Deletes internal/memory (Manager, builtin.Provider, memory_edit tool) now
that slices 2-4 built the CRUD engine family and its per-turn read/write
seams. Also deletes internal/infrastructure/memory/builtin/provider.go (the
memory_edit adapter over the old package -- its markdown store already
relocated in slice 2), internal/tools/provider/memory (the old tool
registration, redundant with slice 4's memory_create/update/delete/list),
config.Memory.{Provider,ProviderConfig} and the validateMemory rejection
that existed only to complain about Provider, and webui.MemoryStatus/
MemoryProviderHandle plus its dashboard page -- never wired in production
(s.Memory was always nil), confirmed by /api/capabilities always reporting
"memory": false.
Rewrites ARCHITECTURE.md's "Memory engine family" section to describe the
current engine (internal/domain/memory contract, internal/infrastructure/
memory builtin engine + its builtin/ markdown store, the per-turn read seam
in gateway/turn_memory.go, the per-turn write tools in
gateway/turn_memory_tool.go) instead of the deleted Manager. Fixes two
docs/architecture/configuration.md rows that described the deleted
manager's literals and SaveConfig mechanism.
Build a per-turn memory tool set (memory_create/update/delete/list) onto
the turn's resolved Subject, matching slice 3's read-side scope model.
The model picks a scope KIND from an enum built off Subject.WritableScopes()
(never global); the agent and user ids a scope resolves to come from the
turn's Subject, with no schema field either could ever land in. A subject
with no writable scope, or a nil write store, gets no memory tools at all.
TurnRunnerConfig gains MemoryWriter (MemoryWriteStore: Create/Update/
Forget/List), wired alongside the existing MemoryEngine read surface
through the same active engine (boot.activeMemoryEngine, narrowed by
memoryStore/memoryWriter).
Greptile review on #887 (slice 3, merged):
- BuiltinEngine.Query bounds Limit across the whole result, not per scope
it is given. renderMemory passed one Limit for all of subject.Scopes()
combined, so an early scope (agent-user, queried first) could exhaust
the whole budget and starve later, wider scopes. Now queries each scope
separately, each capped at memoryRecordsPerScope.
- memoryBlockByteCap was checked against each line's raw size, but
BuildSystemPrompt's {{xml .Memory}} escapes &/</> afterward, expanding
a byte up to fivefold. The cap is now measured against the escaped
size (escapeXML, extracted from prompt.go's template func) while the
block itself still accumulates raw lines, since the template escapes
once on render -- escaping here too would double-escape it.
Wires the durable-memory engine into the chat turn: prepareTurn resolves a
per-channel Subject (BotUser as AgentID, TurnRunnerConfig.UserIdentity for
the user), runs a scope-only Query over Subject.Scopes(), and renders the
result into a new <memory purpose="durable_context" trust="data"> block
between <tools> and <env>, following the same untrusted-data framing as
those two blocks. The read is synchronous, total, and never surfaces an
error: a nil engine, a failing Query, or a panicking provider all degrade to
no memory block (recovered in gateway.renderMemory).
UserIdentity is supplied per channel by the composition
(userIdentityResolver in internal/app/archied): telegram and email resolve
their native SenderID, the dashboard ("web") and webhook resolve nothing, so
a webhook's route-path SenderID can never become a user identity and the
dashboard's shared bearer token can never impersonate a person.
Fixes the composition-ordering bug that left every turn runner holding a nil
memory engine: setupMemoryAll now runs before setupGateways in main.go, and
before setupGatewayChat in gateway.go's startGatewayRuntime, so
boot.memoryStore() has a live engine at every turn-runner construction site.
Named constants bound the read: memoryRecordsPerScope per scope, and
memoryBlockByteCap on the rendered block, which drops (and logs) trailing
records rather than truncating one mid-line.
* feat(memory): four-scope contract with CRUD and revisions
Seam for memory unification slice 2 (docs/prds/memory-engine-unification.md
§1, §2, §7): internal/domain/memory is now a scope-addressed CRUD contract.
- Scope{Kind,Agent,User} with the four ratified kinds, Validate rejecting a
component present where it is not required, and a length-prefixed Key so
opaque channel-native ids cannot collide.
- Subject{AgentID,UserID} with Scopes()/WritableScopes(): global is never
writable, and an absent user id removes every scope requiring one.
- Store becomes Create/Get/Query/List/Update/Forget/Revisions over
NewRecord/RecordUpdate/Record/Revision, with ErrNotFound/ErrStaleRevision.
