feat(identity): verify provider tokens and attribute task actions to their actor
Two halves of one boundary: a credential resolves to an identity, and an action records which identity acted and whose authority it used. resource server. internal/infrastructure/oidc verifies a provider-issued bearer token against the provider's published keys, using an OSS OIDC library: archie compares no signature, validates no claim and rotates no key itself, holds no client secret and issues no session, so a compromised archie cannot mint an identity. Audience is required rather than optional -- a token minted for another service must not authenticate here -- and discovery happens at construction, so an unreachable provider is a startup failure rather than a request-time surprise. identity.Authenticate is the single place a credential becomes an identity, and it refuses in four distinguishable ways: no credential presented, a credential that did not verify (wrong key, expired, wrong issuer, wrong audience, malformed), a verified subject with no identity bound to it, and an identity that may not act. The order is deliberate: verification happens before any field of the token is used, so nothing an unverified token carries can select an identity. A suspended identity is refused even though its credential verified, because suspension is archie's decision and must not depend on the provider withdrawing a token. The binding is the second bridge beside the legacy-name alias: identity_subjects keys (issuer, subject) so the same subject string from another issuer is a different caller, and rebinding moves a subject so two identities can never claim one provider subject. The contract Authenticate needs is SubjectResolver, narrower than Repository, so a consumer that only authenticates does not take the whole identity CRUD surface -- and staterpc.Client, which asserts Repository, does not need a new RPC to satisfy it. attribution. taskactions now records two identities per action: the acting identity and the authorising principal, both on the event row as new columns added through the existing migration table. The rule that the bug turned on is enforced by the event kind describing the actor: a person's approval is human_approved, an agent's is agent_approved, and an action with no verified actor is task_approved, a task-level event that credits nobody. An agent acting under a person's standing approval records itself as the actor and that person as the principal, so "approved by came from me" is answerable from the record rather than asserted. Scope and actor are separated: scope decides which task a caller may touch and is never promoted into an actor, because the dashboard's credential is a shared token and possession of it is not evidence that a person was at the keyboard. That last point is a deliberate fidelity trade, and the reason the transport is not wired: the dashboard action path passes no actor yet, so dashboard approvals are now recorded as task_approved rather than claimed as a human's. Recording nothing false is the requirement; naming the human verifiably needs the dashboard to authenticate a token and resolve it, which needs two new state-store RPCs (ResolveIdentitySubject, BindIdentitySubject) -- the next piece, not a rewrite: the verifier is a one-method interface, so introspection would be a second implementation of it. Verified: task check exit 0; focused runs recorded in the handoff. Opaque authelia_at_ tokens were inspected rather than assumed and cannot be verified against public keys; infra is configuring access_token_signed_response_alg RS256 on the archie client, with audience https://archie.catlow.cloud and issuer https://auth.catlow.cloud.
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@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ func TestActionErrorKeepsItsSentinelAcrossNATS(t *testing.T) {
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t.Fatalf("error %v (%T) is not %v", err, err, tc.want)
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}
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// The wording the operator reads survives too, not just the class.
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direct := service.Apply(t.Context(), nil, 7, tc.action)
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direct := service.Apply(t.Context(), nil, domain.Actor{}, 7, tc.action)
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if direct == nil || err.Error() != direct.Error() {
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t.Fatalf("remote message = %q, want the daemon's own %v", err.Error(), direct)
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}
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@@ -122,17 +122,17 @@ func TestActionErrorKeepsItsSentinelAcrossNATS(t *testing.T) {
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}
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// TestActionScopeCrossesNATS pins the operator scope over the same hop: a nil
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// identity is an authenticated dashboard operator, and JSON has to carry that
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// absence rather than an empty name. The service records which one acted, so
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// the timeline is the observable.
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// identity is a caller authenticated across identities, and JSON has to carry
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// that absence rather than an empty name. The scope decides which task may be
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// touched and nothing else -- it is not an actor, so it must not change what the
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// timeline says about who acted.
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func TestActionScopeCrossesNATS(t *testing.T) {
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for _, tc := range []struct {
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name string
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identity *string
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want string
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}{
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{name: "operator", want: "abandoned via the dashboard"},
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{name: "chat identity", identity: new("scout"), want: "abandoned via chat"},
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{name: "operator scope"},
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{name: "chat identity scope", identity: new("scout")},
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} {
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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srv := startEmbedded(t)
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@@ -159,8 +159,17 @@ func TestActionScopeCrossesNATS(t *testing.T) {
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if result.TaskID != 7 {
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t.Fatalf("result = %+v, want task 7", result)
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}
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if published.Detail != tc.want {
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t.Fatalf("event detail = %q, want %q", published.Detail, tc.want)
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// No actor crosses this hop yet, so the action is recorded with no
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// actor at all -- and the scope must not be promoted into one.
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if published.ActorID != "" || published.PrincipalID != "" {
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t.Fatalf("scope was recorded as an actor: %+v", published)
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}
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if published.Kind != events.KindTaskAbandoned {
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t.Fatalf("event kind = %q, want %q", published.Kind, events.KindTaskAbandoned)
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}
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const want = "abandoned with no recorded actor"
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if published.Detail != want {
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t.Fatalf("event detail = %q, want %q", published.Detail, want)
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}
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})
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}
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