From f47e60db0077d10f3a88d7831d151807a90c4673 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sam Catlow Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2026 13:52:33 +1100 Subject: [PATCH] refactor(events,deliveries): split source saving and plain the new prose (#2021, #2016) --- api/openapi.yaml | 12 +- .../connector/v1/connector_grpc.pb.go | 8 +- .../00042_events_source_verification.sql | 4 +- .../pg/migrations/00043_deliveries_failed.sql | 5 +- modules/connectors/connector.go | 13 +- modules/deliveries/deliveries.go | 7 +- modules/deliveries/internal/store/store.go | 4 +- modules/events/api.go | 141 +++++++++++------- modules/events/events.go | 21 +-- modules/events/internal/store/store.go | 9 +- modules/events/verify.go | 10 +- modules/events/verify_test.go | 5 +- proto/connector/v1/connector.proto | 4 +- ui/src/events/SourceList.vue | 6 +- 14 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 110 deletions(-) diff --git a/api/openapi.yaml b/api/openapi.yaml index 4dda6079b..fb236e536 100644 --- a/api/openapi.yaml +++ b/api/openapi.yaml @@ -948,7 +948,7 @@ components: source: type: string token: - description: Shown once, for a token source; only its hash is stored + description: Returned once for a token source; only its hash is stored type: string url: description: Where the sender posts its events @@ -2084,18 +2084,18 @@ components: description: The connector that parses this source's events type: string hmac_header: - description: The header that carries the signature, for hmac + description: The header that carries the signature (hmac only) type: string hmac_prefix: - description: Text before the hex digest in that header, such as sha256=, for hmac + description: Text before the hex digest in the signature header, such as sha256= (hmac only) examples: - sha256= type: string hmac_secret: - description: "The shared signing secret, for hmac. Write-only: it is sealed and never returned" + description: "The shared signing secret (hmac only). Write-only: it is sealed and never returned" type: string verification: - description: "How a delivery proves itself: a bearer token, an HMAC-SHA256 signature of the body, or nothing" + description: "How deliveries are verified: a bearer token, an HMAC-SHA256 signature of the body, or no verification" enum: - token - hmac @@ -5381,7 +5381,7 @@ paths: schema: $ref: "#/components/schemas/ErrorModel" description: Error - summary: Add a source, or change how it verifies deliveries and rotate its token + summary: Add or update a source, its verification scheme and its token tags: - Events /api/sources/{name}/key-fields: diff --git a/internal/contracts/connector/v1/connector_grpc.pb.go b/internal/contracts/connector/v1/connector_grpc.pb.go index 79bc67f3b..84a3a3e55 100644 --- a/internal/contracts/connector/v1/connector_grpc.pb.go +++ b/internal/contracts/connector/v1/connector_grpc.pb.go @@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ type ConnectorServiceClient interface { // delivery is never offered to an agent: hard rules apply to it, guards // don't. The host retries a failed delivery, so a connector should make a // repeat with the same idempotency key harmless where its service allows. - // A connector answers InvalidArgument, FailedPrecondition, PermissionDenied - // or NotFound when the service refuses the delivery for good: the host + // A connector returns InvalidArgument, FailedPrecondition, PermissionDenied + // or NotFound when the service rejects the delivery permanently: the host // records the reason and stops retrying. Any other status is retried. Deliver(ctx context.Context, in *DeliverRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*DeliverResponse, error) // Listen streams the events of a source the connector holds its own @@ -213,8 +213,8 @@ type ConnectorServiceServer interface { // delivery is never offered to an agent: hard rules apply to it, guards // don't. The host retries a failed delivery, so a connector should make a // repeat with the same idempotency key harmless where its service allows. - // A connector answers InvalidArgument, FailedPrecondition, PermissionDenied - // or NotFound when the service refuses the delivery for good: the host + // A connector returns InvalidArgument, FailedPrecondition, PermissionDenied + // or NotFound when the service rejects the delivery permanently: the host // records the reason and stops retrying. Any other status is retried. Deliver(context.Context, *DeliverRequest) (*DeliverResponse, error) // Listen streams the events of a source the connector holds its