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@@ -55,10 +55,10 @@ Save. The binding starts in **draft** -- nothing fires yet.
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## 5. Approve it
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A **draft** or freshly-**edited** binding needs explicit approval
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before it can ever match a live event -- this is deliberate, not a missing step:
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an operator authoring a binding is a considered act, an event arriving is not,
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and nothing should self-arm. Click **Approve**. Status becomes **armed**.
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A **draft** or freshly-**edited** binding needs explicit approval before it can
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ever match a live event -- this is deliberate, not a missing step: an operator
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authoring a binding is a considered act, an event arriving is not, and nothing
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should self-arm. Click **Approve**. Status becomes **armed**.
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## 6. Fire it for real
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@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
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# PR review benchmark
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```
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task bench:prreview
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```
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Reviews the 38 runnable Martian pull requests once each at `deep` depth with the
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production pipeline, judges the posted comments against the golden comments in
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`internal/app/prbench/martian.json`, and writes
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`docs/benchmarks/pr-review-<timestamp>.md` (recall per PR, overall recall,
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precision, models, archie version). Commit that file with the run.
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- Models come from the config at `~/.config/archie/config.toml`: the reviewer
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and judge both default to its `default` alias. Override with
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`task bench:prreview -- -model ALIAS_OR_PROVIDER/MODEL -judge-model ALIAS_OR_PROVIDER/MODEL`.
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Pick a judge other than the reviewer's model for an independent judgement.
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Aliases set only in the dashboard are not in the file; pass a `provider/model`
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ref instead.
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- Pull requests are public, so no credential is needed. `GH_TOKEN` or
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`GITHUB_TOKEN`, if set, only raises the GitHub API rate limit.
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- `-problems ID,ID` runs a partial smoke run; its report says it is not the
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acceptance run. A full run reports PASS when nothing failed and golden
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micro-recall is at least 0.70.
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- It is not part of `task test` and posts nothing to any pull request.
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@@ -4,11 +4,11 @@
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persistently takes on development of archie-core itself. This file records a
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desired state, not an implementation or a product: nothing below exists unless
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the "Built today" section says so. The plan is tracked as epic #1769 with child
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issues #1770–#1775. This file is a record, not a mechanism: agents only see
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what is in their context, so verify every claim here against the code before
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acting on it — where they disagree, the code wins. The boundary below is
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load-bearing only where it is enforced (the gate, access control, the daemon's
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git monopoly) and stated in `AGENTS.md`; everywhere else this file is a pointer.
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issues #1770–#1775. This file is a record, not a mechanism: agents only see what
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is in their context, so verify every claim here against the code before acting
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on it — where they disagree, the code wins. The boundary below is load-bearing
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only where it is enforced (the gate, access control, the daemon's git monopoly)
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and stated in `AGENTS.md`; everywhere else this file is a pointer.
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## Built today
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@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ workflows, the adversarial self-review stage before a PR opens (epic #1348,
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closed), the prbench judge for review quality with its acceptance bar, canary
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releases judged on the installed release (releaseupdate), and the curator
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engine. What does not exist is the loop itself: no self-intake curator, no
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approved-issue auto-run, no judge for diffs, no outcome distillation, no
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canary routing specific to self-directed changes.
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approved-issue auto-run, no judge for diffs, no outcome distillation, no canary
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routing specific to self-directed changes.
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## Decision
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@@ -54,35 +54,35 @@ accounts by unverified email, or create an administrator.