Observation, Identity and Metadata are deleted.
- The content scanner moves into the family (internal/domain/memory) so every
engine applies it in Create and Update; internal/memory re-exports the types
until slice 5 deletes it.
- The markdown store moves to internal/infrastructure/memory/builtin, its
correct home per organisation.md.
WIP: internal/infrastructure/memory and internal/infrastructure/sessioncurator
are converted in the lanes that follow this commit.
* feat(memory): builtin engine CRUD, retained revisions and the curator's agent-user write
Slice 2 implementation (docs/prds/memory-engine-unification.md §1, §2, §6,
§7), on top of the contract seam in the previous commit.
- internal/infrastructure/memory: per-scope markdown heads with a JSON
provenance marker, per-scope HISTORY.md retaining superseded and deleted
states, Update superseding before replacing the live block, ErrStaleRevision
via RecordUpdate.Expected, idempotent Forget, and the family scanner applied
in Create and Update. Scope directories are hex(sha256(Scope.Key())).
- internal/infrastructure/sessioncurator: the participant is derived from the
session's user-role senders; exactly one writes agent-user scope, zero or
several write nothing and return ActionSkipped naming the count.
- docs/architecture: the settled decision recorded in migration-decisions §5
(superseding the 2026-09-02 marker entry) and agent-system.md pointing at it.
Draft: to be squashed and reviewed before publication.
* test(curator): conform the registry's fake memory engine to the CRUD contract
The fake still implemented the pre-CRUD Store surface (Write taking an
Observation, List/Forget keyed by a bare string), so the package's test
binary no longer compiles: fakeMemoryEngine is missing Create, Get, Update
and Revisions, and domainmemory.Observation no longer exists. That took
`go fix ./...`, `go vet ./...` and `go test ./...` down with it, which is
what `task check` runs first.
Missed by the same commit that updated internal/infrastructure/sessioncurator's
own fake to the new interface. Repaired on the fake, not by loosening the
interface: the fake is the only thing out of date.
* fix(sessioncurator): refuse to attribute a session with unidentified user messages
sessionParticipant skipped user-role messages with an empty SenderID and
counted only the identified ones, so a session holding one identified sender
plus any number of unidentified user messages yielded that sender as the
single participant. Those messages are still part of the excerpt the
extraction model reads, so facts derived from content of unknown provenance
were written into the identified sender's agent-user scope: user A's memory
can end up crediting content that may belong to someone else. It is exactly
the case the function's own doc comment claims to handle, which it only
caught when no message at all was identified.
An unidentified user message now makes the session unattributable outright,
beside any number of identified senders, and the skip action's reason names
the count instead of reporting a sender count that no longer explains the
skip. Assistant-role messages are unaffected: they carry the bot, so they
still cannot manufacture a participant.
Fixed in sessionParticipant rather than at the write, because it is the
single producer of the attribution decision: it now returns the participant
or the reason there is none, so the caller cannot print a reason that
disagrees with what it decided. The fail-closed path (nothing written, one
ActionSkipped) and the extraction flow are unchanged.
* fix(memory): carry record content through the block format intact
builtin.Store's format ends a block at a blank line and starts a section at a
"## " line, but storeContent only trimmed the content and rejected an empty
one. Content holding either delimiter was accepted, written, and answered back
to the caller in full -- then read back truncated at the delimiter by Get,
List, or a process restart, with the remainder unaddressable and no error
anywhere along the path.
Fixed at the producer, in the render/parse pair that owns the block format:
renderBlock escapes the two delimiter shapes (an empty line becomes a single
backslash, a line already starting with a backslash or "## " gains one) and
parseBlocks undoes it on the way back, so a record's content survives the
write whole. Rejecting the content instead would have made an ordinary
multi-paragraph note or a quoted heading unrepresentable; escaping every line
would have changed the on-disk shape of every record. Only the lines that need
it are escaped, so a one-paragraph record is byte-identical to what the
unfixed engine wrote and the document stays hand-editable.
Reachable from both producers: the chat tool's note and the curator's
model-extracted fact are free text, and neither is constrained to one
paragraph.
Tests: TestBuiltinEngineRenderedBlockRoundTripsContent asserts
parseBlocks(renderBlock(c)) == c for eleven content shapes, and
TestBuiltinEngineContentSurvivesTheWriteAndAReopen carries the same shapes
through Create, Get, and a second engine reading the file a restart would.
* fix(memory): compare Update's expected revision against the file, not the cache
Update read the record to compare against out of findBlock(stores.live, ...)
