc's unresolved execution-time gaps (idempotency, mid-run failure). - internal/domain/eda/module/log: hand-written schema source (Args/Result/ SchemaVersion per module-position.md) + logextract generated symbol table via go:generate yaegi extract (same tooling as wfextract/ gateextract; scoped to ./internal/domain/eda/module/...). - internal/domain/eda/module: ModuleRegistry with Register(kind, dir) / Invoke(ctx, kind, rawArgs). No generic Module interface with an any payload: each kind is its own tiny package with its own generated contract; the registry's internal storage is the only place erasure appears (exactly as inside wfextract). Invoke decodes rawArgs strictly into the kind's Args before calling the interpreted function -- an unknown key or wrong type is a reported failure, not a silent zero-value fill (the 'schema defines the accepted message' rule). Generalizes gateeval's fixed-signature Yaegi pattern via yaegiutil.New/Resolve/Safe -- no new interpreter-construction or panic-recovery mechanism. - Config: ModuleDir mirroring PluginDir's shape and doc comment (operator-trusted directory of Yaegi module implementations, one .go per kind; empty means none loaded). Wired at daemon startup in bootstrap.go alongside PlaybookDirs loading -- log-and-abort on load failure (a broken module is a startup failure, not degrade-and-skip). - examples/modules/log.go: operator-facing example (//go:build ignore, mirroring examples/secret-engines/) proving the shipped contract. Tests: registry (register/invoke, unknown kind, missing file, strict arg-decode shape failures, malformed file, panic recovery), logextract smoke test, and an example-load test that runs the shipped examples/modules/log.go through the real registry (not a test fixture). task check clean (113/113 UI, exit 0). Playbook YAML action dispatch is deliberately out of this slice: a minimal 'run this one module action, no chaining' dispatch still requires naming how args values reach the action (parent doc open question 1 -- data-flow/interpolation syntax) and what the result feeds, both unresolved by design. Dispatch is a follow-up ticket that consumes this registry as-is; recorded in module-position.md. |
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dc951d5601 |
feat(workflow): load kind/label bindings from multiple playbook directories
Third slice of docs/prds/eda-playbook-engine.md (t2db.11), completing open question 2: instead of a single playbook dir, the config gains a LIST of directories (playbook_dirs) of *.yaml/*.yml binding files, loaded at startup as an additional input to workflow_routing_file and workflow_labels_file, which remain supported unchanged. - LoadPlaybookDirs(dirs []string) reads every yaml file across the configured directories and merges kind + arbitrary-label bindings. - This is what finally exercises the design doc's drop-and-report collision rule: a single file cannot collide with itself, so the cross-source path (two files in one dir, two dirs, or a dir plus a single-file field) had never run in production. A binding key declared by more than one source is a reported load failure, not a silent pick-one by source order or version. - Router-level collision handling: MergeKindWorkflows/MergeLabelWorkflows fail on a key bound by both the single-file fields and the playbook dirs, applied at boot. - Config: PlaybookDirs []string, empty by default (no behavior change for existing configs). Repo-scoping (typing dirs to Config.Repos owner/name) is explicitly deferred to a separate later decision per ticket; org/tenant keying is out of scope. - PRD: records the list shape per Sam's correction (single dir would contradict multiple independently-maintained playbook sources). |
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06f4bbe3b3 |
feat(workflow): route arbitrary forge labels to workflows via playbook YAML
Second slice of docs/prds/eda-playbook-engine.md, complementing the kind->workflow layer (WorkflowRoutingFile): the label vocabulary itself becomes playbook data. A label outside the closed bug/feature/bootstrap kind set (e.g. security) now dispatches to a registered workflow from an optional WorkflowLabelsFile, instead of falling through to triage. - LabelWorkflows + LoadLabelWorkflowsYAML/SetLabelWorkflows in internal/domain/workflow/routing.go, mirroring the kind layer's once-at-startup lifecycle. The closed Kind/NATS-subject set is untouched; the map only extends binding authority for labels the kind layer does not own. - Collision rule per design doc: a label owned by the kind set, an empty label, an empty workflow name, or a duplicate binding is a reported load failure (dropped, logged, error returned to the caller) -- the schema defines what is accepted; nothing is silently arbitrated by schema/version. - Route() precedence: explicit t.Workflow -> arbitrary-label binding -> kind binding -> triage -> implement -> default. - Config: WorkflowLabelsFile (workflow_labels_file), wired at boot alongside WorkflowRoutingFile; documented in config.example.toml. - PRD: records this slice's decisions (single-file shape, collision rule, precedence) so later slices stay anchored. |