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## Enforcement inventory
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| Location | Enforcement | Regression evidence |
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| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
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| Browser credential gate: `webui/auth.go`, `accounts.go` | Account session or verified provider identity; shared dashboard token is not a person when accounts are enabled. No API data before authentication. | `TestAccountBoundary`, `TestAccountSessionFailureIsClosed` |
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| Browser policy gate: `webui/authorize.go` | Resolve principal from stored identity; evaluate action against stored org/workspace and resource kind before handler. Missing chain refuses. | `TestHTTPPolicyCannotBeBypassed`, `TestAuthorizeRefusesWithoutAChain`, `TestAuthorizeRecord`, `TestTaskAuthorizationUsesStoredAttributes`, `TestAuthorizeCreateIn` |
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| Instance-only HTTP surfaces: `webui/instance_only.go`, server route registration | Hide instance-owned configuration and diagnostics from another org; policy still applies first. | `TestInstanceOnlyHidesTheInstanceFromOtherOrgs`, `TestInstanceAdminOrgs` |
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| First setup: `webui/accounts.go`, `postgres/accounts.go` | Initial organization, workspace, instance URL, admin identity and password commit together. Transaction lock closes bootstrap after first account; later requests require `manage_members`. | Disposable PostgreSQL smoke verification for bootstrap race and rollback; account policy tests below |
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| Account creation: `webui/accounts.go`, `staterpc/accounts.go`, `postgres/accounts.go` | Cedar `manage_members` at HTTP and RPC; target org is authenticated context. New local accounts cannot request owner role. | `TestAccountManagementUsesPolicy`, `TestAccountBoundary` |
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| Local passwords and sessions: `identity/password.go`, `postgres/accounts.go` | Argon2id, independent salts, length/common-password checks, generic login refusal, account throttling, session hashes and expiry, revocation on logout/password change/suspension. | `TestPasswordVerification`, `TestAccountBoundary`; disposable PostgreSQL session verification |
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| Transport and CSRF: `webui/accounts.go`, `api_tasks.go` | Password/account mutations require HTTPS or localhost development, JSON, custom CSRF header and same-origin requests. Forwarded headers require explicit trusted-proxy configuration. | `TestAuthenticationTransport`, existing mutation security tests |
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| Personal account routes: `webui/accounts.go` | Active signed-in person; principal supplied by server. Password change verifies current password. Sensitive authenticator changes require recent sign-in. No caller-supplied target identity. | `TestAccountBoundary` |
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| Recovery: `postgres/account_security.go`, `webui/accounts.go` | Fresh authenticated owner generates a hashed, one-use recovery secret. Redemption replaces password and revokes all sessions atomically. No email-existence disclosure. | Disposable PostgreSQL recovery verification |
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| Passkeys: `postgres/passkeys.go`, `webui/passkeys.go` | Configured RP origin, browser-bound one-use expiring challenge, verified credential signature and user verification. Enrollment/management belong to caller. Credential counters persist under a row lock. | Disposable browser virtual-authenticator verification; task-grant denial tests |
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| OIDC: `infrastructure/oidc`, `archieui/account_oidc.go`, `webui/auth.go` | Discovery and signed ID token with issuer/client audience/expiry, PKCE, state and nonce. Verified subject resolves to active identity. Browser-local session cannot outlive provider token, and provider credential remains checked. | `TestBrowserFlowVerifiesIDToken`, `TestProviderOutageIsUnavailableThenRecovers`, subject-claim tests; no external provider acceptance implied |
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| OIDC settings: `webui/accounts.go`, `postgres/authentication.go` | Instance ownership plus policy; recent sign-in for changes. Public URL cannot change while enrolled passkeys would be orphaned. | `TestAccountBoundary`, `TestAuthenticationSettingsRejectUntrustedOrigins` |
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| Org membership/workspaces/agent assignment: `webui/api_orgs.go`, `staterpc/orgs.go`, `postgres/orgs.go` | Own org or instance-owner relationship, allowed role vocabulary, membership escalation/last-owner guards, tenant-scoped SQL. | `TestOrgRPCsActInTheCallersOrg`, `TestSetMembershipRefusesUnknownRole`, org HTTP tests |
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| Personal API tokens: `webui/api_personal_tokens.go`, `staterpc/personal_tokens.go`, `postgres/personal_tokens.go` | Token owner comes from principal; store only token hash; revoke only caller's binding. | `TestPersonalTokensWithoutPerson`, `TestPersonalTokenOwner` |
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| gRPC caller attribution: `rpcidentity/identity.go` | Authenticated service may forward a principal; State Store resolves memberships/org itself. Task grant metadata is stripped. | `TestCallerAttribution` |