-- the engine's cached copy of the scope document -- and checked Expected
against that copy. This engine caches one document per scope and rewrites it
whole, so a second engine over the same scope file (archied and the gateway,
or a restart) holds a copy taken when it last read the file: its view of the
record's revision is superseded, Expected matches the revision it remembers,
ErrStaleRevision never fires, and the rewrite that follows writes that stale
copy back over the file -- discarding the other writer's update and every
record written since the copy was loaded. The field existed and could not
fire.
Reload the scope document before anything is decided from it, so the check
answers about the revision actually on disk and the rewrite starts from the
current document. That is the smaller of the two fixes the PRD leaves open
("Not determined": a reload-before-mutate or an advisory lock); no locking
scheme, no retry loop, and no change to the read paths.
Still unsolved, and deliberately: the whole-document rewrite is
last-writer-wins between the reload and the write, so two engines writing one
scope concurrently can still lose one of the two writes, and HISTORY.md is
rewritten from the cached copy the same way.
Tests: TestBuiltinEngineSecondEngineCannotReuseAStaleRevision asserts the
second engine gets ErrStaleRevision and the first writer's state survives;
TestBuiltinEngineUpdateDoesNotEraseRecordsItHasNotLoaded asserts the record
written after the second engine loaded is still there after its update.
* fix(memory): emit the scanner's warning instead of dropping it
scanContent returned nil for every result that was not ThreatBlock, so a
ThreatWarn result -- documented in the scanner as "allow the write but emit a
warning", and what every sensitive-data match produces (API keys, passwords,
tokens, private keys) -- was stored with no audit signal anywhere. The
comment justified the silence by pointing at Bind, but Bind's argument is
about Registrar.Events: internal/events declares no memory kind and the
composition binds no memory event sink, so an invented kind would look wired
and not be. A scanner warning is a diagnostic rather than an event, and there
was nothing else to carry it: the registrar had no logger.
Bind now takes Registrar.Log, optional and mirroring the curator family's
Registrar for the same reason, scanContent emits the warn-level result
through it before the write is allowed, and bootstrap passes the daemon's
logger so the line reaches archied's configured sinks instead of only the
process default. The write is still allowed: only the silence changed.
Tests: TestBuiltinEngineScanWarnsWithoutRefusingTheWrite runs Create and
Update over warn, clean and block content, asserting the write lands either
way, that a warn-level scan result logs exactly one warning carrying the
scanner's own message, that clean content logs none, and that a refused
block-level match logs none.
* test(memory): carry every content shape through Update and Revisions
Update replaces the block it read out of the document by that text, and
retains the superseded state in HISTORY.md, so an escaped block has to be
found, superseded and retained exactly like an unescaped one. Covered here
rather than left to the Create path: without the escaping, every shape in
this table came back truncated after an update, including the plain
one-paragraph record whose replacement holds a blank line.
The test asserts values only: the updated record as a second engine reads it
off disk, and the superseded content as Revisions returns it.
* style(memory): apply the linter's gofumpt form to the Update revision error
golangci-lint's bundled gofumpt wants the closing paren of that wrapped
fmt.Errorf on its own line; the standalone gofumpt binary the fmt task uses
(0.7.0, a different version) leaves it as it was. The text is unchanged from
before the engine fixes in this branch, so this is pre-existing drift inside a
function these commits already touch -- taken so the file is clean under both
formatters rather than only one.
Direct bumps:
- github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 v2.14.6 -> v2.15.0
- github.com/nats-io/nats.go v1.53.1 -> v1.54.0
- github.com/samcharles93/ai-sdk v0.1.32 -> v0.1.39
- google.golang.org/grpc v1.83.2 -> v1.84.0
- modernc.org/sqlite v1.58.0 -> v1.59.0
- golang.org/x/net v0.58.0 -> v0.59.0
- golang.org/x/term v0.45.0 -> v0.46.0
Indirect: go-humanize, x/crypto, x/exp, x/sync, x/sys, x/text, x/time,
genproto/googleapis{,/api,/rpc}, modernc.org/libc.
tools/ is a separate module and needs its own tidy to match the root's
ai-sdk and sqlite bumps. docs:check runs it with -mod=readonly, so a
stale tools/go.mod fails loudly there rather than being rewritten.
The dashboard was a hybrid: a Preact page per route rendered into a shell
built by a hand-rolled el() helper. Every route was Preact and the shell was
not, which is why nothing failed -- the last of the vanilla layer was the
part that composed the app.
