Webhook intake answers 503 and counts no refusal while the chain loads.
The readiness probe reads the chain on every check. The UI never exits on
a first-load failure. An invalid instance policy closes the instance but
lets an instance admin repair policies. Outage pages are 503, and the
health detail names the unloaded chain.
IsLoopback(":8484") returned true: the empty host fell through the
switch as loopback, so a wildcard bind skipped the non-loopback token
requirement and served every interface unauthenticated. An empty host is
the wildcard, not loopback.
A State Store that was unreachable at startup left the access chain nil,
and authorize treated nil as no chain at all: every request passed the
credential check, no principal or org reached the context, the State Store
defaulted each call to org-sys, and the instance-only surfaces were served.
The dashboard stayed open until a restart.
Build a chain with no engine when the first load is Unavailable; it refuses
every request with 503 (or the notice page for a browser) until the first
load succeeds, and Run keeps retrying so the dashboard recovers without a
restart. A denial is not recorded, because nothing was evaluated.
The setup terminal created its PTY at a fixed 24x80 while the browser
measured its own box and threw the measurement away, so a full-screen CLI
login drew into a corner of a much larger xterm.
OpenRequest now carries a ConsoleSize with the target frame; the route
reads cols/rows from the WebSocket URL, falling back to 24x80 when they
are absent or out of range, and the daemon creates the PTY at that
geometry. The component sends the size it measured before connecting.
Live resize is the follow-on: it needs a control channel on the WebSocket,
which today is a raw byte copy.
The dashboard's setup terminal was a 503: it had a WebSocket route, an
authorizer and an xterm.js surface, but nothing owned a container. The
daemon owns containers, so the session contract lands there and the
dashboard consumes it over a new gRPC contract.
One session concept, two targets. A setup session is addressed by Kit
profile and is ephemeral; a run session (archie-core-qi91) is addressed by
task and attempt and is bounded by the task. This slice serves setup and
answers Unimplemented for run.
The contract, the authorisation, the lifetime and the egress phase are
settled in docs/prds/external-agent-harness.md, "Session contract". The
short version: the daemon serves harness.v1.HarnessService; the dashboard
authorizes the operator as an update on the secret and then dials the
daemon with the harness service token, required even on loopback because a
session is a shell holding an org's credential; the setup container runs
no worker, mounts no worktree, holds a keepalive, and carries an empty
container environment. Install hooks run at the install phase and the
session enters runtime before the shell, so a runtime-phase credential's
token endpoint is the one the proxy intercepts.
Capture is gated by the egress proxy on a granted service, and a setup
session has no task, so the daemon registers a session grant: the
session's proxy token resolves to the org's bindings for the Kit's
declared services. The real token never enters the container: the token
endpoint response is sentinelized and stored as the org's harness secret.
Every teardown path releases the pool slot, revokes the egress session and
the grant, removes the sandbox network, and removes the session's volumes.
The listener requires HARNESS_TOKEN and stops with a 10s grace before
Stop, so an open session cannot hold shutdown to the watchdog leash.
29 of 59 directives did nothing. Removing each one individually and
re-running the gate revealed no issue from any of them: 20 named gosec,
which is not enabled in .golangci.yml and never has been, plus 4 nilerr
in functions that return no error, 2 dupl where dupl reports nothing
repo-wide, and one each of contextcheck, nestif and unused. The funlen
name on settings.go:147 is gone for the same reason; its gocyclo and
cyclop names are both live.
The unused directive in webui/authorize.go sat on `var _ = slog.Default`,
a statement that only existed to keep the log/slog import alive. Both go.
The 30 remaining directives all suppress a real issue.
Each finished stage records the run's step results; a retry may name a resume
point, and the next attempt skips the steps before it with their results
loaded. A run with a repository resumes only on its pushed branch. The canvas
offers Resume/Re-run from here on parked runs.