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| Agent/task gRPC: `staterpc/task_grants.go` | Durable task-scoped grant, explicit allowed RPC and target task, no definition-pin replacement, no account RPCs. | `TestTaskCredentialsCannotManageAccounts`, `TestTaskCredentialCannotReplaceItsPin`, `TestRecordUsageAuthority`, `TestWorkerPresenceAuthority` |
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| Chat HTTP: `webui/api_chat.go` | Server stamps sender and person thread; lists/read/turns/cancel/persona verify session ownership. Browser cannot submit another sender identity. | `TestWebChatOwnership`, `TestWebChatSenderCannotBeSuppliedByBrowser`; HTTP deny matrix |
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| Chat history, slash commands and model session tools: `gateway/session_store_postgres.go` | Store filters `Get`, `List`, `GetByChannel`; shared read/write guards check person ownership as well as org. A saved session cannot change its conversation source to claim another person's history. Service curation runs without a person principal. | `TestSessionVisibility`; PostgreSQL smoke for history isolation |
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| Chat questions/approvals: `webui/api_chat_ask.go` | Waiting question is bound to the initiating person, in addition to its unguessable ID. | `TestChatQuestionBelongsToInitiatingPerson` |
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| Chat downloads: `webui/api_chat_files.go` | Offered file token expires and is bound to the initiating person; requests cannot supply a filesystem path. | `TestChatFileDownload` |
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| Per-person memory: `archiegateway/chat_identity.go`, gateway memory tools, `sessioncurator` | Verified web sender identity scopes reads/writes. Curator refuses unidentified or mixed participants instead of guessing a person. | Gateway memory and session-curator tests |
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| Workflow/task actions: `webui/api_tasks.go`, `domain/taskactions`, `staterpc` | Policy and stored workspace before action; domain transition, authority and durable dispatch guards remain in force. | HTTP deny matrix, task action/domain tests, task grant tests |
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| Incoming webhooks: `captureintake`, access delivery engine | Verify HMAC before parsing; derive source/org from stored source; evaluate source delivery policies and egress rules. No browser-user credential is inferred. | Capture tests, `TestAuthorizeDelivery` |
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| Control-plane configuration, secrets and extensions | Browser policy and instance-only restrictions where registered; service contracts carry principal/org; task grants cannot invoke administrative RPCs. | HTTP deny matrix, `TestAdministrationRoutes`, `TestChannelReloadRoute` |
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| Location | Enforcement | Regression evidence |
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| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| Browser credential gate: `webui/auth.go`, `accounts.go` | Account session or verified provider identity; shared dashboard token is not a person when accounts are enabled. No API data before authentication. | `TestAccountBoundary`, `TestAccountSessionFailureIsClosed` |
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| Browser policy gate: `webui/authorize.go` | Resolve principal from stored identity; evaluate action against stored org/workspace and resource kind before handler. Missing chain refuses. | `TestHTTPPolicyCannotBeBypassed`, `TestAuthorizeRefusesWithoutAChain`, `TestAuthorizeRecord`, `TestTaskAuthorizationUsesStoredAttributes`, `TestAuthorizeCreateIn` |
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| Instance-only HTTP surfaces: `webui/instance_only.go`, server route registration | Hide instance-owned configuration and diagnostics from another org; policy still applies first. | `TestInstanceOnlyHidesTheInstanceFromOtherOrgs`, `TestInstanceAdminOrgs` |
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| First setup: `webui/accounts.go`, `postgres/accounts.go` | Initial organization, workspace, instance URL, admin identity and password commit together. Transaction lock closes bootstrap after first account; later requests require `manage_members`. | Disposable PostgreSQL smoke verification for bootstrap race and rollback; account policy tests below |
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| Account creation: `webui/accounts.go`, `staterpc/accounts.go`, `postgres/accounts.go` | Cedar `manage_members` at HTTP and RPC; target org is authenticated context. New local accounts cannot request owner role. | `TestAccountManagementUsesPolicy`, `TestAccountBoundary` |
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| Local passwords and sessions: `identity/password.go`, `postgres/accounts.go` | Argon2id, independent salts, length/common-password checks, generic login refusal, account throttling, session hashes and expiry, revocation on logout/password change/suspension. | `TestPasswordVerification`, `TestAccountBoundary`; disposable PostgreSQL session verification |
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| Transport and CSRF: `webui/accounts.go`, `api_tasks.go` | Password/account mutations require HTTPS or localhost development, JSON, custom CSRF header and same-origin requests. Forwarded headers require explicit trusted-proxy configuration. | `TestAuthenticationTransport`, existing mutation security tests |