Removed:
- ui/src/base/dom.jsx -- el/append/mount, the unused pill/empty pair, and a
statusKind re-export that duplicated task-meta for one caller
- ui/src/chat/chat-tools.jsx and the el-based bubble builders in
chat-render.jsx: nothing in src/ called them, only their own tests did
- the chatPage() DOM bridge, which existed so an imperative shell could embed
a VNode
Ported:
- base/icons.jsx: icon() -> <Icon>; the glyph path table stays data
- base/gauge.jsx, base/statTile.jsx, base/log-row.jsx: DOM builders ->
components, with inline SVG instead of innerHTML
- base/format.jsx: ago/compact, which never were DOM
- chat/markdown.jsx: renderMarkdown() -> <ChatMarkdown>, so a streamed reply
is diffed rather than rebuilt block by block
- main.jsx: shell, nav, jump-to search, theme and chat drawer are one App;
pages still render into one long-lived outlet
Routing stays wired at import rather than from an effect. A page installs its
own hash-sensitive state as it mounts, and task detail writes its tab
selection back with replaceState as it settles: if the outgoing page is still
mounted when the hashchange lands it canonicalises the URL back to its own
route and the navigation is silently lost. The outlet and the two
navigation-owned pieces of chrome are published through a callback ref, which
runs at commit time, before any page effect.
Tests: dom.test.js (el) and chat-tools.test.js are gone. The statTile cases
in dom.test.js were not dropped -- they pinned the zero-value headline bug
that made fresh installs look broken, and moved to test/statTile.test.js
against the component. log-row and chat-markdown render their components.
ui/dist rebuilt: index.js 146977 -> 146010 bytes.
Closes archie-core-v9gv.2 and archie-core-v9gv.
ctx.Err() is non-nil for a parent cancellation as well as for the sweep
budget, so SIGINT/SIGTERM during the boot sweep logged "sweep budget
exhausted" with err="context canceled" -- an expected shutdown reported
as a failed sweep (Greptile P2 on #881).
Attribute on this sweep's own context instead: DeadlineExceeded is the
budget, any other non-nil context error means the startup was cancelled,
and neither is a repo access failure. A forge's own request timeout,
with the sweep context still live, still reports per repo.
RED before (cancelled parent, three repos):
budget warnings = 1, want 0
level=WARN msg="push check abandoned: sweep budget exhausted" repo=acme/one err="context canceled"
Two of the three findings from review. The third had already been fixed by the
version of the service-registry PRD that landed on main.
1. docs/prds/state-store-contract.md §10 still prescribed the topology that was
deleted when the State Store was extracted. It said an empty `Target` opens a
local `*store.Store` adapter, and that the daemon's base path is that local
store "already opened by openProductionTaskStore". Neither holds: the
standalone archie-state-store process exclusively owns archie.db, and both
archied and archie-gateway reject an empty target (bootstrap.go,
state_store_client.go: "services.state.target is required").
openProductionTaskStore still exists, but only inside that standalone process.
Following the ratified section would have reinstated the deleted in-process
ownership path. The config.example.toml bullet (which still advised adding the
section with a COMMENTED target -- impossible to boot) and the "opposite
default (local, not remote)" blockquote are corrected with it; the section is
already present with the target uncommented and marked REQUIRED.
2. CLAUDE.md named the State Store authority rev. 2c while the contract itself is
ratified at rev. 2d. AGENTS.md is a symlink to CLAUDE.md, so one edit covers
both guides.
Not changed: the typo-visibility finding is already addressed by the PRD on main.
Its tracking name, unregisteredServiceKeys, is unimplemented in Go, so the runtime
diagnostic is still missing -- filed as archie-core-jp4g.
Config.Clone deep-copies every reference-type field except Services, which became a
map[string]ServiceConnection. A value copy shares the map header, and yaml.Unmarshal
writes keys into whatever map it is handed -- so Loader.ApplyOverlay, which clones
precisely so it cannot corrupt the base document, rewrote the published snapshot in
place:
ApplyOverlay(doc, {"services": {"state": {"target": "10.0.0.5:9090"}}})
left doc.Config.Services["state"].Target changed
That defeats the reason Clone exists: a failed or partial overlay must not alter the
configuration still being served.
Red: TestConfigCloneDeepCopiesReferenceFields failed with "Services map is shared"
after the case was added; green with the one-line clone.