own diff --git a/internal/platform/pg/migrations/00042_events_source_verification.sql b/internal/platform/pg/migrations/00042_events_source_verification.sql index e2ce1e48b..8ef243a57 100644 --- a/internal/platform/pg/migrations/00042_events_source_verification.sql +++ b/internal/platform/pg/migrations/00042_events_source_verification.sql @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -- +goose Up -- How a source's deliveries are verified. A token source checks the bearer --- token and an hmac source checks a signature over the raw body with a shared --- secret, which is kept sealed. A source that chose none checks nothing. +-- token. An hmac source checks a signature over the raw body using a shared +-- secret, which is stored sealed. A source set to none performs no check. ALTER TABLE events.sources ADD COLUMN verification text NOT NULL DEFAULT 'token' CHECK (verification IN ('token', 'hmac', 'none')), diff --git a/internal/platform/pg/migrations/00043_deliveries_failed.sql b/internal/platform/pg/migrations/00043_deliveries_failed.sql index c1a7c39b9..2eb6c5c27 100644 --- a/internal/platform/pg/migrations/00043_deliveries_failed.sql +++ b/internal/platform/pg/migrations/00043_deliveries_failed.sql @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ -- +goose Up --- A delivery the channel refuses for good, or that keeps failing past the retry --- limit, is failed rather than retried: failed_at stops the worker claiming it. +-- A delivery that the channel rejects permanently, or that still fails at the +-- retry limit, is marked failed instead of retried. The worker does not claim +-- rows with failed_at set. ALTER TABLE deliveries.messages ADD COLUMN failed_at timestamptz; DROP INDEX deliveries.messages_due; CREATE INDEX messages_due ON deliveries.messages (next_attempt_at) WHERE sent_at IS NULL AND failed_at IS NULL; diff --git a/modules/connectors/connector.go b/modules/connectors/connector.go index ac5c08dbf..508b48e5d 100644 --- a/modules/connectors/connector.go +++ b/modules/connectors/connector.go @@ -31,10 +31,11 @@ var ( // ErrUnknownName names an action, lookup or event type the connector // never declared. ErrUnknownName = errors.New("not declared by the connector") - // ErrRejected means a delivery was refused in a way a retry can't change: - // the connector answered InvalidArgument, FailedPrecondition, - // PermissionDenied or NotFound, or the input broke the declared schema. - ErrRejected = errors.New("delivery rejected for good") + // ErrRejected means a delivery was rejected permanently, so retrying it + // cannot succeed: the connector returned InvalidArgument, + // FailedPrecondition, PermissionDenied or NotFound, or the input did not + // match the declared schema. + ErrRejected = errors.New("delivery permanently rejected") ) // Reversibility says whether and how an action can be undone. @@ -249,8 +250,8 @@ func (c *Connector) Deliver(ctx context.Context, name string, input jsontext.Val return resp.GetExternalId(), nil } -// rejectedForGood reports whether a connector's error says the same delivery -// can never succeed. +// rejectedForGood reports whether a connector's error status means that +// retrying the same delivery cannot succeed. func rejectedForGood(err error) bool { switch status.Code(err) { case codes.InvalidArgument, codes.FailedPrecondition, codes.PermissionDenied, codes.NotFound: diff --git a/modules/deliveries/deliveries.go b/modules/deliveries/deliveries.go index 6544df363..411aedf4d 100644 --- a/modules/deliveries/deliveries.go +++ b/modules/deliveries/deliveries.go @@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ // dashboard, is the first channel: its messages are rows a client reads from a // cursor, with a live stream that only says when to read. Every accepted // connector that delivers messages is another: each gets its own row, retried -// until the connector confirms it, refuses it for good, or the attempts run out. +// until the connector confirms it, rejects it permanently, or the retry limit +// is reached. package deliveries import ( @@ -228,8 +229,8 @@ func (m *Module) deliver(ctx context.Context, msg store.Message) { } } -// recordFailure stores why an attempt failed, and ends the delivery when the -// channel refused it for good or the attempts are spent. +// recordFailure records why an attempt failed. It marks the delivery failed +// when the channel rejected it permanently or the retry limit is reached. func (m *Module) recordFailure(ctx context.Context, msg store.Message, cause error, took time.Duration) { record := m.store.Failed reason := cause.Error() diff --git a/modules/deliveries/internal/store/store.go b/modules/deliveries/internal/store/store.go index 34f81efae..af2134838 100644 --- a/modules/deliveries/internal/store/store.go +++ b/modules/deliveries/internal/store/store.go @@ -171,8 +171,8 @@ func (s *Store) Failed(ctx context.Context, seq int64, attempt int, reason strin `UPDATE deliveries.messages SET last_error = $2 WHERE seq = $1`, reason) } -// GaveUp records the attempt that ended a delivery for good: the message is -// marked failed and no worker claims it again. +// GaveUp records the final attempt of a delivery and marks the message failed, +// so no worker claims it again. func (s *Store) GaveUp(ctx context.Context, seq int64, attempt int, reason string, took time.Duration) error { return s.attempt(ctx, seq, attempt, attemptOutcome{failure: reason, took: took}, `UPDATE deliveries.messages SET failed_at = now(), last_error = $2 WHERE seq = $1`, reason) diff --git a/modules/events/api.go b/modules/events/api.go index e49cc7dd6..6576c7365 100644 --- a/modules/events/api.go +++ b/modules/events/api.go @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ func (m *Module) Register(api huma.API) { }, m.sources) huma.Register(api, huma.Operation{ OperationID: "put-source", Method: http.MethodPut, Path: "/api/sources/{name}", - Summary: "Add a source, or change how it verifies deliveries and rotate its token", Tags: tags, + Summary: "Add or update a source, its verification scheme and its token", Tags: tags, }, m.putSource) huma.Register(api, huma.Operation{ OperationID: "put-source-key-fields", Method: http.MethodPut, Path: "/api/sources/{name}/key-fields", @@ -61,25 +61,26 @@ type putSourceInput struct { Name string `path:"name" doc:"Lowercase letters, digits and hyphens; the webhook URL ends in it"` Body struct { Connector string `json:"connector" doc:"The connector that parses this source's events"` - // Verification defaults to a bearer token so a source that names none - // keeps working. - Verification string `json:"verification,omitzero" enum:"token,hmac,none" doc:"How a delivery proves itself: a bearer token, an HMAC-SHA256 signature of the body, or nothing"` - HMACHeader string `json:"hmac_header,omitzero" doc:"The header that carries the signature, for hmac"` - HMACPrefix string `json:"hmac_prefix,omitzero" doc:"Text before the hex digest in that header, such as sha256=, for hmac" example:"sha256="` - HMACSecret string `json:"hmac_secret,omitzero" doc:"The shared signing secret, for hmac. Write-only: it is sealed and never returned"` + // A new source without a scheme uses a bearer token, so existing + // senders keep working. + Verification string `json:"verification,omitzero" enum:"token,hmac,none" doc:"How deliveries are verified: a bearer token, an HMAC-SHA256 signature of the body, or no verification"` + HMACHeader string `json:"hmac_header,omitzero" doc:"The header that carries the signature (hmac only)"` + HMACPrefix string `json:"hmac_prefix,omitzero" doc:"Text before the hex digest in the signature header, such as sha256= (hmac only)" example:"sha256="` + HMACSecret string `json:"hmac_secret,omitzero" doc:"The shared signing secret (hmac only). Write-only: it is sealed and never returned"` } } type sourceCreated struct { Source string `json:"source"` - Token string `json:"token,omitzero" doc:"Shown once, for a token source; only its hash is stored"` + Token string `json:"token,omitzero" doc:"Returned once for a token source; only its hash is stored"` URL string `json:"url" doc:"Where the sender posts its events"` } -// putSource creates a source or changes it. A save that names no verification -// keeps the stored scheme and its credentials. A token is returned once, when -// a token scheme is chosen, and stored only as its hash. An hmac secret is -// sealed and never returned; leaving it blank keeps the sealed one. +// putSource creates or updates a source. A save that omits verification keeps +// the stored scheme and its credentials. A token is returned only when the +// token scheme is chosen explicitly or the source is new, and only its hash is +// stored. An HMAC secret is sealed and never returned; a blank secret keeps the +// sealed one. func (m *Module) putSource(ctx context.Context, in *putSourceInput) (*httpapi.Reply[sourceCreated], error) { if !validName.MatchString(in.Name) || !validName.MatchString(in.Body.Connector) { return nil, huma.Error400BadRequest("a source needs a lowercase name and a connector") @@ -88,55 +89,77 @@ func (m *Module) putSource(ctx