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| Personal account routes: `webui/accounts.go` | Active signed-in person; principal supplied by server. Password change verifies current password. Sensitive authenticator changes require recent sign-in. No caller-supplied target identity. | `TestAccountBoundary` |
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| Recovery: `postgres/account_security.go`, `webui/accounts.go` | Fresh authenticated owner generates a hashed, one-use recovery secret. Redemption replaces password and revokes all sessions atomically. No email-existence disclosure. | Disposable PostgreSQL recovery verification |
|
||||
| Passkeys: `postgres/passkeys.go`, `webui/passkeys.go` | Configured RP origin, browser-bound one-use expiring challenge, verified credential signature and user verification. Enrollment/management belong to caller. Credential counters persist under a row lock. | Disposable browser virtual-authenticator verification; task-grant denial tests |
|
||||
| OIDC: `infrastructure/oidc`, `archieui/account_oidc.go`, `webui/auth.go` | Discovery and signed ID token with issuer/client audience/expiry, PKCE, state and nonce. Verified subject resolves to active identity. Browser-local session cannot outlive provider token, and provider credential remains checked. | `TestBrowserFlowVerifiesIDToken`, `TestProviderOutageIsUnavailableThenRecovers`, subject-claim tests; no external provider acceptance implied |
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| OIDC settings: `webui/accounts.go`, `postgres/authentication.go` | Instance ownership plus policy; recent sign-in for changes. Public URL cannot change while enrolled passkeys would be orphaned. | `TestAccountBoundary`, `TestAuthenticationSettingsRejectUntrustedOrigins` |
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| Org membership/workspaces/agent assignment: `webui/api_orgs.go`, `staterpc/orgs.go`, `postgres/orgs.go` | Own org or instance-owner relationship, allowed role vocabulary, membership escalation/last-owner guards, tenant-scoped SQL. | `TestOrgRPCsActInTheCallersOrg`, `TestSetMembershipRefusesUnknownRole`, org HTTP tests |
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| Personal API tokens: `webui/api_personal_tokens.go`, `staterpc/personal_tokens.go`, `postgres/personal_tokens.go` | Token owner comes from principal; store only token hash; revoke only caller's binding. | `TestPersonalTokensWithoutPerson`, `TestPersonalTokenOwner` |
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| gRPC caller attribution: `rpcidentity/identity.go` | Authenticated service may forward a principal; State Store resolves memberships/org itself. Task grant metadata is stripped. | `TestCallerAttribution` |
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| Agent/task gRPC: `staterpc/task_grants.go` | Durable task-scoped grant, explicit allowed RPC and target task, no definition-pin replacement, no account RPCs. | `TestTaskCredentialsCannotManageAccounts`, `TestTaskCredentialCannotReplaceItsPin`, `TestRecordUsageAuthority`, `TestWorkerPresenceAuthority` |
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| Chat HTTP: `webui/api_chat.go` | Server stamps sender and person thread; lists/read/turns/cancel/persona verify session ownership. Browser cannot submit another sender identity. | `TestWebChatOwnership`, `TestWebChatSenderCannotBeSuppliedByBrowser`; HTTP deny matrix |
|
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| Chat history, slash commands and model session tools: `gateway/session_store_postgres.go` | Store filters `Get`, `List`, `GetByChannel`; shared read/write guards check person ownership as well as org. A saved session cannot change its conversation source to claim another person's history. Service curation runs without a person principal. | `TestSessionVisibility`; PostgreSQL smoke for history isolation |
|
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| Chat questions/approvals: `webui/api_chat_ask.go` | Waiting question is bound to the initiating person, in addition to its unguessable ID. | `TestChatQuestionBelongsToInitiatingPerson` |
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| Chat downloads: `webui/api_chat_files.go` | Offered file token expires and is bound to the initiating person; requests cannot supply a filesystem path. | `TestChatFileDownload` |
|
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| Per-person memory: `archiegateway/chat_identity.go`, gateway memory tools, `sessioncurator` | Verified web sender identity scopes reads/writes. Curator refuses unidentified or mixed participants instead of guessing a person. | Gateway memory and session-curator tests |
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| Workflow/task actions: `webui/api_tasks.go`, `domain/taskactions`, `staterpc` | Policy and stored workspace before action; domain transition, authority and durable dispatch guards remain in force. | HTTP deny matrix, task action/domain tests, task grant tests |
|
||||
| Incoming webhooks: `captureintake`, access delivery engine | Verify HMAC before parsing; derive source/org from stored source; evaluate source delivery policies and egress rules. No browser-user credential is inferred. | Capture tests, `TestAuthorizeDelivery` |
|
||||
| Control-plane configuration, secrets and extensions | Browser policy and instance-only restrictions where registered; service contracts carry principal/org; task grants cannot invoke administrative RPCs. | HTTP deny matrix, `TestAdministrationRoutes`, `TestChannelReloadRoute` |
|