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97a5c0d2ca |
feat(workflow): make kind-to-workflow routing YAML-overridable
First slice of docs/prds/eda-playbook-engine.md: which registered workflow an intake Kind (bug/feature/bootstrap) prefers is now data, loaded from an optional WorkflowRoutingFile, instead of a Go literal. labelKinds and the NATS-subject-per-kind set are unchanged -- expanding the label vocabulary itself is a separate, larger decision (subject allocation) deferred per the design doc's open questions. An unrecognised kind in the file is a reported load failure (schema defines what's accepted, per the design doc's collision-handling rule), not a silently-dropped binding. No file configured falls back to today's hardcoded defaults unchanged. |
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087f161836 |
feat(store): encrypt playbook binding secrets at rest
binding.Binding.Secret was persisted as plaintext in the bindings.secret column, so anyone with the SQLite file saw sender-side HMAC secrets. Seal it with AES-256-GCM transparently inside the store: encrypt-on-write, decrypt-on-read. - cipher: AES-256-GCM, 12-byte random nonce, SHA-256-normalised 32-byte key resolved through the secret registry ([bindings].encryption_key). - envelope 'arcie-binding:v1:<fingerprint>:<b64(nonce||ct||tag)>' so a future cipher/KDF change is a version bump and old rows stay readable. - rotation via previous_encryption_keys; key identity is the material's SHA-256 fingerprint embedded in each row. - legacy plaintext rows written before a key was configured stay readable; encryption is not retroactive. - nil cipher (no key configured) preserves the pre-t2db.7 plaintext path. Deferred: captured_events.body redaction upgrade (separate concern, see docs/prds/binding-secret-encryption.md). Refs archie-core-t2db.7 |
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75158b7fc7 |
feat(image): define provider-neutral image capability contract and config
Adds internal/domain/image (Provider/Registry per the plugin engine family shape, but no Lifecycle -- a provider is call-scoped, not long-running) and config.ImageConfig with the same explicit enabled=true cost gate MinimaxConfig already uses, since a hosted provider spends real API credits and a local one can saturate the host GPU. Design doc at docs/prds/image-capability-contract.md per CLAUDE.md's rule for undesigned capabilities. No provider implementation lands here -- that's the epic's next child bead. Also re-links all 7 epic children that were unlinked from archie-core-1786748942120-1-6636e629 (same orphaning pattern found in the curator/memory epics earlier this session). |
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be03844df8 |
feat(config): config surface for memory engine selection
Part of archie-core-1786637490043 (config surface for memory engine selection and settings). config.MemoryConfig gets an Engine field selecting among the domain/memory engine family, plus toml tags on every field -- Provider, ProviderConfig, and SessionTTL had none before, yaml/json only, which didn't match repo convention. Engine and Provider are kept as two separate fields rather than one: they select between two different mechanisms (the new engine family vs. the legacy external-provider path, archie-core-1786637499161-356-e424e40d.1), and conflating them would mean a value meant for one silently getting read by the other once both are wired. applyMemoryDefaults resolves an absent engine to "builtin" so unconfigured and explicitly-builtin are the same state everywhere after defaulting. validateMemory rejects an unrecognised engine name in the same style as forge.type's existing validation -- named constant list, "%w: field %q (want %s)" shape, wired into the same validate() chain. config.example.toml documents the new field. Not yet wired to anything: nothing reads cfg.Memory.Engine at daemon boot yet to actually select and start an engine through domain/memory.Registry. That's bootstrap wiring, tracked as the remaining half of archie-core-1786637499480 (ship the builtin store as the default engine). |
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c3e9e4c43e |
feat(workflow): adversarial self-review stage before PR open
Implements archie-core-h019.3 (reviewer isolation) and h019.4 (wiring),
per docs/prds/adversarial-self-review.md.