context.Context, in *putSourceInput) (*httpapi.Re if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotFound) { return nil, huma.Error500InternalServerError("couldn't read the source", err) } - found := err == nil - created := sourceCreated{Source: in.Name, URL: "/hooks/" + in.Name} - src := store.Source{OrgID: m.orgID, Name: in.Name, Connector: in.Body.Connector, Verification: in.Body.Verification} - switch { - case src.Verification == "" && found: - // Naming no scheme keeps the stored one with its token or secret, so - // a save can't downgrade a source. - src = existing - src.Connector = in.Body.Connector - case src.Verification == "": - src.Verification = store.Token + var stored *store.Source + if err == nil { + stored = &existing } - if src.Verification == store.Token && (!found || in.Body.Verification != "") { - token, err := newToken() - if err != nil { - return nil, huma.Error500InternalServerError("couldn't make a token", err) - } - src.TokenSHA256, created.Token = httpjson.TokenHash(token), token - } - switch src.Verification { - case store.Token, store.None: - if in.Body.Verification != "" && src.Verification == store.None { - src.TokenSHA256 = "" - } - case store.HMAC: - if in.Body.Verification != "" { - src.HMACHeader, src.HMACPrefix, src.TokenSHA256 = in.Body.HMACHeader, in.Body.HMACPrefix, "" - switch { - case in.Body.HMACSecret != "": - sealed, err := m.sealer.Seal(secretLabel(m.orgID, in.Name), []byte(in.Body.HMACSecret)) - if err != nil { - return nil, huma.Error500InternalServerError("couldn't seal the secret", err) - } - src.HMACSecretSealed = sealed - case found && existing.Verification == store.HMAC: - // A blank secret keeps the sealed one. - src.HMACSecretSealed = existing.HMACSecretSealed - } - } - if src.HMACHeader == "" || len(src.HMACSecretSealed) == 0 { - return nil, huma.Error400BadRequest("an hmac source needs the signature header and a secret") - } - default: - return nil, huma.Error400BadRequest("verification is token, hmac or none") + src, token, err := m.sourceToSave(in, stored) + if err != nil { + return nil, err } if err := m.store.UpsertSource(ctx, src); err != nil { return nil, huma.Error500InternalServerError("couldn't save the source", err) } - return httpapi.OK(created), nil + return httpapi.OK(sourceCreated{Source: in.Name, Token: token, URL: "/hooks/" + in.Name}), nil +} + +// sourceToSave builds the row to store from the request and the stored source, +// if there is one. It returns the new token when one was issued. +func (m *Module) sourceToSave(in *putSourceInput, stored *store.Source) (store.Source, string, error) { + explicit := in.Body.Verification != "" + src := store.Source{OrgID: m.orgID, Name: in.Name, Connector: in.Body.Connector, Verification: in.Body.Verification} + switch { + case !explicit && stored != nil: + // Omitting the scheme keeps the stored one with its token or secret, so + // a save cannot downgrade a source. + src = *stored + src.Connector = in.Body.Connector + case !explicit: + src.Verification = store.Token + } + switch src.Verification { + case store.Token: + if stored != nil && !explicit { + return src, "", nil + } + token, err := newToken() + if err != nil { + return src, "", huma.Error500InternalServerError("couldn't generate a token", err) + } + src.TokenSHA256 = httpjson.TokenHash(token) + return src, token, nil + case store.None: + return src, "", nil + case store.HMAC: + if explicit { + if err := m.setHMAC(&src, in, stored); err != nil { + return src, "", err + } + } + if src.HMACHeader == "" || len(src.HMACSecretSealed) == 0 { + return src, "", huma.Error400BadRequest("an HMAC source needs a signature header and a secret") + } + return src, "", nil + default: + return src, "", huma.Error400BadRequest("verification must be token, hmac or none") + } +} + +// setHMAC applies the requested HMAC settings. A blank secret keeps the sealed +// secret of a source that already uses HMAC. +func (m *Module) setHMAC(src *store.Source, in *putSourceInput, stored *store.Source) error { + src.HMACHeader, src.HMACPrefix = in.Body.HMACHeader, in.Body.HMACPrefix + switch { + case in.Body.HMACSecret != "": + sealed, err := m.sealer.Seal(secretLabel(m.orgID, in.Name), []byte(in.Body.HMACSecret)) + if err != nil { + return huma.Error500InternalServerError("couldn't seal the secret", err) + } + src.HMACSecretSealed = sealed + case stored != nil && stored.Verification == store.HMAC: + src.HMACSecretSealed = stored.HMACSecretSealed + } + return nil } type putTriggerInput struct { @@ -279,8 +302,10 @@ func (m *Module) sources(ctx