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| Audit feed: `webui/api_audit.go`, `domain/audit` | `read_audit` on the `audit` resource; org scope and the instance-wide exception come from the authenticated principal, never the query string. Export carries the same grant, needs an explicit range of at most a year, and is rate-limited per identity, one at a time. Redaction runs in the State Store adapter before an entry crosses gRPC. | `TestReadAuditRoleBoundary`, `TestAuditRoutesFollowTheReadAuditRole`, `TestHTTPPolicyCannotBeBypassed`, `TestAuditErrorMapping`, `TestAuditCSVCellNeutralisesFormulas` |
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| Live HTTP/SSE and diagnostics | Authenticated policy gate applies before stream creation; org-scoped event reads; instance logs require administrative visibility. | HTTP deny matrix, instance-only tests, `TestServiceLogsRequireInstanceCredential` |
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| Background schedules, dispatch, curation | Service/agent authority, not an implicit browser user. Task-scoped grants and org scopes remain distinct from initiating operator attribution. | Existing dispatch, grant, memory and org-scope tests |
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| Live HTTP/SSE and diagnostics | Authenticated policy gate applies before stream creation; org-scoped event reads; instance logs require administrative visibility. | HTTP deny matrix, instance-only tests, `TestServiceLogsRequireInstanceCredential` |
|
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| Background schedules, dispatch, curation | Service/agent authority, not an implicit browser user. Task-scoped grants and org scopes remain distinct from initiating operator attribution. | Existing dispatch, grant, memory and org-scope tests |
|
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The policy HTTP matrix enumerates each registered protected route. It checks
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both anonymous refusal and refusal by an explicit Cedar forbid, using the real
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@@ -1,20 +1,20 @@
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# Handoff: organisation-owned automation
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Read this file and `GUIDELINES.md` before running a numbered implementation prompt.
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The maintainer approved the architecture below. Implement it; do not restart a
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navigation brainstorming exercise. The initial Antigravity navigation proposal
|
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was rejected. A later externally authored design or issue description field is
|
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not additional approval.
|
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Read this file and `GUIDELINES.md` before running a numbered implementation
|
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prompt. The maintainer approved the architecture below. Implement it; do not
|
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restart a navigation brainstorming exercise. The initial Antigravity navigation
|
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proposal was rejected. A later externally authored design or issue description
|
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field is not additional approval.
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## Approved product model
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| Scope | Ownership |
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| --- | --- |
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| Account | Login methods, personal API tokens, preferences |
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| Instance | Authentication providers, execution infrastructure, installed extensions, secret-engine infrastructure, organisation limits |
|
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| Organisation | Members, execution identities, external connections, model configuration, workflows, schedules, channels |
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| Workspace | Groups organisation work and resources; initially inherits organisation permissions |
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| Task/run | Requesting actor, execution identity, resolved workflow and resource references |
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| Scope | Ownership |
|
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| ------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| Account | Login methods, personal API tokens, preferences |
|
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| Instance | Authentication providers, execution infrastructure, installed extensions, secret-engine infrastructure, organisation limits |
|
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| Organisation | Members, execution identities, external connections, model configuration, workflows, schedules, channels |
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| Workspace | Groups organisation work and resources; initially inherits organisation permissions |
|
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| Task/run | Requesting actor, execution identity, resolved workflow and resource references |
|
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|
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External connections are explicit organisation resources. A forge connection
|
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identifies its host, authentication reference and verified external account.
