32 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
sam d6f3a1a01d docs(connectors): describe the extension kinds table accurately (#2084) 2026-11-21 15:00:01 +11:00
sam 23f23a6cab fix(connectors): refuse to store a contract that has no group (#2084) 2026-11-21 14:59:48 +11:00
sam 64ef2c9af7 feat(connectors): group extensions as platform, integration or agent (#2084) 2026-11-21 14:58:53 +11:00
sam f47e60db00 refactor(events,deliveries): split source saving and plain the new prose (#2021, #2016) 2026-11-21 13:52:33 +11:00
sam 29a06f7c54 Merge branch 'worktree-agent-a2d0eb6dd8a9d5b66' 2026-11-21 13:47:46 +11:00
sam 01eb4aaf7c fix(events): verify webhook signatures before parsing (#2021)
A source now declares how its deliveries prove themselves: token (the
default, unchanged), hmac (HMAC-SHA256 over the raw body, per-source header
and prefix, secret sealed at rest and write-only) or none. The events module
verifies before the connector parses, answers 401 and logs the refusal.

The digest comparison is ported from internal/webhookguard/hmac.go and the
header-borne signature from internal/infrastructure/captureintake/receiver.go;
the old copies stay until their service goes. The seal package moves to
internal/platform/seal so events can seal the secret.
2026-11-21 13:46:48 +11:00
sam b48616798d fix(deliveries): stop retrying a delivery the channel rejects for good (#2016) 2026-11-21 13:45:31 +11:00
sam 81bca2251e fix(app): retry startup and atomically seed policies (#2081) 2026-11-21 11:45:18 +11:00
sam 98c0c11cbb feat(chat): track session taint and hold mutations in tainted conversations (#2068)
A conversation gets a persisted tainted flag (migration 00040), set the
first time output from a tool whose declaration trust level is not
"trusted" enters the turn, before that output reaches the model. The
flag is only ever set, never cleared, so later turns and resumed
processes inherit it. In a tainted conversation every non-read-only
action is raised to a floor of propose_and_wait, so the existing hold
path renders the approval card with the exact judged action; read-only
lookups still run, and a hard-rule refusal stays a refusal. An
unreadable taint state or a failed taint write fails closed. Trust
levels live on connectors.Declaration; unknown levels are untrusted.
2026-11-21 03:15:04 +11:00
samandCopilot 264062866c feat(ui): run events, workflows, runs, controls and settings pages on the archie binary (#2023)
Events (sources, triggers), workflows (list, document, YAML publish,
read-only canvas), runs with approvals and the decision trail, controls
(policies, guards, action classes), agent models, accepted extensions,
secret engines and credentials now read the binary's API. Capabilities
name every section, so pages the binary can't back yet (the visual
workflow editor, captures, mappings, bindings, the extension catalogue,
model aliases and the rest) stay in the tree, hidden. Adds
GET /api/credential-kinds for the credentials form.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-11-20 01:04:29 +11:00
sam 1026d5e3b6 feat(httpapi): the API is described by an OpenAPI document generated with Huma (#2028)
Every /api operation is registered with Huma behind one admin-token
middleware, served at /api/openapi.json with a docs page at /api/docs,
and committed as api/openapi.yaml, which task check keeps current.
2026-11-16 20:05:05 +11:00
sam 52b027955b feat(connectors): a secret setting is resolved through its engine before the extension starts (#2026) 2026-11-16 13:46:48 +11:00
sam 053ed58c08 feat(connectors): an extension declares the settings it reads, and each accepted package is listed (#2026) 2026-11-16 13:45:12 +11:00
sam 2f802e04a4 Merge branch 'worktree-agent-a1bd90c329b751a72' 2026-11-16 12:06:07 +11:00
sam 124d2033fc feat(guard): a judge record keeps the request, response, path, status and latency of every model call 2026-11-16 12:06:05 +11:00
sam 4b97ac5841 feat(audit): a connector call keeps the request core sent and the response it received
Resolve, target facts, invoke, lookup, deliver and parse record the protobuf wire messages as JSON on the context recorder the owning module supplies. Credentials are redacted and a body over 1 MiB keeps its prefix, full length and SHA-256. Judgement stores the resolve and target facts in the decision body and appends the executed invoke to it.
2026-11-16 12:06:05 +11:00
sam 4cdb5996c5 feat(guard): a model judge's answer, basis and eval standing are recorded in every verdict, clean answers included (audit requirement) 2026-11-16 11:12:15 +11:00
sam 88afd1ebc9 feat(guard,runs): a guard is shown the agent's diagnosis and the evidence it read before proposing an action (#2006) 2026-11-16 09:55:14 +11:00
sam a4a4e97f07 feat(judgement): a target's owner is looked up from the connectors at decision time, and an unknown owner is a finding that sends the request to the default owner (#1991) 2026-11-16 09:49:33 +11:00
sam 55077620bb feat(judgement,connectors): guard extension contract; every running guard judges with the built-ins and records its name and digest (archie #1986) 2026-11-16 05:17:58 +11:00
sam 4e1f1b3c4d feat(connectors): an accepted package can be removed, and a secret engine credentials still use is refused (archie #2013) 2026-11-16 04:31:29 +11:00
sam 7903a0e225 feat(connectors,deliveries,events): channels are connectors that deliver and listen; messages retry from their rows, and answers arrive as events (archie #1984, #1985) 2026-11-16 04:22:52 +11:00
sam 3a700cddfa fix(connectors,runs): an approved action runs as judged however its input was re-encoded, and one that can't be confirmed is reported as unknown (archie #1985, #1990) 2026-11-16 04:08:15 +11:00
sam 0dbf241106 feat(judgement): the weakest-link decision, and executing only what was judged (#1986, #1989, #1990, #1988)
A new judgement module assesses one concrete action: hard rules refuse before
any guard runs; every guard sets a ceiling and the action runs at the lowest;
a guard that fails, panics or gives no ceiling holds it at propose and wait;
an advisory verdict is recorded and sets no ceiling. Reversibility and
Precedent (the fresh-install class default) are the first guards. Every
decision is recorded with its verdicts and class, and the run's trail lists
them. Agent tools now offer connector actions too: each call is assessed and
executed only as decided and only with the judged input, and a held action
comes back to the agent as a failed call naming its level and findings.
Tools gain Resolve, so an MCP server's declared effect reaches judgement.
2026-11-16 01:05:29 +11:00
sam a6644c20cd fix(connectors): accepting a connector writes an empty tool list, not NULL
Since the MCP migration made accepted.tools NOT NULL, the connector and secret
engine accept path never set it, so re-accepting any connector failed with a
not-null violation.
2026-11-16 00:44:02 +11:00
sam deb3865d75 chore: use generic host names in a deploy comment and test labels 2026-11-16 00:13:04 +11:00
sam cf249d7643 feat(connectors): MCP servers as a fourth accepted package, with their declared tools offered to agents (archie #2005)
An investigation needs Prometheus's own metrics, and Prometheus publishes an
MCP server, so the connectors module now runs MCP servers as published instead
of wrapping them: a stdio binary in its own user and network namespace with an
egress allow-list, or an HTTP endpoint dialled through declared egress.