An overlay or dashboard PATCH naming only some fields of a map-valued config entry
silently zeroed the rest. For [services.<name>] that meant losing the bearer token,
so changing a State Store endpoint dropped its authentication:
start Services{"state": {Target: "127.0.0.1:50051", TargetToken: "secret"}}
overlay {"services": {"state": {"target": "10.0.0.5:50051"}}}
result Services{"state": {Target: "10.0.0.5:50051", TargetToken: ""}}
Cause: ApplyOverlayValues did yaml.Marshal(overrides) then yaml.Unmarshal into cfg.
yaml gives a struct FIELD the field-level treatment the doc comment promises, but a
map VALUE is decoded into a fresh zero value, so an entry the overlay only partly
addresses loses every field it does not name. That contract was written when
Services was a struct; making it map[string]ServiceConnection changed the behaviour
underneath it.
Fix at the producer: fold the fields the overlay omits forward out of the entry cfg
already holds, so the decoder is handed a complete entry. Recursion follows the
destination type, so the promise now holds for every map of structs -- services,
image.hosted, image.local and providers -- in one place instead of at each field's
reader. Struct field-level merge, scalar-valued map-key merge and slice replacement
are unchanged, and overrides is read, never mutated.
The regression test also converts to the map form, which is what unbreaks the build:
apply_test.go still built Services with the struct form after services.go became a
map, and because the two live in different files the breakage merged cleanly. There
is no Go build or test CI, so nothing compiled it.
Red: four cases failed with the token, the target and the sibling fields zeroed.
Green after the fold.
sweepAccess spends one sweepTimeout budget on a forge's whole boot
sweep. When that budget ran out mid-loop, every remaining repo was
warned as "repo not pushable -- tasks from it will fail" -- asserting
that access had been denied when all that was known was that the
deadline passed, once per repo.
Report the budget once, name it as the cause, and stop: later calls
return the same deadline error, so continuing only multiplies a
misleading warning.
RED before (three repos, budget exhausted by the first):
VerifyPush calls = 3, want 1
"sweep budget exhausted" logged 0 times, want 1
level=WARN msg="repo not pushable -- tasks from it will fail" repo=acme/one err="context deadline exceeded"
level=WARN msg="repo not pushable -- tasks from it will fail" repo=acme/two err="context deadline exceeded"
level=WARN msg="repo not pushable -- tasks from it will fail" repo=acme/three err="context deadline exceeded"
Five files survived the Preact chat cutover with no production consumer:
- ui/src/chat/chat-view.jsx, chat-catalog.jsx, chat-panels.jsx: zero importers
anywhere in ui/src or ui/test.
- ui/src/chat/chat.html: referenced only by chat-view.jsx, itself orphaned.
- ui/src/chat/chat-stream.jsx: imported only by ui/test/chat-markdown.test.js.
Its updateStreamingReply helper swaps a rendered Markdown node into the DOM --
the imperative hyperscript pattern the Preact port replaced.
Corroborating evidence that these were already outside the build graph: a full
"task ui" rebuild after deleting them produced NO change to the committed
ui/dist bundle, so tree-shaking had already excluded all five.
ui/test/chat-markdown.test.js loses only the case that exercised the deleted
module. Its two renderMarkdown cases stay, because renderMarkdown is live --
ui/src/chat/chat-render.jsx and chat.jsx both call it.
Not touched: chat.jsx, chat-render.jsx, chat-retry.jsx, chat-state.jsx,
chat-tools.jsx, chat-update-status.jsx, markdown.jsx -- each still has at least
one importer, so none of them is an orphan.
sweepAccess sweeps each forge in its own goroutine, but nothing pinned
that: the table test asserts coverage, not ordering, so the sweep could
be made sequential again without a failure.
The test stalls the root forge in AcceptInvitations and asserts the
sibling identity is swept while it is still blocked, then that Startup
returns once the stall is released. Verified RED against a sequential
sweepAccess (times out waiting for the sibling) and GREEN against the
goroutine-per-forge implementation.
Code review on this PR: navigating from one /tasks/:id route to another keeps the
previous task's data. The router renders pages with Preact's own render() into
one long-lived outlet (main.jsx show()), and taskDetailPage returned
RunDetail with no key, so the same element was diffed in place and never
remounted. Every task-scoped read lives in a useEffect with empty deps and the
open tab and pinned attempt are useState initialisers, so all of them ran once
for the first task and the new task was rendered against another task's reads:
run history, events, open tab, pinned attempt, and the log/change/debug caches.
RunDetail's own comment already asserted "the route remounts it when that
changes" -- the remount it relied on never happened. Keying by id makes it happen.