|
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@@ -22,16 +22,18 @@ Repositories reference connections. Execution identities receive permission for
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specified operations on those resources. Git commit authorship is separate from
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authentication. Database-backed execution identities are authoritative.
|
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|
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Preserve existing service boundaries: State Store/control plane persists resources
|
||||
and authority; archied resolves execution resources, performs Git operations and
|
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verifies repository access; Gateway owns conversations and organisation-scoped
|
||||
model use; UI presents contracts and diagnostics. Use existing gRPC contracts for
|
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service communication. Do not add a service or access another service's tables.
|
||||
Preserve existing service boundaries: State Store/control plane persists
|
||||
resources and authority; archied resolves execution resources, performs Git
|
||||
operations and verifies repository access; Gateway owns conversations and
|
||||
organisation-scoped model use; UI presents contracts and diagnostics. Use
|
||||
existing gRPC contracts for service communication. Do not add a service or
|
||||
access another service's tables.
|
||||
|
||||
A saved change must become effective without a server login. Connection state
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||||
must distinguish saved, applied, verified and failed. A resolved secret is not
|
||||
proof of repository access. Setup follows the requested capability: repositories,
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chat channels and a global default model are not universal prerequisites.
|
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proof of repository access. Setup follows the requested capability:
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repositories, chat channels and a global default model are not universal
|
||||
prerequisites.
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||||
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## Starting state to verify
|
||||
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@@ -49,19 +51,20 @@ that snapshot is current. Other agents may have worked since this handoff.
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4. `04-navigation-and-setup.md` — #47.
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||||
|
||||
Gitea issues are authoritative for progress and dependencies. The parent is
|
||||
#1043. These files are reusable instructions, not completion records.
|
||||
Read each issue before claiming it. Complete the current slice end to end before
|
||||
starting the next. Do not close the parent until all acceptance criteria have
|
||||
actual evidence. Do not delegate unless the maintainer explicitly authorises it.
|
||||
#1043. These files are reusable instructions, not completion records. Read each
|
||||
issue before claiming it. Complete the current slice end to end before starting
|
||||
the next. Do not close the parent until all acceptance criteria have actual
|
||||
evidence. Do not delegate unless the maintainer explicitly authorises it.
|
||||
|
||||
## Final acceptance scenario
|
||||
|
||||
An organisation administrator configures a forge connection through the dashboard,
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||||
binds a private repository, permits an execution identity to clone/push/open a PR,
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||||
verifies access using the daemon, selects that identity in a workflow, and runs or
|
||||
retries a task successfully. No configuration-file edit, restart, root credential
|
||||
fallback or daemon secret in a container is needed. A separate repository-free
|
||||
workflow runs without a forge connection. Cross-organisation use is refused.
|
||||
An organisation administrator configures a forge connection through the
|
||||
dashboard, binds a private repository, permits an execution identity to
|
||||
clone/push/open a PR, verifies access using the daemon, selects that identity in
|
||||
a workflow, and runs or retries a task successfully. No configuration-file edit,
|
||||
restart, root credential fallback or daemon secret in a container is needed. A
|
||||
separate repository-free workflow runs without a forge connection.
|
||||
Cross-organisation use is refused.
|
||||
|
||||
Use an isolated authenticated private-repository equivalent for verification.
|
||||
Production configuration, deployment, pushes and external posting require the
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,14 +1,15 @@
|
||||
# Implement live database execution identities
|
||||
|
||||
Read `00-start-here.md` and `GUIDELINES.md`. Work against
|
||||
`archie-core-kgxw.13`; read and claim it before editing.
|
||||
Read `00-start-here.md` and `GUIDELINES.md`. Work against `archie-core-kgxw.13`;
|
||||
read and claim it before editing.
|
||||
|
||||
## Outcome
|
||||
|
||||
A bot or service account created and assigned through the dashboard can execute a
|
||||
repository-free workflow without a configuration-file entry or process restart.
|
||||
The database is the lifecycle and identity authority. A database identity cannot
|
||||
silently acquire the root forge account, model authority or container grants.