- internal/domain/workflow: new Reviewer interface and StageReview,
inserted between StageDiffCap and StageOpenPR in the implement
workflow. Fail-closed: a review that didn't run, or a confirmed
error-level finding, parks the task (store.StatusParked) with
findings in Detail; warn/plausible findings never block. Inert
unless Repo.ReviewEnabled.
- internal/worktree: Manager.Snapshot exports HEAD's tracked files into
a fresh directory with no .git, for the reviewer's isolated
workspace. Trees interface gains Snapshot; hybridTrees delegates to
it.
- internal/app/agentworker: subagentReviewer implements Reviewer using
ai-sdk's agent.Subagent (nested, in-process, non-streaming
generation) -- conversation isolation is structural (Subagent.Run
never carries message history), workspace isolation is the snapshot
above. The reviewer's toolset is read-only (read/grep/find) rooted
at the snapshot, never the worker's own toolset, so it cannot reach
the worktreerpc publication grant. Findings are captured via a typed
record_finding tool appending to a slice the stage owns, read even
when Subagent.Run errors (a truncated run's captured findings
survive).
- internal/config: Repo.ReviewEnabled (default false) and
Models["reviewer"] (falls back to Models["builder"], no schema
change).
Judgment calls: Reviewer.Review never returns a Go error -- every
failure folds into ReviewReport per the PRD's fail-closed contract,
which the stage can act on uniformly. A Subagent.Run error with zero
captured findings resolves to ReviewStatusNotRun (park); a
Subagent.Run error with >=1 captured findings resolves to
ReviewStatusCompleted with those findings, since the PRD's own example
("three defects survive a step-limit truncation") requires them to
still be evaluated for blocking rather than discarded.
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a825db283c |
fix: harden task and chat execution
Task runs now preserve real model context limits, provider usage, baseline-repair spend, commit identity, durable agent-finish telemetry, and useful timeline details without imposing a token cap. Dashboard forge links are canonical per owning GitHub or Gitea identity. Chat turn claims acquire SQLite writer intent before reading, eliminating the concurrent SQLITE_BUSY snapshot race. |
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37cfe87508 |
fix(webui): validate mutation Origin against the effective external scheme
Origin validation compared the request's Origin against the daemon's own direct connection: scheme from r.TLS, host from r.Host. Behind a TLS- terminating reverse proxy the browser sends Origin: https://host while the daemon sees a plain HTTP connection, so every dashboard mutation was refused as cross-origin. Taking X-Forwarded-Proto/-Host unconditionally would be worse than the bug: any client can set them, so an exposed daemon would let an attacker forge the scheme half of the CSRF check. They are honoured only when web.trust_forwarded_headers is explicitly enabled, which is off by default and documented as safe only behind a proxy that overwrites or strips untrusted forwarded headers. authorizeTaskMutation becomes a method because the decision now depends on server configuration; its three call sites move with it. |
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972fb5b8e1 |
feat(deployment): default to managed NATS workers
Autonomous workflows now always hand a complete task to a scoped archie-agent container. Embedded NATS is the default and external NATS changes only broker placement; legacy agent and containers.enabled inputs decode for migration but cannot select an execution path. The daemon flushes task-event subscriptions before a worker can publish, and runtime updates snapshot and restore the configured worker image. |
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5d00ec7b0c |
refactor(agentexec): remove legacy execution paths
Autonomous workflows now have exactly one production boundary: a task-scoped archie-agent receives a full-task core-NATS request and runs the worker-local stage loop. The legacy [agent] section remains decode-only for migration; it no longer selects runtime behavior. |
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1b7bc004b6 | feat(nats): expose embedded broker to managed workers | ||
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691e10c251 |
fix(telegram): compact tool output and drop turn caps
Render completed ToolCallEvents as Telegram-safe streaming blocks with compact name/status and a short cleaned preview. Summarize file contents and listings instead of dumping source or quoted JSON. Collapse repeated legacy turn-budget failures. Remove max_tokens turn gating and the 200000 turn_budget_chars default so absent or commented config cannot restore an aggregate cap. Keep per-result max_result_chars and spill. Confine find/grep discovery to the active workspace/worktree. Refs #604 |
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eb55d8b900 |
feat(archied): wire generate_video end to end, gate it behind config
drainChatStream now detects a tools.MultimodalResult in a tool result's Output and reports each URL via turn.Media(...), alongside the existing turn.ToolCall(...) narration -- the missing link between a tool producing media and a channel delivering it. MinimaxConfig registers the tool only once an API key actually resolves (registerMinimaxTool), matching web_fetch's "never advertise a broken capability" pattern. Off by default, unlike web_fetch: this spends real API credits per call. |
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508a0ad48c |
feat(forge): GitHub webhook receiver for immediate issue dispatch
Add [forge] intake = "poll" (default) | "webhook" | "both", and a forge
webhook receiver (internal/forge/webhook) that verifies a GitHub webhook's
HMAC signature, decodes the "issues" event, and publishes a matched issue
through the same path the poller uses -- so a labelled or assigned issue
starts a task the moment it happens instead of waiting up to poll_interval
(bead archie-core-7d5u.4).