context.Context, _ *struct{}) (*httpapi.Reply[[]sou } out := make([]sourceView, 0, len(sources)) for _, src := range sources { - view := sourceView{Name: src.Name, Connector: src.Connector, TokenSet: src.TokenSHA256 != "", KeyFields: []string{}, - Verification: src.Verification, HMACHeader: src.HMACHeader, HMACPrefix: src.HMACPrefix, HMACSecretSet: len(src.HMACSecretSealed) > 0} + view := sourceView{ + Name: src.Name, Connector: src.Connector, TokenSet: src.TokenSHA256 != "", KeyFields: []string{}, + Verification: src.Verification, HMACHeader: src.HMACHeader, HMACPrefix: src.HMACPrefix, HMACSecretSet: len(src.HMACSecretSealed) > 0, + } if len(src.KeyFields) > 0 { if err := json.Unmarshal(src.KeyFields, &view.KeyFields); err != nil { m.log.ErrorContext(ctx, "read source key fields", "source", src.Name, "error", err) diff --git a/modules/events/events.go b/modules/events/events.go index 7bf9295ab..e7191b17e 100644 --- a/modules/events/events.go +++ b/modules/events/events.go @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ func NewModule(db *sqlx.DB, log *slog.Logger, orgID string, sealer Sealer, c Con return m } -// sourceReader is the one read intake makes of the store. +// sourceReader is the store method that intake uses to look up a source. type sourceReader interface { Source(ctx context.Context, orgID, name string) (store.Source, error) } @@ -98,9 +98,9 @@ func (m *Module) Routes(mux *http.ServeMux) { mux.HandleFunc("POST /hooks/{source}", m.intake) } -// intake has the source's connector parse a verified delivery and stores each -// event before answering. A re-delivered event is a constraint conflict, -// counted as a duplicate. +// intake verifies a delivery, parses it with the source's connector and stores +// each event before responding. A redelivered event violates a uniqueness +// constraint and is counted as a duplicate. func (m *Module) intake(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { src, parsed, body, status, err := m.accept(r) if err != nil { @@ -115,10 +115,11 @@ func (m *Module) intake(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { httpjson.Write(w, http.StatusAccepted, map[string]int{"stored": stored, "duplicates": duplicates}) } -// accept verifies a delivery against its source's scheme, then has the -// connector parse it. A delivery that fails verification is refused with 401 -// before the connector sees its body, and the refusal is logged. An unknown -// source and a failed delivery answer alike, so neither is probed. +// accept verifies a delivery against its source's scheme, then passes it to +// the connector for parsing. A delivery that fails verification is rejected +// with 401 before the connector sees its body, and the rejection is logged. +// An unknown source and a failed verification get the same response, so a +// caller cannot use it to discover source names. func (m *Module) accept(r *http.Request) (src store.Source, parsed []connectors.Event, body []byte, status int, err error) { ctx := r.Context() src, err = m.reader.Source(ctx, m.orgID, r.PathValue("source")) @@ -163,8 +164,8 @@ var ( errConnectorDown = errors.New("connector isn't running") ) -// refuse logs why a delivery was turned away and picks its status: 401 when it -// failed to prove itself, 503 when verification couldn't run. +// refuse logs why a delivery was rejected and chooses the status: 401 when +// verification failed, 503 when verification could not run. func (m *Module) refuse(ctx context.Context, src store.Source, err error) (store.Source, []connectors.Event, []byte, int, error) { m.log.WarnContext(ctx, "refused webhook delivery", "source", src.Name, "verification", src.Verification, "reason", err.Error()) if errors.Is(err, errUnverified) { diff --git a/modules/events/internal/store/store.go b/modules/events/internal/store/store.go index a0acb3ef4..fb9f1b7f3 100644 --- a/modules/events/internal/store/store.go +++ b/modules/events/internal/store/store.go @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ import ( // ErrNotFound means the named row doesn't exist. var ErrNotFound = errors.New("not found") -// The ways a source verifies a delivery. +// Verification schemes for a source's deliveries. const ( Token = "token" HMAC = "hmac" @@ -31,10 +31,11 @@ type Source struct { Name string `db:"name"` Connector string `db:"connector"` TokenSHA256 string `db:"token_sha256"` - // Verification is how a delivery proves itself: Token, HMAC or None. + // Verification is the scheme that deliveries must pass: Token, HMAC or None. Verification string `db:"verification"` - // HMACHeader carries the signature, HMACPrefix precedes its hex digest, - // and HMACSecretSealed is the shared secret, sealed. + // HMACHeader names the header that carries the signature, HMACPrefix is + // the text before its hex digest, and HMACSecretSealed is the sealed + // shared secret. HMACHeader string `db:"hmac_header"` HMACPrefix string `db:"hmac_prefix"` HMACSecretSealed []byte `db:"hmac_secret_sealed"` diff --git a/modules/events/verify.go b/modules/events/verify.go index 189da35d4..74249ab0c 100644 --- a/modules/events/verify.go +++ b/modules/events/verify.go @@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ func secretLabel(orgID, name string) string { return "events.sources/" + orgID + "/" + name + "/hmac" } -// errUnverified means a delivery didn't prove itself. Its text is safe to -// log: it names the scheme, never a secret or a signature. +// errUnverified means a delivery failed verification. Its text is safe to log: +// it names the scheme, never a secret or a signature. var errUnverified = errors.New("delivery not verified") // checkToken verifies a token source before its body is read. @@ -39,9 +39,9 @@ func checkToken(src store.Source, r *http.Request) error { } // verifyHMAC checks the signature header against an HMAC-SHA256 of the raw -// body, which the connector hasn't seen yet. The header holds the hex digest -// after the source's prefix, in either case. An absent or malformed -// signature never verifies. +// body, before the connector sees it. The header holds the hex digest, in +// either case, after the source's prefix. A missing or malformed signature +// always fails. // // Ported from internal/webhookguard/hmac.go (digest comparison) and // internal/infrastructure/captureintake/receiver.go (header-borne signature), diff --git a/modules/events/verify_test.go b/modules/events/verify_test.go index 11e0c126f..5d8a024ac 100644 --- a/modules/events/verify_test.go +++ b/modules/events/verify_test.go @@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import ( "crypto/hmac" "crypto/sha256" "encoding/hex" - "io" "log/slog" "net/http" "net/http/httptest" @@ -73,13 +72,13 @@ func TestHMACSourceVerifiesBeforeParsing(t *testing.T) { parsed := false m := &Module{ orgID: "org", reader: fakeSources{src}, sealer: sealer, - log: slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), + log: slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler), parse: func(context.Context, string, []byte, map[string]string) ([]connectors.Event, error) { parsed = true return nil, nil }, } - req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/hooks/hook", strings.NewReader(body)) + req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodPost, "/hooks/hook", strings.NewReader(body)) req.SetPathValue("source", "hook") if tt.header != "" { req.Header.Set("X-Signature", tt.header) diff --git a/proto/connector/v1/connector.proto b/proto/connector/v1/connector.proto index 4991b0da5..539fe641b 100644 --- a/proto/connector/v1/connector.proto +++ b/proto/connector/v1/connector.proto @@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ service ConnectorService { // delivery is never offered to an agent: hard rules apply to it, guards // don't. The host retries a failed delivery, so a connector should make a // repeat with the same idempotency key harmless where its service allows. - // A connector answers InvalidArgument, FailedPrecondition, PermissionDenied - // or NotFound when the service refuses the delivery for good: the host + // A connector returns InvalidArgument, FailedPrecondition, PermissionDenied + // or NotFound when the service rejects the delivery permanently: the host // records the reason and stops retrying. Any other status is retried. rpc Deliver(DeliverRequest) returns (DeliverResponse); // Listen streams the events of a source the connector holds its own diff --git a/ui/src/events/SourceList.vue b/ui/src/events/SourceList.vue index d701a85df..a99e07c68 100644 --- a/ui/src/events/SourceList.vue +++ b/ui/src/events/SourceList.vue @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ onMounted(() => { const columns: DataTableColumn[] = [ { id: "name", label: "Source", fixed: true, sort: (s) => s.name }, { id: "connector", label: "Connector", sort: (s) => s.connector }, - { id: "verification", label: "Verified by" }, + { id: "verification", label: "Verification" }, { id: "key", label: "Grouped by" }, ]; @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ const connectorNames = computed(() => (connectors.data.value ?? []).map((c) => c - +