|
||||
A bot or service account created and assigned through the dashboard can execute
|
||||
a repository-free workflow without a configuration-file entry or process
|
||||
restart. The database is the lifecycle and identity authority. A database
|
||||
identity cannot silently acquire the root forge account, model authority or
|
||||
container grants.
|
||||
|
||||
## Source investigation
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,9 +17,10 @@ Trace `internal/domain/identity`, organisation agent assignment, State Store
|
||||
identity RPC and principal assembly, `internal/app/archied/bootstrap.go`,
|
||||
`internal/app/archied/main.go`, `internal/daemon/workflow_identity.go`,
|
||||
`internal/daemon/workflow_org.go`, and identity-dependent paths in daemon.go and
|
||||
kit_task.go. Inspect `ui/src/workflows/WorkflowSettings.vue` and the organisation
|
||||
agent screen. Inspect every caller of declaredIdentity, identityMayAct,
|
||||
identityFor, publisherIdentity, configFor, forgeFor, treesFor and repoFor.
|
||||
kit_task.go. Inspect `ui/src/workflows/WorkflowSettings.vue` and the
|
||||
organisation agent screen. Inspect every caller of declaredIdentity,
|
||||
identityMayAct, identityFor, publisherIdentity, configFor, forgeFor, treesFor
|
||||
and repoFor.
|
||||
|
||||
At handoff, the UI offered database IDs but execution used startup-built
|
||||
IdentityRunner objects from cfg.Identities. Forge/worktree NATS registrations
|
||||
@@ -46,15 +48,17 @@ while keeping root fallback paths would create a credential exposure.
|
||||
assign every identity to the system organisation. Preserve effective grants
|
||||
without granting anything to newly created agents by default.
|
||||
7. Keep repository authentication separate. A repository-free agent needs no
|
||||
forge connection. Until the connection slice is implemented, reject unsupported
|
||||
repository access explicitly rather than borrowing root credentials.
|
||||
forge connection. Until the connection slice is implemented, reject
|
||||
unsupported repository access explicitly rather than borrowing root
|
||||
credentials.
|
||||
8. Make workflow identity selection use eligible identities of the active
|
||||
organisation and display their names while saving stable IDs. Show loading,
|
||||
unavailable and empty states truthfully.
|
||||
|
||||
Do not invent new meanings for `root` or replace it with another organisation's
|
||||
agent automatically. Migrate existing references only with a deterministic,
|
||||
organisation-correct mapping; surface genuinely ambiguous records for resolution.
|
||||
organisation-correct mapping; surface genuinely ambiguous records for
|
||||
resolution.
|
||||
|
||||
## Acceptance evidence
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,34 +1,36 @@
|
||||
# Implement organisation forge connections and repository access
|
||||
|
||||
Read `00-start-here.md` and `GUIDELINES.md`. Work against
|
||||
`archie-core-oygqd`. Its prerequisite is `archie-core-kgxw.13`; verify acceptance
|
||||
before claiming this slice. Do not treat a closed issue without evidence as proof.
|
||||
Read `00-start-here.md` and `GUIDELINES.md`. Work against `archie-core-oygqd`.
|
||||
Its prerequisite is `archie-core-kgxw.13`; verify acceptance before claiming
|
||||
this slice. Do not treat a closed issue without evidence as proof.
|
||||
|
||||
## Outcome and resource relationships
|
||||
|
||||
An organisation owns a named external connection. It identifies the forge host,
|
||||
authentication reference and verified external account. A repository references
|
||||
that connection. An execution identity is authorised for specified operations
|
||||
such as clone, push and opening a PR. Commit author name/email remain independent
|
||||
of the authenticating external account. Choose the smallest representation that
|
||||
fits the existing control-plane resource and policy contracts; do not build a
|
||||
new integration service or expose root config fields as the domain model.
|
||||
such as clone, push and opening a PR. Commit author name/email remain
|
||||
independent of the authenticating external account. Choose the smallest
|
||||
representation that fits the existing control-plane resource and policy
|
||||
contracts; do not build a new integration service or expose root config fields
|
||||
as the domain model.
