append(nonce, sealed...) appends to a slice initialized with a non-zero
length, which makezero flags. Build the nonce||ciphertext||tag payload with
an explicit buffer sized upfront instead.
Found by golangci-lint.
binding.Binding.Secret was persisted as plaintext in the bindings.secret
column, so anyone with the SQLite file saw sender-side HMAC secrets. Seal
it with AES-256-GCM transparently inside the store: encrypt-on-write,
decrypt-on-read.
- cipher: AES-256-GCM, 12-byte random nonce, SHA-256-normalised 32-byte
key resolved through the secret registry ([bindings].encryption_key).
- envelope 'arcie-binding:v1:<fingerprint>:<b64(nonce||ct||tag)>' so a
future cipher/KDF change is a version bump and old rows stay readable.
- rotation via previous_encryption_keys; key identity is the material's
SHA-256 fingerprint embedded in each row.
- legacy plaintext rows written before a key was configured stay readable;
encryption is not retroactive.
- nil cipher (no key configured) preserves the pre-t2db.7 plaintext path.
Deferred: captured_events.body redaction upgrade (separate concern, see
docs/prds/binding-secret-encryption.md).
Refs archie-core-t2db.7