Commit Graph
3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
sam a7d6f71d5a feat(identity): verify provider tokens and attribute task actions to their actor
Two halves of one boundary: a credential resolves to an identity, and an action
records which identity acted and whose authority it used.

resource server. internal/infrastructure/oidc verifies a provider-issued bearer
token against the provider's published keys, using an OSS OIDC library: archie
compares no signature, validates no claim and rotates no key itself, holds no
client secret and issues no session, so a compromised archie cannot mint an
identity. Audience is required rather than optional -- a token minted for another
service must not authenticate here -- and discovery happens at construction, so an
unreachable provider is a startup failure rather than a request-time surprise.

identity.Authenticate is the single place a credential becomes an identity, and it
refuses in four distinguishable ways: no credential presented, a credential that
did not verify (wrong key, expired, wrong issuer, wrong audience, malformed), a
verified subject with no identity bound to it, and an identity that may not act.
The order is deliberate: verification happens before any field of the token is
used, so nothing an unverified token carries can select an identity. A suspended
identity is refused even though its credential verified, because suspension is
archie's decision and must not depend on the provider withdrawing a token.

The binding is the second bridge beside the legacy-name alias: identity_subjects
keys (issuer, subject) so the same subject string from another issuer is a
different caller, and rebinding moves a subject so two identities can never claim
one provider subject. The contract Authenticate needs is SubjectResolver, narrower
than Repository, so a consumer that only authenticates does not take the whole
identity CRUD surface -- and staterpc.Client, which asserts Repository, does not
need a new RPC to satisfy it.

attribution. taskactions now records two identities per action: the acting
identity and the authorising principal, both on the event row as new columns added
through the existing migration table. The rule that the bug turned on is enforced
by the event kind describing the actor: a person's approval is human_approved, an
agent's is agent_approved, and an action with no verified actor is task_approved,
a task-level event that credits nobody. An agent acting under a person's standing
approval records itself as the actor and that person as the principal, so
"approved by came from me" is answerable from the record rather than asserted.
Scope and actor are separated: scope decides which task a caller may touch and is
never promoted into an actor, because the dashboard's credential is a shared token
and possession of it is not evidence that a person was at the keyboard.

That last point is a deliberate fidelity trade, and the reason the transport is
not wired: the dashboard action path passes no actor yet, so dashboard approvals
are now recorded as task_approved rather than claimed as a human's. Recording
nothing false is the requirement; naming the human verifiably needs the dashboard
to authenticate a token and resolve it, which needs two new state-store RPCs
(ResolveIdentitySubject, BindIdentitySubject) -- the next piece, not a rewrite:
the verifier is a one-method interface, so introspection would be a second
implementation of it.

Verified: task check exit 0; focused runs recorded in the handoff. Opaque
authelia_at_ tokens were inspected rather than assumed and cannot be verified
against public keys; infra is configuring access_token_signed_response_alg RS256
on the archie client, with audience https://archie.catlow.cloud and issuer
https://auth.catlow.cloud.
2026-09-22 14:34:16 +10:00
sam 2ef962912a feat(tasks): attribute events, changes and config to the attempt that produced them
The events table had no attempt column, so two attempts of the same task were
indistinguishable: a retried task's stage events interleaved into one timeline and
nothing could say which run produced a given result.

- events gains an `attempt` column through the existing presence-gated
  migrateTasks loop rather than a version bump, so user_version stays 3 and an
  existing archie.db is migrated in place. A legacy-database test builds the
  pre-change schema and proves both that existing rows survive unattributed
  (attempt = 0) and that a new value round-trips.
- Event.attempt = 11 and ReadTaskLogRequest.stage = 9 are field additions to
  existing messages: no new RPC, no new table, and no change to any canonical error
  message that crosses the state-store wire.
- Every task event the workflow engine emits now carries the attempt. Producers
  that have no attempt yet (task_queued, binding_dispatch_failure) stay
  unattributed rather than guessing one.
- Changed files are captured as a durable changes_captured event at commit and push
  time, reusing the existing three-dot diff primitive: paths from FilePatches(),
  counts from Stats(), base_sha recorded as the merge base actually diffed rather
  than the base tip, a 200-file cap with totals kept complete. Consumption goes
  through an unexported optional interface so workflow.Trees -- the yaegi capability
  surface for interpreted stage plugins -- is not widened. A capture is also taken
  once the pull request exists, so the capture can link it.
- The per-attempt configuration is captured as a durable config_captured event
  carrying the non-secret config.TaskConfig, instead of a new table plus two new
  state-store RPCs: events are already this system's per-attempt provenance stream,
  so a table would have given one feature two provenance mechanisms. Redaction is
  proven against canary secrets. Measured payload: 539 bytes typical, 2333 bytes at
  20 models.
- Captures carry a schema marker and are refused unless their key set matches the
  declared payload shape, so drift surfaces as "recorded but could not be read"
  rather than as a capture of zeroes.
- Three read endpoints serve the attempt rail, the changed-file captures and a raw
  debug view, mapping to UI-owned response types rather than dumping store types.
- The task-log read gains a stage filter, bound to the stage logger for that
  stage's own lines; agent and tool output records no stage.

A task-scoped grant may already insert events on its own task, so this provenance
is exactly as trustworthy as the rest of that task's event stream. That limit is
documented rather than papered over.
2026-09-18 18:32:59 +10:00
sam 10e76e7528 feat(gateway): consolidate task actions and repair daemon default path
Phase 1 (extract the Gateway Service), first stage. Repairs the
half-migrated working tree so the default (inproc) daemon path works
again while keeping the WIP's direction:

- chatTaskActorAdapter is contract-only (no HTTP detour); nil contract
  returns ErrChatCapabilityUnavailable instead of panicking.
- openStores opens the conversation store for both processes again;
  the standalone gateway no longer owns it exclusively. Phase 1 keeps
  the daemon's Telegram/email routers and session-memory curator
  reading the same SQLite file; remote conversations arrive when a
  process that cannot open the file needs them.
- setupLLMAndChat composes the local gateway (setupGatewayChat) in
  default mode and a remote gRPC client in mode=remote; the returned
  contract is never nil, and Run handles the error.
- taskactions.Service is now the single task-mutation implementation
  shared by the dashboard (webui TaskActionService), the daemon's local
  gateway actor, and the NATS responder. The daemon registers
  taskactions.Register so the standalone Gateway's client can forward
  actions; transport follows the repo's natsrpc pattern.
- uncommitted sessions.proto / SessionStoreService gRPC contract
  deferred: it has no wired consumers (scope creep for this stage).
- task_action_adapter_test.go rewritten against the contract chain.

task check passes; archied and archie-gateway both build.
2026-09-06 01:35:15 +10:00