task check's go fix pass rewrote the test helper to Go 1.26's generic
new(v) and marked it //go:fix inline. Committed from the gate rather than
left dirty in the tree.
Origin validation compared the request's Origin against the daemon's own
direct connection: scheme from r.TLS, host from r.Host. Behind a TLS-
terminating reverse proxy the browser sends Origin: https://host while the
daemon sees a plain HTTP connection, so every dashboard mutation was
refused as cross-origin.
Taking X-Forwarded-Proto/-Host unconditionally would be worse than the bug:
any client can set them, so an exposed daemon would let an attacker forge
the scheme half of the CSRF check. They are honoured only when
web.trust_forwarded_headers is explicitly enabled, which is off by default
and documented as safe only behind a proxy that overwrites or strips
untrusted forwarded headers.
authorizeTaskMutation becomes a method because the decision now depends on
server configuration; its three call sites move with it.