Commit Graph
30 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
sam e4560c9f44 test(egress): a recording session performs no central tool call 2026-10-25 16:02:46 +11:00
sam 64ab228658 feat(egress): record a test run's deliveries instead of sending them
A test run used to suppress only forge and push writes, which named one
destination among many. Deliveries now have one seam: TaskContext.Deliveries
records each as "would ..." and performs none, and a recording egress
session does the same for a Kit run's HTTP writes and central tool calls,
answering them synthetically. Provider hosts stay live, since model traffic
is how a test run reads. Native containers have no proxy (archie-core-n8d3).
2026-10-25 16:01:06 +11:00
sam b4d8bb702e fix(egress): bind a task's model providers from their api_key_ref
A container task parked when a provider carried an api_key_env but no
credential binding named after it, even though the task's models never
reached that provider. Egress pre-bound every provider the instance
configures and ignored api_key_ref, so the credentials an operator stores in
provider-settings were never used.

A task's config now carries only the providers its model aliases resolve to,
each with the variable its credential is read from: the operator's
api_key_env, or a name derived from the provider when its credential is a
secret reference. modelEgress resolves that reference once for the session
and the proxy substitutes the session's key for the sentinel, so the
container still holds no key. A provider that only declares an env var keeps
resolving through its org credential binding.
2026-10-20 06:56:38 +11:00
sam 3a0c52dcb3 fix(egress): name the denied target when refusing a tunnel CONNECT (#1808) 2026-10-19 07:50:58 +00:00
sam 3f553bb6f2 feat(kit): central tools for harnesses through the egress proxy and gateway task-tool RPCs 2026-10-17 23:42:37 +11:00
sam d0f4842cae fix(staterpc): derive harness secret org from caller grants 2026-10-17 21:44:08 +11:00
sam 0cc8e5e676 refactor: delete wrappers superseded by live entry points
Remove controlplanerpc.NewClient (superseded by NewRPCClient), Loader.Overlay
(-config-overlay reaches Resolve directly), and setup.Run (RunParams is
the live entry point). Move ResolverFunc into a test file, since only
tests adapt functions to the egress Resolver.
2026-10-14 23:10:35 +11:00
sam 66a977763d fix(daemon): keep model provider keys out of agent containers via the egress proxy 2026-10-10 17:12:09 +11:00
sam be31522e6a fix(kit): migrate runtime to sandbox kit m8 2026-10-09 18:31:56 +11:00
sam be3efd4fc4 fix(egress): use context-aware dial and request in the token-endpoint test
net.Dial and httptest.NewRequest fail the noctx linter, so the gate was red
on the commit that added the test.
2026-10-09 12:27:45 +11:00
sam f5cf74df45 fix(egress): refuse a token endpoint the run is not granted
forward intercepted a declared OAuth credential's token endpoint only when
the run was granted the service. For an optional credential it fell
through to the reverse proxy, so the provider's real access and refresh
tokens reached the container un-sentinelized, contradicting the harness
contract's "the real credential never enters the container".

A matched token endpoint is now refused when the service is not granted
(403 for an optional credential; a required one keeps its existing 502).
The table test drives forward against a recording upstream and asserts
both the status and that the upstream was never contacted.
2026-10-09 11:42:39 +11:00
sam 209ef6f71e fix(extension): confine each extension's network to its accepted egress hosts 2026-10-05 23:30:52 +11:00
sam 23636d6120 feat(egress): the run credential is the proxy login; Kit secrets resolve per request from live grants 2026-10-04 19:35:26 +11:00
sam 20d5624840 refactor: cut remaining long comments down to what the code does 2026-10-03 22:06:57 +10:00
sam 96e5d7b84b refactor: strip doc and issue narration from code comments
Remove PRD/doc paths, bead IDs, phase notes and deleted-test references
from comments; drop test-only hooks left by the test deletion. Includes
in-progress archied bootstrap, gateway and query changes.
2026-10-03 21:47:46 +10:00
sam ff424b70ac refactor: testing from the beginning. a journey in 150k lines of tests to none 2026-10-03 21:16:25 +10:00
sam 2e1ab386fb fix(egress): take a run's credential kind from its binding, not the Kit
The sandbox kit spec lets one credential@1 declare apiKey and oauth
together, meaning "whichever the host has bound": the published
docker/claude-code-kit does exactly that for anthropic, and codex for
openai. archie decided the kind from the Kit's declaration instead
(egress.IsOAuthManaged), so a dual-declared service always came out
OAuth-bound however the org had bound it:

