diff --git a/internal/infrastructure/egress/ca.go b/internal/infrastructure/egress/ca.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..351705ed9 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/infrastructure/egress/ca.go @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ +package egress + +import ( + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/elliptic" + "crypto/rand" + "crypto/tls" + "crypto/x509" + "crypto/x509/pkix" + "encoding/pem" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io/fs" + "math/big" + "net" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "sync" + "time" +) + +const ( + caCertFile = "ca.pem" + caKeyFile = "ca-key.pem" + + caLifetime = 10 * 365 * 24 * time.Hour + leafLifetime = 7 * 24 * time.Hour +) + +// CA is the daemon's egress certificate authority. Sandbox containers trust +// it so the proxy can terminate their TLS; nothing outside a sandbox does. +// It persists across restarts because every running container was started +// trusting this exact certificate. +type CA struct { + cert *x509.Certificate + certPEM []byte + key *ecdsa.PrivateKey + + mu sync.Mutex + leaves map[string]*tls.Certificate +} + +// LoadOrCreateCA loads the CA from dir, creating it on first use. A CA that +// exists but will not load is an error: minting a replacement silently +// would break trust in every running container. +func LoadOrCreateCA(dir string) (*CA, error) { + certPath, keyPath := filepath.Join(dir, caCertFile), filepath.Join(dir, caKeyFile) + certPEM, certErr := os.ReadFile(certPath) + keyPEM, keyErr := os.ReadFile(keyPath) + switch { + case certErr == nil && keyErr == nil: + return parseCA(certPEM, keyPEM) + case errors.Is(certErr, fs.ErrNotExist) && errors.Is(keyErr, fs.ErrNotExist): + return createCA(dir, certPath, keyPath) + case certErr != nil && !errors.Is(certErr, fs.ErrNotExist): + return nil, fmt.Errorf("read egress CA certificate: %w", certErr) + case keyErr != nil && !errors.Is(keyErr, fs.ErrNotExist): + return nil, fmt.Errorf("read egress CA key: %w", keyErr) + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("egress CA in %s is incomplete: one of %s and %s is missing", dir, caCertFile, caKeyFile) + } +} + +func createCA(dir, certPath, keyPath string) (*CA, error) { + key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + now := time.Now() + template := &x509.Certificate{ + SerialNumber: serial(), + Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "archie egress CA"}, + NotBefore: now.Add(-time.Hour), + NotAfter: now.Add(caLifetime), + IsCA: true, + BasicConstraintsValid: true, + MaxPathLenZero: true, + KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageCertSign | x509.KeyUsageCRLSign, + } + der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, template, template, &key.PublicKey, key) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + keyDER, err := x509.MarshalECPrivateKey(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + certPEM := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: der}) + keyPEM := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "EC PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: keyDER}) + if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o700); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if err := os.WriteFile(keyPath, keyPEM, 0o600); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if err := os.WriteFile(certPath, certPEM, 0o644); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return parseCA(certPEM, keyPEM) +} + +func parseCA(certPEM, keyPEM []byte) (*CA, error) { + certBlock, _ := pem.Decode(certPEM) + if certBlock == nil { + return nil, errors.New("egress CA certificate is not PEM") + } + cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(certBlock.Bytes) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse egress CA certificate: %w", err) + } + keyBlock, _ := pem.Decode(keyPEM) + if keyBlock == nil { + return nil, errors.New("egress CA key is not PEM") + } + key, err := x509.ParseECPrivateKey(keyBlock.Bytes) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse egress CA key: %w", err) + } + if !key.PublicKey.Equal(cert.PublicKey) { + return nil, errors.New("egress CA key does not match its certificate") + } + return &CA{cert: cert, certPEM: certPEM, key: key, leaves: map[string]*tls.Certificate{}}, nil +} + +// CertPEM is the certificate a sandbox container installs as trusted. +func (c *CA) CertPEM() []byte { return c.certPEM } + +// leaf returns a certificate for host signed by the CA, issuing it once and +// reusing it until it nears expiry. +func (c *CA) leaf(host string) (*tls.Certificate, error) { + c.mu.Lock() + defer c.mu.Unlock() + if cached, ok := c.leaves[host]; ok && time.Until(cached.Leaf.NotAfter) > leafLifetime/2 { + return cached, nil + } + key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + now := time.Now() + template := &x509.Certificate{ + SerialNumber: serial(), + Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: host}, + NotBefore: now.Add(-time.Hour), + NotAfter: now.Add(leafLifetime), + KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature, + ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth}, + } + if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil { + template.IPAddresses = []net.IP{ip} + } else { + template.DNSNames = []string{host} + } + der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, template, c.cert, &key.PublicKey, c.key) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + parsed, err := x509.ParseCertificate(der) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + issued := &tls.Certificate{Certificate: [][]byte{der}, PrivateKey: key, Leaf: parsed} + c.leaves[host] = issued + return issued, nil +} + +func serial() *big.Int { + n, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 127)) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + return n +} diff --git a/internal/infrastructure/egress/ca_test.go b/internal/infrastructure/egress/ca_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7e1cfe5fb --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/infrastructure/egress/ca_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +package egress + +import ( + "crypto/tls" + "crypto/x509" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "testing" +) + +func verifyLeaf(t *testing.T, ca *CA, leaf *tls.Certificate, name string) error { + t.Helper() + pool := x509.NewCertPool() + if !pool.AppendCertsFromPEM(ca.CertPEM()) { + t.Fatal("CertPEM is not a PEM certificate") + } + cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(leaf.Certificate[0]) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + _, err = cert.Verify(x509.VerifyOptions{DNSName: name, Roots: pool}) + return err +} + +func TestCAPersistsAcrossLoads(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + first, err := LoadOrCreateCA(dir) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + second, err := LoadOrCreateCA(dir) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if string(first.CertPEM()) != string(second.CertPEM()) { + t.Fatal("reloading the CA produced a different certificate; every container would stop trusting the proxy") + } + info, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, caKeyFile)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if perm := info.Mode().Perm(); perm != 0o600 { + t.Fatalf("CA key is mode %o, want 600", perm) + } +} + +func TestCAIssuesVerifiableLeaves(t *testing.T) { + ca, err := LoadOrCreateCA(t.TempDir()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + for _, host := range []string{"api.example.com", "10.0.0.5"} { + leaf, err := ca.leaf(host) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("leaf(%q): %v", host, err) + } + if err := verifyLeaf(t, ca, leaf, host); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("leaf for %q does not verify: %v", host, err) + } + if err := verifyLeaf(t, ca, leaf, "other.example.com"); err == nil { + t.Fatalf("leaf for %q also verifies for another host", host) + } + again, err := ca.leaf(host) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if again != leaf { + t.Fatalf("leaf for %q is re-signed on every connection", host) + } + } +} + +func TestCARejectsATamperedKey(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + if _, err := LoadOrCreateCA(dir); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, caKeyFile), []byte("not a key"), 0o600); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if _, err := LoadOrCreateCA(dir); err == nil { + t.Fatal("a corrupt CA key loaded; the proxy must fail closed rather than mint a new CA silently") + } +}