Cookies took Secure from r.TLS, which is nil behind a proxy that terminates
TLS, so sign-in cookies went out without it. Every dashboard cookie now goes
through one builder that reads the scheme the way the origin check does.
The worktree reset and the agent worker's chown walk use os.Root, so a
symlink swapped in mid-walk can't point them outside the worktree.
gosec runs in golangci-lint, tests included. G104, G115, G204 and G304 are
excluded in config; each remaining finding is fixed or suppressed at the site
with its reason.
Archie runs its own agent loop only. Removes Kit resolution and launch,
the harness runner and adapters, the setup terminal and sandbox view,
harness secrets and OAuth capture (table dropped in migration 0075), the
task-tools contract that only Kit containers reached, and the
sandbox-kit-spec dependency. Agent profiles carry image and tools only.
The egress proxy keeps the model-session path; the sandbox relay code
stays for #1867.
Model usage was recorded per call and never read, so an org could not see
what it spent. Add the read side:
- model_usage carries identity_id. Task calls take it from the task row,
chat and curator calls from the calling principal carried in the usage
record, so an outbox replay keeps its attribution. Existing task rows are
backfilled from tasks.
- StatsService.UsageTotals sums the caller org's rows by UTC day, source,
provider, model and identity. The org comes from the principal, with no
org parameter, so cross-org reads do not exist.
- GET /api/usage prices tokens at the catalog's list rate, netting cache
hits, and reports calls to unpriced models as tokens only. The published
catalog view now carries each model's cost.
- A new org Usage page behind a read_usage grant: admin and owner only,
with a 7, 30 or 90 day range, totals, the daily series, and model, source
and identity breakdowns. The org shell keeps it on the caller's own org.
Same pattern as the bindings pilot: eventTypesAPI (registers unconditionally,
list answers enabled:false without a store), mappingsAPI and sourcesAPI
(constructed only when their store is configured, 503 stub otherwise).
Shared helpers unsignedSources/recentRefusals/listedIn stay on Server; the
dispatch-ledger handler stays shared for captures/tasks. task check green.
Pilot for one-module-per-resource: bindingsAPI owns the /api/bindings*
routes and their handlers, constructed only when the binding store is
configured; a 503 stub mounts the same routes otherwise, preserving the
old not-configured answers. Handlers move off *Server unchanged in
behavior; the shared dispatch-ledger handler stays on Server for the
captures/tasks routes. task check green.
The canary now authenticates as a dedicated service-account identity in the
system org whose only grant is access.CalaryGrantPolicy: read the signal
endpoints (chat update, alerts, logs, tasks), read and write the
update-settings resource, and trigger an update install. CANARY_TOKEN no
longer carries instance admin; DEPLOY_TOKEN stays CI-only.
- authorize: POST /api/chat/update/install and /defer map to
update on Object::"update" (dashboard) instead of run on any workflow,
so the grant can cover installs without granting workflow runs
- accounts: active service-account identities may authenticate with bearer
tokens (CanAct), not just users
- new POST /api/identities/{id}/tokens (behind manage_identities) mints a
token for a named non-user identity; new AccountService RPC
BindIdentityPersonalToken backs it remotely, refusing user-kind targets,
with the caller recorded as audit actor
- engine tests pin the grant's exact allow/deny surface
RELEASING.md documents the one-time setup. task check passes on this tree.
The loop runner hooks every model call and tool call and reports ordered,
redacted, clipped entries. Each is persisted as an agent_transcript task
event through InsertEvent, left out of the timeline read, and served per
attempt at /api/tasks/{id}/transcript. The step run view shows it with Trace.
Add [access].denial_retention (default 90 days, matching the audit-retention
seed) wired through config defaults and validation; the State Store sweeps
denial records older than the configured age hourly via the new
access.DenialPruner / PruneDenials store query. The dashboard gains
GET /api/access/denials (read_audit-gated, so org admins/owners see their
org's records; the store scopes by the credential's org) and an
/org/denials page backed by a Pinia store.
Schedules list as a table with enable, run now, edit, duplicate, delete and
view runs; built-ins only enable, retime and run. The runs page links each
run's tasks through its capture's dispatches. The Start node gains a Schedule
trigger that picks or creates a schedule and binds the schedule source to the
workflow. Times show in a per-browser display zone set under Appearance; the
cron time zone and run retention are edited on the Schedules page.
archied, archie-ui and the tool gateway re-read the stored policies on a 30s
ticker, so a forbid written seconds earlier did not stop a run. One
instance-wide revision now moves inside the transaction of every policy write,
and a decision reads it first and rebuilds the engine only when it moved.
A version read that fails, or a policy list that fails after a bump, refuses
with ErrChainUnavailable instead of standing on the last chain, so three call
sites now treat unavailable as availability rather than denial: dispatch leaves
the capture for the next cycle, a task start parks transient, and the tool
gateway reports the tool as unavailable.
Personas were a misread requirement: SOUL is the chat identity and
identities are per action. The selected persona's prompt never reached the
model. Drops the resource, /personality, the chat selector, the settings
page and ChatService.SetPersona, and deletes stored persona documents.
* feat(archied): read-only run-scoped sandbox view over the harness contract
Serve RunTarget: the daemon resolves a running task and attempt to its Kit
container and follows its output, refusing a finished or unknown task with a
stated reason. The dashboard adds a Sandbox tab behind the task log's read
authority. Takeover stays out of scope until the sod1 authority is wired.
* fix(archied): scope and close sandbox views correctly
Forward harness activity into container output, bind containers and dashboard views to their attempt, enforce the asserted org, and report unavailable dependencies and interrupted streams accurately.
Refs: archie-core-qi91, archie-core-252tj
* feat(state): durable operator alerts owned by the State Store
Alerts dedup on org+kind+subject, resolve themselves when a condition
clears, and are raised, resolved, dismissed and listed through the state
contract. Task transitions raise needs-human and failed alerts in the same
transaction; the store checks service health and prunes closed alerts.
Each raise and resolve queues a webhook delivery whose attempts are kept.
* feat(notify): deliver operator alerts to the webhook; raise config and release alerts
notify.webhook now receives raised and resolved alerts above a severity
threshold with HMAC-signed payloads, bounded retry and every attempt recorded
on the alert. archied raises model alias, provider and credential-binding
alerts from the effective configuration, an update alert from the release
channel, and a credential-rejected alert from the egress resolver. The
dashboard API lists and dismisses the caller's org's alerts.
* feat(ui): alert bell in the top bar and webhook alert settings
The bell lists the org's open alerts by severity with dismiss and a link per
alert, and refreshes from the event stream. The task settings page gains the
webhook severity threshold and signing secret. ui/dist rebuilt.
POST /api/orgs/{id}/members binds a person by subject, or by email as a
placeholder. The first sign-in whose provider vouches for that email
claims it: the State Store moves the binding onto the provider's subject
in one statement, so a second account with the same address finds
nothing to claim and later sign-ins rest on the subject alone.
Webhook intake answers 503 and counts no refusal while the chain loads.
The readiness probe reads the chain on every check. The UI never exits on
a first-load failure. An invalid instance policy closes the instance but
lets an instance admin repair policies. Outage pages are 503, and the
health detail names the unloaded chain.