  - kitrun.resolveCredentials granted an API-key binding's service the
    empty string, so the proxy had no key to inject and every request to
    a domain the Kit named carried an empty credential. The reference
    Claude Code Kit could not authenticate with an API key at all.
  - an API-key-only service whose binding named no secret resolved to ""
    through the zero SecretRef, presenting an empty credential rather than
    staying unbound.
  - the proxy fired an apiKey inject rule for an OAuth-bound service,
    putting "Bearer " on the wire, and intercepted the token endpoint of
    an API-key-bound one, whose only outcomes were a 502 on the missing
    token set, a capture the org never bound, or -- for a required
    dual-declared credential -- a refused launch when no token store was
    configured.
  - the container's SBX_CRED_*_MODE said "apikey" for an OAuth-bound
    dual-declared service, and kitrun demanded a captured OAuth token for
    an API-key-bound one whose Kit renders a credential file.

One root cause, fixed once: the org's binding decides the kind. It is
now a first-class fact (egress.CredentialKind: apikey or oauth, absent
meaning unbound), computed from the binding in resolveCredentials and
carried to every consumer of it -- the resolver grant, the container's
credential state (mode variable and credential file), and the proxy
session, whose rule sets are built from it so a rule can only fire for a
service the run carries as that same kind. A service the run does not
carry at all keeps both rule sets, so resolving it still refuses a
required credential and skips an optional one.

Declared and bound stay two independent facts, as the reported
declared-and-granted intersection requires: neither widens the other.
No secret value crosses into kit (Bound carries kinds only) and none is
logged or written to a task row.
2026-10-02 09:37:20 +10:00
sam 9d4e18e091 feat(egress): capture the OAuth scope set and carry it to the harness secret
A Kit's credentialFile cannot render {{.Scopes}} because nothing records the
granted scopes: the token response's `scope` field (RFC 6749 section 5.1,
space-delimited) was never read, and the token set had nowhere to hold it.

capture now parses `scope` into []string and keeps the previous set when the
field is absent or empty -- the same rule the refresh token follows, so a
refresh that does not repeat the scopes preserves what the login captured.

The set is carried end to end: Scopes on harnesssecret.Secret, in
harnessSecretPayload (JSON inside the existing encrypted envelope, so no
migration), on message HarnessSecret as `repeated string scopes = 8`, and
both ways through staterpc values.go. The proto field is load-bearing: the
daemon reads the token set over gRPC, so a local-struct-only field is
silently lost in production -- TestHarnessSecretConformance proves the round
trip in both its local and grpc modes.
2026-09-30 07:52:13 +10:00
sam 8fcb9ef964 feat(egress): intercept OAuth token endpoints and inject stored access tokens
The egress proxy now holds a Kit's OAuth tokens on the host. A refresh
carrying the sentinel refresh token goes upstream with the org's stored
one; a successful response is written to the State Store and returned to
the container with sentinels only. Requests to the Kit's resource hosts
carrying the sentinel access token get the stored one.

The org's token set is read or written only for a run whose credential
carries the service, so a Kit declaring a service never reaches the org
secret by itself. The launcher grants a bound OAuth service without a
config secret, and Register refuses a required OAuth credential when no
harness secret store is wired. A provider that does not rotate refresh
tokens keeps the stored one.

Part of archie-core-egkf.7 (#1208). Credential-file rendering and
per-binding concurrency remain.
2026-09-28 01:52:07 +10:00
sam 58984c8bc1 feat(egress): credential resolver backed by declared-and-granted run credentials
docs/prds/external-agent-harness.md (Credentials) and orgs-and-access.md:
egress.Resolver had no production implementation, and no run carried a
credential naming the org secrets its identity is granted, so a Kit's
required credential@1 was refused at the proxy and no harness run
authenticated (archie-core-egkf.11).

Two things, as scoped (this does not attempt #1026's full run-credential
consolidation replacing WorktreeGrantIssuer/StateStoreGrantIssuer -- that
PRD item is real, separate, and still open; this is deliberately narrower):

1. A run credential naming granted secrets: config.CredentialBinding maps a
   Kit credential@1 service to a secret; config.Config/IdentityConfig gain
   Org and GrantedCredentials (a per-identity allowlist of service names,
   reusing the existing per-identity config-override pattern DiffCapLines
   already uses, not a new Cedar/Authorizer integration -- KindSecret policy
   objects exist in internal/domain/access but assembling a full Principal
   is #1026's job, not a two-line addition here). config.ContainerConfig.
   BoundCredentials computes the declared (Kit) ∩ granted (identity) ∩
   org-matched intersection Sam's own rule requires: neither side widens
   the other, proven by a mutation-checked test flipping each of the three
   independently.