Acceptance names the transport, the tools it permits, and the credential slots
that resolve into the server's environment (stdio) or Authorization header
(HTTP). Each permitted tool is declared as a lookup, or as an action with its
effect; a tool the server lists but the acceptance doesn't name is never
offered, and a declared tool the server doesn't list fails the start rather
than going silently missing. Declared tools reach agents beside connector
lookups through the same declaration and the same call path, with the server's
own input schema, under a name no connector can take: an accepted name runs one
package.

A server that fails to start, exits or stops answering is reported by readiness
and reconnected with backoff. Tool calls carry a deadline, results are capped,
and an error result fails its call with the server's own text rather than the
run.

The investigate prompt now asks for a time-until-full figure from
`predict_linear` through the metrics server instead of an estimate from raw
points.

The old core MCP path stays for now: the legacy gateway and task containers
still read config.Tools.MCPServers, so it goes with them.
2026-11-15 23:43:39 +11:00
sam e787a79af4 feat(connectors): credentials sealed with age, and secret engines that resolve them (#1977, #1982)
Credentials are typed (machine, age), write-only through the API and sealed
to the age identity in the bootstrap config. A field holds a value or names a
secret engine key; connectors and engines are accepted with credential slots
that resolve into their Configure secrets. The secret engine contract gains
secrets so an engine can receive its own key.
2026-11-15 22:14:26 +11:00
sam 02df83ccb7 feat(runs): the in-process agent loop, checkpointed as run steps, and the investigate workflow (#1977, #1889)
The agent model is an organisation setting in the new governance module.
Every model and tool call is a journal step, so a killed run resumes without
repeating either. Agents are offered connector lookups and read-only actions
only, until judgement exists.
2026-11-15 21:49:53 +11:00
sam 68d81fbbd0 refactor: the single binary uses encoding/json/v2 and jsontext (#1977) 2026-11-15 18:11:37 +11:00
sam b89d9e0f05 feat(events): hear Alertmanager through its connector: verified intake, dedupe, links, triggers that start runs (#1980, #1978) 2026-11-15 18:05:38 +11:00
sam 58858f0d92 feat(connectors): the connector contract and its confined extension host (#1979) 2026-11-15 17:24:31 +11:00