Commit Graph
12 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
sam fc5d24c9f7 feat(egress): intercept OAuth token endpoints and inject stored access tokens
The egress proxy now holds a Kit's OAuth tokens on the host. A refresh
carrying the sentinel refresh token goes upstream with the org's stored
one; a successful response is written to the State Store and returned to
the container with sentinels only. Requests to the Kit's resource hosts
carrying the sentinel access token get the stored one.

The org's token set is read or written only for a run whose credential
carries the service, so a Kit declaring a service never reaches the org
secret by itself. The launcher grants a bound OAuth service without a
config secret, and Register refuses a required OAuth credential when no
harness secret store is wired. A provider that does not rotate refresh
tokens keeps the stored one.

Part of archie-core-egkf.7 (#1208). Credential-file rendering and
per-binding concurrency remain.
2026-09-28 01:52:07 +10:00
sam 416df69b00 feat(egress): credential resolver backed by declared-and-granted run credentials
docs/prds/external-agent-harness.md (Credentials) and orgs-and-access.md:
egress.Resolver had no production implementation, and no run carried a
credential naming the org secrets its identity is granted, so a Kit's
required credential@1 was refused at the proxy and no harness run
authenticated (archie-core-egkf.11).

Two things, as scoped (this does not attempt #1026's full run-credential
consolidation replacing WorktreeGrantIssuer/StateStoreGrantIssuer -- that
PRD item is real, separate, and still open; this is deliberately narrower):

1. A run credential naming granted secrets: config.CredentialBinding maps a
   Kit credential@1 service to a secret; config.Config/IdentityConfig gain
   Org and GrantedCredentials (a per-identity allowlist of service names,
   reusing the existing per-identity config-override pattern DiffCapLines
   already uses, not a new Cedar/Authorizer integration -- KindSecret policy
   objects exist in internal/domain/access but assembling a full Principal
   is #1026's job, not a two-line addition here). config.ContainerConfig.
   BoundCredentials computes the declared (Kit) ∩ granted (identity) ∩
   org-matched intersection Sam's own rule requires: neither side widens
   the other, proven by a mutation-checked test flipping each of the three
   independently.

2. egress.GrantResolver: the production Resolver, holding only what a
   caller explicitly Grant-ed one run, replaced wholesale (not merged) on
   a repeated Grant, gone entirely on RevokeGrant. kitrun.Launcher.Launch
   computes the intersection per launch and resolves real values through
   the existing secret registry (SecretResolver), Grants it before the
   proxy session opens, and Release/error-path rollback (a new shared
   Launcher.release) always revokes it.

Course-corrected mid-implementation (flagged by Sam): credential bindings
first landed as a boot-time config.ContainerConfig.Credentials field
captured once into Launcher.Bindings -- exactly the "parses but is not a
resource" trap CLAUDE.md warns about, and inconsistent with agent-profiles
(#1207) making a Kit profile apply without a restart. Rebuilt as its own
live control-plane resource, CredentialBindingsKind ("credential-bindings"),
following the agent-profiles/container-runtime-policies split precisely:
config.ContainerConfig.Credentials is json:"-", [containers].credentials
is only its seed, and kitrun.Launcher now holds *config.Holder (not a
captured slice) and reads Containers.Credentials fresh on every Launch.
Org/GrantedCredentials were already read fresh per dispatch (d.configFor
inside runKitTask, never cached), so no equivalent fix was needed there.

Deliberately not built: identities and grants as their own State Store
resource (orgs-and-access.md's "Org owns ... identities and their grants").
Identities are entirely config.toml-defined today with no control-plane
resource at all; moving GrantedCredentials alone into one would put half
an identity in two places. That migration is identities' own scope, not
credential bindings'.
2026-09-27 06:14:22 +10:00
sam a8c8dfbd7d feat(daemon): run a Kit profile's task in its Kit container on the egress path 2026-09-26 10:14:33 +10:00
sam 08d5df9b11 feat(egress): relay forwards the proxy, NATS and the State Store
A Kit task's worker shares the sandbox network with its harness, so it
reaches NATS and the State Store through the relay like the harness
reaches the proxy. archie-agent relay takes repeated -forward
listen=target pairs, binds them all before serving so a port conflict
fails at start, and stops every forward when one fails. RelayArgs builds
the command from the fixed relay ports.
2026-09-26 03:10:11 +10:00
sam 19e110e68c style(egress): adopt go fix's promoted-field literal 2026-09-26 02:47:15 +10:00
sam f747ff87d0 feat(egress): inject Kit API-key credentials at the proxy
A session carries its run and its Kit's credential@1 requests. The proxy
applies apiKey inject rules only in the credential's phase and only to
hosts its rule names, after the network policy has admitted the request,
so a key never reaches a host its Kit did not declare. The real value
comes from a Resolver that returns only secrets the run credential
carries: a required credential that is unbound or unresolvable stops the
request before anything is sent, and an optional one passes only when it
is genuinely unbound. Named keys appear in the sandbox as a sentinel;
inject-only keys have no presence.
2026-09-26 02:46:40 +10:00
sam 71435c2bb6 style(egress): adopt go fix's WaitGroup.Go 2026-09-26 02:38:59 +10:00
sam 9b16c0fd64 feat(egress): sandbox networks that reach only the relay
Each sandbox gets an internal bridge on which the host holds no address,
so host services listening on every interface are unreachable; the relay
is attached under a fixed alias and is the one way out. ProxyEnv gives a
sandbox container its proxy URL and CA trust. The Docker integration test
proves allowed egress works and that the proxy listener, host services and
the internet are unreachable directly; it fails if the host-address
inhibition is removed.
2026-09-26 02:38:12 +10:00
sam 4fc06b5d7d feat(egress): relay forwarding a sandbox network to the egress proxy
archie-agent relay listens on the sandbox's isolated network and joins
every connection to one fixed target, the proxy. The relay holds no
secrets and can reach nothing else, so the host needs no address on a
sandbox network at all.
2026-09-26 02:33:41 +10:00
sam 78dd50d60b feat(egress): session-authenticated proxy terminating TLS under the Kit network policy
CONNECT tunnels and absolute-form http requests authenticate to a
per-container session, are checked against the session's phase policy,
and are forwarded with verified upstream TLS. A tunnel serves only its
admitted host: mismatched SNI and Host headers are refused. Upstream dials
refuse loopback, and refuse internal addresses unless the policy names the
exact IP, so an allowed name cannot resolve back into the host.
2026-09-26 02:31:00 +10:00
sam 77a479e99a feat(egress): persistent per-daemon CA issuing cached leaf certificates 2026-09-26 02:27:58 +10:00
sam 6bc7a85404 feat(egress): network-policy@1 matcher 2026-09-26 02:27:25 +10:00