2. egress.GrantResolver: the production Resolver, holding only what a
   caller explicitly Grant-ed one run, replaced wholesale (not merged) on
   a repeated Grant, gone entirely on RevokeGrant. kitrun.Launcher.Launch
   computes the intersection per launch and resolves real values through
   the existing secret registry (SecretResolver), Grants it before the
   proxy session opens, and Release/error-path rollback (a new shared
   Launcher.release) always revokes it.

Course-corrected mid-implementation (flagged by Sam): credential bindings
first landed as a boot-time config.ContainerConfig.Credentials field
captured once into Launcher.Bindings -- exactly the "parses but is not a
resource" trap CLAUDE.md warns about, and inconsistent with agent-profiles
(#1207) making a Kit profile apply without a restart. Rebuilt as its own
live control-plane resource, CredentialBindingsKind ("credential-bindings"),
following the agent-profiles/container-runtime-policies split precisely:
config.ContainerConfig.Credentials is json:"-", [containers].credentials
is only its seed, and kitrun.Launcher now holds *config.Holder (not a
captured slice) and reads Containers.Credentials fresh on every Launch.
Org/GrantedCredentials were already read fresh per dispatch (d.configFor
inside runKitTask, never cached), so no equivalent fix was needed there.

Deliberately not built: identities and grants as their own State Store
resource (orgs-and-access.md's "Org owns ... identities and their grants").
Identities are entirely config.toml-defined today with no control-plane
resource at all; moving GrantedCredentials alone into one would put half
an identity in two places. That migration is identities' own scope, not
credential bindings'.
2026-09-27 06:14:22 +10:00
sam 70df8d1131 feat(daemon): run a Kit profile's task in its Kit container on the egress path 2026-09-26 10:14:33 +10:00
sam 763023a2fe feat(egress): relay forwards the proxy, NATS and the State Store
A Kit task's worker shares the sandbox network with its harness, so it
reaches NATS and the State Store through the relay like the harness
reaches the proxy. archie-agent relay takes repeated -forward
listen=target pairs, binds them all before serving so a port conflict
fails at start, and stops every forward when one fails. RelayArgs builds
the command from the fixed relay ports.
2026-09-26 03:10:11 +10:00
sam b24b256d0f style(egress): adopt go fix's promoted-field literal 2026-09-26 02:47:15 +10:00
sam 266dac9e5c feat(egress): inject Kit API-key credentials at the proxy
A session carries its run and its Kit's credential@1 requests. The proxy
applies apiKey inject rules only in the credential's phase and only to
hosts its rule names, after the network policy has admitted the request,
so a key never reaches a host its Kit did not declare. The real value
comes from a Resolver that returns only secrets the run credential
carries: a required credential that is unbound or unresolvable stops the
request before anything is sent, and an optional one passes only when it
is genuinely unbound. Named keys appear in the sandbox as a sentinel;
inject-only keys have no presence.
2026-09-26 02:46:40 +10:00
sam ecf4216726 style(egress): adopt go fix's WaitGroup.Go 2026-09-26 02:38:59 +10:00
sam 7b103b5af4 feat(egress): sandbox networks that reach only the relay
Each sandbox gets an internal bridge on which the host holds no address,
so host services listening on every interface are unreachable; the relay
is attached under a fixed alias and is the one way out. ProxyEnv gives a
sandbox container its proxy URL and CA trust. The Docker integration test
proves allowed egress works and that the proxy listener, host services and
the internet are unreachable directly; it fails if the host-address
inhibition is removed.
2026-09-26 02:38:12 +10:00
sam c98c9dcc22 feat(egress): relay forwarding a sandbox network to the egress proxy
archie-agent relay listens on the sandbox's isolated network and joins
every connection to one fixed target, the proxy. The relay holds no
secrets and can reach nothing else, so the host needs no address on a
sandbox network at all.
2026-09-26 02:33:41 +10:00
sam d1e5c628d0 feat(egress): session-authenticated proxy terminating TLS under the Kit network policy
CONNECT tunnels and absolute-form http requests authenticate to a
per-container session, are checked against the session's phase policy,
and are forwarded with verified upstream TLS. A tunnel serves only its
admitted host: mismatched SNI and Host headers are refused. Upstream dials
refuse loopback, and refuse internal addresses unless the policy names the
exact IP, so an allowed name cannot resolve back into the host.
2026-09-26 02:31:00 +10:00
sam 6f0540ba16 feat(egress): persistent per-daemon CA issuing cached leaf certificates 2026-09-26 02:27:58 +10:00
sam a5b5d7748a feat(egress): network-policy@1 matcher 2026-09-26 02:27:25 +10:00