Keying rather than resetting is deliberate: RunDetail holds 14 pieces of
task-scoped state, and a hand-rolled reset must name every one and silently
regresses when a fifteenth is added. A remount is exhaustive by construction.
Preact 10.29.8 wraps render() in a Fragment and diffs children by key, so a
changed root key unmounts and mounts fresh; both regression tests were shown to
fail without the key.
Tests: component-level (two task ids rendered into one shared host, mirroring the
router's outlet) and router-level through the real show() path.
ApplyOverlayValues documents that "only the keys present are replaced, every
field the overlay omits keeps its existing value". That promise was only tested
one level deep (budgets.max_steps); it was untested two levels deep into a
struct of structs, which is the shape config.Services has.
The concrete risk being pinned: an overlay that changes only
services.state.target must not clear target_token, because dropping the token
silently removes authentication for a non-loopback State Store.
All three cases pass, so the behaviour is correct as written and no production
change is warranted. This test is a regression guard on the depth that matters.
.github/workflows/docs.yml runs actions/setup-python@v6 with cache: pip. That
option hashes a requirements.txt or pyproject.toml to build the cache key and
fails outright when neither exists:
##[error]No file in ... matched to
[**/requirements.txt or **/pyproject.toml]
This repository is Go and has no Python manifest, so the step failed as the
first step of every run triggered by the workflow's pull_request paths: docs/**
filter. mkdocs build --strict therefore never executed: docs changes were not
being verified, and every docs-touching PR was reported as a build failure. It
only surfaced on #878 because #878 touches docs/architecture/; PRs that do not
touch docs report no checks at all.
Drop cache: pip. The only Python use is a single `pip install mkdocs-material`,
so there is nothing worth caching.
Review fix for PR #873. The previous attempt wired Router.Restart on the
Telegram router, but that path is unreachable: telegram.go:260 registers an
exact-match /restart handler (restartHandler, restart.go:24) which consumes the
update before the chat router is reached.
The wiring was therefore a false affordance: it made the Telegram router report
RestartAvailable: true for a callback no production path invokes, and the test
only passed because it assembled a LocalChatAdapter by hand rather than driving
the composition production uses.
Remove it. Telegram's own restartHandler remains the sole path to
RequestRestart. The removals of boot.restartTelegram and
telegramSetup.RegisterRestart stand: those were written and never read, which is
the real defect (channels-telegram-3).
Tests are retargeted and table-driven: buildTelegramRouter leaves Restart nil
with and without an adapter (regression guard against re-adding the unreachable
wiring), the router's /restart route reports not-configured, and
RequestRestart's queue-then-reject contract is pinned at the adapter level.
This deliberately does NOT fix dashboard /restart: the web router runs in the
archie-gateway process while the Telegram adapter runs in archied, and no
gateway->daemon restart RPC exists. That needs its own design (see the bead
referenced in the PR body).
Review fix for PR #875. ARCHIE_REACTIONS is provisioned under LimitsPolicy,
which retains every message until a limit is reached. With no limit configured,
acknowledged reactions accumulated without bound and continuous traffic could
grow the stream until it exhausted disk.
nats.Config gains MaxAge *time.Duration, using the same pointer form as
Retention so "unset" (nil) is distinguishable from an explicit zero. It is
applied to the stream config only when set, so every existing caller keeps its
current behaviour.
ARCHIE_REACTIONS sets MaxAge = 24h. A reaction is a producer-only wake event
whose authoritative state is re-read at pass time, so a dropped reaction delays
work until the next poll (default 60s) rather than losing it; 24h tolerates a
consumer down for a full maintenance window and matches the package's existing
DefaultInactiveTTL.
ARCHIE_TASKS is deliberately left unbounded. It uses WorkQueuePolicy, which
discards a message on acknowledgement, so its size is bounded by outstanding
work; a limit there could discard a task that has not been delivered yet, which
is a worse failure than the disk risk. The table asserts that non-change.
Review fixes for PR #876. The production fix is unchanged; this reworks only
the test.
- Bound the wait for the handler-start signal and select on the request
goroutine's error and on an early serve() exit, so a request that never
reaches the handler fails promptly instead of hanging until the package-wide
timeout.
- Restructure into a table, per AGENTS.md:256 / CLAUDE.md:256 ("table-driven
tests against target behaviour"): a request that drains within
ShutdownTimeout returns nil, and a request still in flight when it elapses is
force-closed and still returns nil.
The overrun row was verified to fail against the previous
"return server.Shutdown(shutdownCtx)" and to pass against the approved
force-close. Both rows hold the request in flight deterministically, so no case
depends on machine load.