The dispatch predicate (workintake.MatchesDispatch/RequiresLabel) is now a
single shared definition consumed by both the poller and the webhook
receiver, so the two cannot drift -- including the empty-label guard from
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c7987f0595 |
feat(nats): run an embedded server when no external NATS is configured
Wire github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 into production startup so a single-process deployment gets reaction delivery and task distribution over an in-process server rather than a separate one (docs/prds/embedded-nats.md). Meaning change: [nats].url empty used to mean "no NATS, use the SQLite ClaimNext flow"; it now means "start an embedded NATS server". The old behaviour is the explicit opt-out [nats].mode = "off". mode resolves from url when unset (url set -> external, url empty -> embedded), and agent.mode="nats" / [containers] now require mode="external" (an embedded loopback server cannot be reached by agent workers or containers). The daemon owns the embedded server's lifecycle: StartEmbedded before dialing the client, Shutdown after the client closes (LIFO cleanups). The embedded server binds loopback on a random port, enables JetStream in a store dir under the data directory, and leaves its logger nil so a startup failure surfaces as a Connect error rather than an os.Exit. Retention becomes a nats.Config field (default WorkQueuePolicy) so a future reaction stream can fan out under LimitsPolicy instead of the hardcoded competing-consumer policy that starves a second consumer on overlapping subjects. |
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37bf8ef05a |
feat(capture): store unbound webhook events, retention-bounded
Adds POST /webhooks/capture/{source}: an unauthenticated endpoint (mounted
alongside /healthz, bypassing dashboard token auth by design) that persists
any inbound webhook archie has no binding for yet, so it can be inspected
and mapped later (t2db.2/t2db.3).
docs/prds/event-capture-storage.md decides SQLite over NATS JetStream for
storage: NATS is not unconditionally available until 7d5u.2 ships embedded
support, and capture's single-writer/single-reader access pattern doesn't
need JetStream's fan-out/replay machinery anyway.
internal/store/captures.go adds a captured_events table with prune-on-write
(retention age + row-count cap, both configurable). The HTTP handler applies
webhookguard redaction before persisting, and enforces two more independent
disk-bound mechanics before that: a per-request body-size cap and a
per-remote-address rate limit. New [capture] config section with documented
defaults; all fields optional, capture is on by default.
Adversarial review (manual, after the usual fresh-subagent pass hit a
session API limit mid-run) caught and fixed three real defects before this
landed, each with a regression test confirmed to fail against the pre-fix
code:
- the body-size cap silently no-op'd when CaptureMaxBodyBytes was left
unset, the one bound that limits a single payload's size rather than row
count or write rate
- the rate limiter was keyed by the request's own source path segment --
unregistered and attacker-chosen by design for this endpoint, violating
webhookguard.RateLimiter's documented bounded-key-space assumption and
letting a sender bypass the limit by rotating the segment; rekeyed to
remote address
- the retention prune compared time.RFC3339Nano strings, whose trimmed
variable-width fractional seconds break lexicographic ordering within the
same second; switched to fixed-width RFC3339
Closes archie-core-t2db.1.
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