RedactPayload only redacted values under a fixed set of sensitive key
names, so a sender that names a secret field something else leaked it into
captured_events.body. Harden the heuristic:
- broaden the key-name markers (compound names like access_token,
client_secret, signing_key, x_api_key, webhook_secret, refresh_token)
and keep gateway.sensitiveParameterKey identical to preserve the
documented agreement between the two redaction paths.
- add value-shape detection: a compact JWT or a PEM private-key block is
redacted under any key, catching the 'sender named the field something
the heuristic misses' gap.
- keep it conservative so schema-by-example field mapping still works:
only unambiguous shapes (eyJ-prefixed JWTs, PEM key blocks) are
redacted by value, never ordinary content.
Best-effort per docs/prds/webhook-intake-security.md point 5.
Refs archie-core-t2db (captured_events.body redaction)
binding.Binding.Secret was persisted as plaintext in the bindings.secret
column, so anyone with the SQLite file saw sender-side HMAC secrets. Seal
it with AES-256-GCM transparently inside the store: encrypt-on-write,
decrypt-on-read.
- cipher: AES-256-GCM, 12-byte random nonce, SHA-256-normalised 32-byte
key resolved through the secret registry ([bindings].encryption_key).
- envelope 'arcie-binding:v1:<fingerprint>:<b64(nonce||ct||tag)>' so a
future cipher/KDF change is a version bump and old rows stay readable.
- rotation via previous_encryption_keys; key identity is the material's
SHA-256 fingerprint embedded in each row.
- legacy plaintext rows written before a key was configured stay readable;
encryption is not retroactive.
- nil cipher (no key configured) preserves the pre-t2db.7 plaintext path.
Deferred: captured_events.body redaction upgrade (separate concern, see
docs/prds/binding-secret-encryption.md).
Refs archie-core-t2db.7