The per-identity sweep skipped the root forge and root repo list whenever
[[identities]] was configured, on the reasoning that Run never polls them
there. Polling is not the only way a task reaches a repo: dispatchBinding
enqueues with an empty identity, resolveBindingRepo falls back to the root
repo list, and forgeFor/repoFor resolve an empty identity to the root forge
and root repos. Root targets stay reachable in multi-identity mode, so they
stay worth verifying at boot.
Collapse both sweeps into one sweepAccess path over the root plus every
identity. Each forge is swept in its own goroutine under its own deadline:
Startup gates the gateways and the run loop and a forge client carries no
request deadline, so warning on a failed sweep isolated a failing sibling
but not a stalled one.
Test is table-driven over single-identity, multi-identity, and an identity
with no repos.
Message.Sender's doc comment asserted "role discrimination uses Role, never this
field", which the code contradicts: at the gateway wire boundary Role is
deliberately dropped and rebuilt from Sender via RoleForSender, and the wire
carries no role field at all.
The comment was wrong, not the code. gatewayrpc already documents the design
(values.go:28, server.go:152 -- "The wire carries no role; both sides derive from
... messaging.RoleForSender"), and RoleForSender's own comment states the rule.
Only the Sender comment disagreed, so it is corrected to say that Role is
authoritative in-process while Sender is preserved for the wire reconstruction,
history search, and transcript rendering.
Resolves .local/issue-tracker messaging-2. Doc-only: no behaviour change.
The gate failed intermittently with "task: Failed to run task \"test\": exit
status 1" and a tailed log that hid the failing package. The package was
cmd/archie-ui, which sorts before internal/logging and so never appeared in the
visible tail.
Cause: serve() returned the error from server.Shutdown, which is
context.DeadlineExceeded whenever a request is still draining when
ShutdownTimeout elapses. That converted a normal load-induced overrun into a
non-zero process exit, and TestUIProcessServesTheDashboardAgainstLiveDependencies
asserts a clean exit after SIGTERM.
Fix at the producer, in serve(): on overrun, force-close the remaining
connections and report a clean shutdown. No timeout is lengthened, no retry,
skip or -p 1 is added, and the smoke test's assertion is untouched.
Reproduced under parallel build load: -count=30 on the suspect test produced the
exact shutdown-deadline signature once; after the fix, 30/30 pass with zero
occurrences. The new test drives the deadline path deterministically by holding
a request in flight rather than relying on machine load.
archie.reaction.* had no matching stream. bootstrap.go:501-502 bound only
ARCHIE_TASKS to archie.task.> under WorkQueuePolicy, so any publish to a
reaction subject made js.PublishMsg fail and the publisher saw a publish error
-- the reason a previously landed reaction producer would have answered HTTP 500
on every webhook delivery.
ARCHIE_TASKS must stay WorkQueuePolicy: under it a second consumer on an
overlapping filter subject silently receives nothing, which is the trap recorded
in CLAUDE.md. Reactions need the opposite property, so they get a second stream:
- workintake.SubjectReactionWildcard ("archie.reaction.>")
- nats.DefaultReactionStreamName ("ARCHIE_REACTIONS")
- nats.FanOutRetention(), a pointer helper so composition can select
LimitsPolicy without importing the NATS SDK, since nil Retention already means
WorkQueuePolicy and the zero value (LimitsPolicy) is a valid explicit choice
- a second nats.Connect in connectNATS carrying that stream, closed on failure
and registered for shutdown cleanup
Red-then-green: TestConnectNATSCreatesReactionStream failed with "publish to
archie.reaction.* = nats: no response from stream, want it to land in
ARCHIE_REACTIONS" before the stream existed.
Step 1 of docs/prds/pr-review-remediation.md (bead archie-core-8li9.1).
daemon.Startup ran the invitation sweep and push verification only against the
root forge and Cfg().Repos. In multi-identity mode Run branches to
runIdentities, where each identity polls its own forge and its own repo list --
so per-identity invitations were never accepted and per-identity repos were
never push-verified. A task from those repos failed later at dispatch instead of
warning at boot.
Startup now branches on len(d.Identities) and sweeps each identity through
sweepIdentity, which reuses id.Forge and id.Repos -- the same IdentityRunner
fields runIdentities and pollForIdentity already iterate, so there is no second
identity-to-forge mapping. One identity's forge outage cannot abort a sibling's
sweep: failures are logged as warnings, matching Run's stated failure-isolation
intent.
