An action judgement holds at propose and wait is no longer a dead end. The
new approvals module owns the request: it binds to the decision and the
action's digest, so an answer covers the action the person was shown and
nothing else, and it settles once. The answer wakes the run, which judges the
action again and runs it only as the approval allows: a refusal still refuses,
an altered input runs nothing, and a judgement that came back worse runs
nothing on that approval.
The composer carries the request as a message with the request id and its
deadline, and its answer is a message too, so the trail shows what was asked
and what was answered. A request nobody answers inside its deadline is settled
as expired and nothing runs.
How long a request waits is an organisation setting, edited in the dashboard
and stored in milliseconds, because a Postgres interval scans as text. A run
pins the deadline it started with, like its model.
An agent that proposes the same action twice is asked about it once, and the
notification says when the investigation proposed nothing at all.
It also said its tools only read, which stopped being true when actions became tools. Judgement decides whether an action runs, so calling one is the proposal.
A new judgement module assesses one concrete action: hard rules refuse before
any guard runs; every guard sets a ceiling and the action runs at the lowest;
a guard that fails, panics or gives no ceiling holds it at propose and wait;
an advisory verdict is recorded and sets no ceiling. Reversibility and
Precedent (the fresh-install class default) are the first guards. Every
decision is recorded with its verdicts and class, and the run's trail lists
them. Agent tools now offer connector actions too: each call is assessed and
executed only as decided and only with the judged input, and a held action
comes back to the agent as a failed call naming its level and findings.
Tools gain Resolve, so an MCP server's declared effect reaches judgement.
Since the MCP migration made accepted.tools NOT NULL, the connector and secret
engine accept path never set it, so re-accepting any connector failed with a
not-null violation.
Killing the binary mid-investigation and restarting it failed the run: the
first model request after the resume didn't match the recorded one. The tool
schemas pinned in a step reached the live attempt as written but the resume
as stored, and both the v2 encoder (compacting raw JSON) and jsonb (reordering
keys) rewrite them. Step now returns the decoded recorded value on the live
path too, and runs.steps.output is json, which keeps the text as written.
An alert about a filesystem carries instance and mountpoint, and those are the
labels the forecast query needs, so the prompt names both and gives the query
that answers what an operator asks: the seconds until the disk is full, from
predict_linear and deriv over the same window. A negative figure is the
filesystem not filling, which the prompt says to report as that rather than as
a time.
Two faults stopped an investigation from finishing on staging.
The runtime role was granted DML on every table but nothing on sequences, so
the first table keyed by a serial (deliveries.messages) failed its insert with
"permission denied for sequence messages_seq_seq", failing the run at its
notification step.
A run that failed has no result, and a step with no output is recorded as NULL;
the rows were read straight into jsontext.Value, which can't hold NULL, so the
trail API answered 500 for exactly the runs and steps that needed reading. The
reads coalesce to JSON null instead.
Verified on staging after deploying: the same run's trail reads back.
The dashboard registered "/api/" and then "GET /", which ServeMux refuses:
"GET /" names fewer methods than "/api/" but a more general path, so a binary
with the dashboard built in panicked on start. Staging went down on the deploy
that first shipped both.
One handler behind one pattern decides instead: an unclaimed /api/ path is a
JSON 404, the page is read-only, and everything else is a route inside the SPA.
The test reproduces the panic against the old routing, and pins what each path
answers.
An investigation needs Prometheus's own metrics, and Prometheus publishes an
MCP server, so the connectors module now runs MCP servers as published instead
of wrapping them: a stdio binary in its own user and network namespace with an
egress allow-list, or an HTTP endpoint dialled through declared egress.
Acceptance names the transport, the tools it permits, and the credential slots
that resolve into the server's environment (stdio) or Authorization header
(HTTP). Each permitted tool is declared as a lookup, or as an action with its
effect; a tool the server lists but the acceptance doesn't name is never
offered, and a declared tool the server doesn't list fails the start rather
than going silently missing. Declared tools reach agents beside connector
lookups through the same declaration and the same call path, with the server's
own input schema, under a name no connector can take: an accepted name runs one
package.
A server that fails to start, exits or stops answering is reported by readiness
and reconnected with backoff. Tool calls carry a deadline, results are capped,
and an error result fails its call with the server's own text rather than the
run.
The investigate prompt now asks for a time-until-full figure from
`predict_linear` through the metrics server instead of an estimate from raw
points.
The old core MCP path stays for now: the legacy gateway and task containers
still read config.Tools.MCPServers, so it goes with them.
GET /api/runs/{id} assembles a run's trail from rows already kept: the event
and trigger that started it, each workflow step, and each model and tool call
from the agent's journal. Investigations end by notifying their findings on
the composer, whose messages are read from a cursor with a live stream that
only says when to read. The binary serves its own SPA entry, archie.html,
calling only the new API. The investigate prompt now treats the event as a
claim to check against what it measures.
Docker's default seccomp profile refuses the clone the extension host
confines with, so a connector that declares egress couldn't start. The profile
is Docker's default plus that clone, limited to the user and network
namespace flags.
Credentials are typed (machine, age), write-only through the API and sealed
to the age identity in the bootstrap config. A field holds a value or names a
secret engine key; connectors and engines are accepted with credential slots
that resolve into their Configure secrets. The secret engine contract gains
secrets so an engine can receive its own key.
The agent model is an organisation setting in the new governance module.
Every model and tool call is a journal step, so a killed run resumes without
repeating either. Agents are offered connector lookups and read-only actions
only, until judgement exists.