Red-then-green: TestStartupSweepsEveryIdentityForgeAndRepos failed with
"identity one AcceptInvitations = 0, want 1" (and both identities' repos empty)
before the change.
/restart could never work in production. boot.setupGateways captured the
Telegram adapter's restart callback into boot.restartTelegram, a field no code
ever read, so gateway.Router.Restart was nil in every composition:
handleRestartAdapter always answered "not configured" and LocalChatAdapter's
snapshot always reported RestartAvailable: false.
Fix at the producer: buildTelegramRouter assigns Router.Restart directly from
the adapter it already holds. The dead field and the telegramSetup.RegisterRestart
indirection are deleted rather than kept alive.
Red-then-green: TestBuildTelegramRouterWiresRestartCallback failed with
"router.Restart = nil, want the telegram adapter restart callback wired into the
router" before the change. TestBuildTelegramRouterRestartUnconfigured pins the
unchanged no-adapter behaviour, including the not-configured reply.
ServiceSpec.Context documented which addresses a service must end up with, but
nothing read it, so a typo'd context was accepted and meant nothing. Review
caught it as scaffolding that looked load-bearing.
RegisterService now validates it: an unknown context, or a hosted (server/both)
service registered with no default listen address, panics. Registrations come
from this repository's own init(), never from operator input, so an invalid one
is a programming error with no caller positioned to handle an error return, and
failing at process start beats a service binding where nobody dials.
Services.RequireTarget replaces the same check and message hand-written in
composeStateStoreClient and composeChatContract. An empty registered default
target is what declares a target operator-supplied, so the requirement belongs
to the registry rather than to each consumer. It stays a lazy check at
composition time rather than becoming load-time validation: a process that
never dials a service must still load a configuration that omits it.
The review's stated failure mode does not occur. A hosted service with an empty
listen does not reach net.Listen as an ephemeral port; resolveServiceListen
returns "no listen address" and archied refuses to start. The defect was the
inert field, not a silent bind.
Refs: archie-core-u23g
Status moves to Decided. Six amendments, all found by measuring the draft
against the tree and against what PR #859 produced from it:
- Sequencing gains the reaction stream as step 1. The parent decision already
requires ARCHIE_REACTIONS under LimitsPolicy and 7d5u.2 parameterised
Retention for it, but no stream exists, so every publish to archie.reaction.*
fails against no matching stream.
- The owned-task guard becomes its own step. The (owner, repo, pr_number)
lookup it depends on does not exist: pr_number is written and never read in
a WHERE clause, so it needs a store method, a StateStoreService RPC and an
index.
- The producers move to the end. A producer built before its consumer and its
guard publishes into nothing, and becomes an unguarded intake the moment a
stream appears.
- Idempotency keys gain the reaction kind. Review IDs and review-comment IDs
are independent forge sequences, so the bare id let the two collide.
- A review is the unit of remediation, never a comment. One review with eight
inline comments would otherwise mean eight builder runs, eight gates and
eight pushes to answer one review. Runs also serialise per task regardless
of allow_concurrent.
- Only archie's own comments are excluded, not all bots'. The external review
bot is the main source of findings on an archie-opened PR. Because that
makes bot comments actionable, the exchange can run away between two bots
with no human involved, so remediation rounds are capped by max_retries.
Withdraws the RepliesAfter citation: no such mechanism exists in the tree.
The selection criteria alone left workflow optional and defaulted an omitted
or unrecognised value to implement, so a decide call could still skip the
decision and send an unsettled capability straight to the builder.
Omission is now a retryable rejection: CaptureTool gains RequiredWhenTrue, a
conditional requirement a flat RequiredFields entry cannot express, because
the close-without-change branch has no workflow to name and must not be made
to invent one. A rejected call is not recorded, so it does not consume
MaxCalls and the model retries with the field.
A value outside the enum now fails the stage rather than degrading to
implement: reaching OnResult with one means the model ignored its own schema.
Splits validateCaptureArgs into per-constraint checks (cyclop) and carries
the regenerated contracts.json.
The classify stage picked between implement, tdd and feasibility with no
stated criteria: the mission spent its guidance on needs_code_change and the
schema said only 'Which workflow fits best', with implement as the free
default for an omitted or unrecognised answer. Issue 813 was classified
implement on that basis.
Both surfaces now state what each workflow is for and say not to pick
implement merely because nothing else obviously fits. The mission moves to a
named triageMission so a test can assert the criteria reach the model.
Closes archie-core-s5ys