|
||||
|
||||
## Investigate first
|
||||
|
||||
Trace existing control-plane resource registration and organisation validation,
|
||||
repository policies, SecretRef handling, forge extensions and resolveForge in
|
||||
archied, worktree.Manager authentication, task-scoped forge/worktree RPC authority,
|
||||
apply-status reporting and settings API authorisation. Check every Git and forge
|
||||
consumer, including intake polling, review handling, retries and post-run actions.
|
||||
A secret-reference check currently performed by another service is not evidence
|
||||
that archied can resolve and use that reference.
|
||||
archied, worktree.Manager authentication, task-scoped forge/worktree RPC
|
||||
authority, apply-status reporting and settings API authorisation. Check every
|
||||
Git and forge consumer, including intake polling, review handling, retries and
|
||||
post-run actions. A secret-reference check currently performed by another
|
||||
service is not evidence that archied can resolve and use that reference.
|
||||
|
||||
## Required behaviour
|
||||
|
||||
1. Organisation administrators manage connections and repository bindings through
|
||||
API/dashboard with server-side authorisation. Other organisations cannot read,
|
||||
modify, select, verify or execute against them by guessing an ID.
|
||||
1. Organisation administrators manage connections and repository bindings
|
||||
through API/dashboard with server-side authorisation. Other organisations
|
||||
cannot read, modify, select, verify or execute against them by guessing an
|
||||
ID.
|
||||
2. Reuse secret references and installed forge capabilities. Do not hardcode a
|
||||
closed GitHub/Gitea list if enabled extensions already supply discovery.
|
||||
Never return token values to the browser. Any credential-entry path must have
|
||||
@@ -36,13 +38,15 @@ that archied can resolve and use that reference.
|
||||
3. Authorise operations for the actual execution identity and selected resource.
|
||||
A valid token does not itself grant an agent permission. Do not grant blanket
|
||||
write/issue/PR permissions when only clone/read is requested.
|
||||
4. Resolve the selected connection in archied for the actual repository operation.
|
||||
Apply updates live. Saved revision, applied revision and verified access are
|
||||
distinct; failed changes must not falsely report that the new revision runs.
|
||||
5. Test access through the daemon's real forge/Git path for the selected repository
|
||||
and base branch, under the relevant execution identity's permissions. Report
|
||||
which operation was checked. Read success cannot prove push or PR permission.
|
||||
Verification must not create commits, branches or PRs as an incidental probe.
|
||||
4. Resolve the selected connection in archied for the actual repository
|
||||
operation. Apply updates live. Saved revision, applied revision and verified
|
||||
access are distinct; failed changes must not falsely report that the new
|
||||
revision runs.
|
||||
5. Test access through the daemon's real forge/Git path for the selected
|
||||
repository and base branch, under the relevant execution identity's
|
||||
permissions. Report which operation was checked. Read success cannot prove
|
||||
push or PR permission. Verification must not create commits, branches or PRs
|
||||
as an incidental probe.
|
||||
6. Credential rotation reaches subsequent operations without process restart.
|
||||
Revoked permissions are enforced on subsequent operations/attempts. Avoid
|
||||
stale cached credentials silently surviving changes.
|
||||
@@ -52,17 +56,18 @@ that archied can resolve and use that reference.
|
||||
A remote 401 or 'Repository not found' does not prove which underlying cause
|
||||
occurred. Do not implement frontend substring/regex diagnosis.
|
||||
8. Populate task repository choices from authorised configured repositories, not
|
||||
only prior tasks. A failed task can lead to its connection and return to retry.
|
||||
only prior tasks. A failed task can lead to its connection and return to
|
||||
retry.
|
||||
9. Migrate existing forge/repository configuration to its existing owner without
|
||||
widening grants; remove obsolete runtime paths after all consumers migrate.
|
||||
Do not force connection setup for repository-free workflows.
|
||||
|
||||
## Acceptance evidence
|
||||
|
||||
Use an isolated authenticated private-repository equivalent. Demonstrate dashboard
|
||||
configuration, actual daemon clone, permitted push/PR execution where the test
|
||||
workflow calls for it, credential rotation and refused unauthorised operations.
|
||||
Show that another org and an ungranted agent cannot use the same connection.
|
||||
Inspect worker handoff/logs to confirm tokens do not leak. Run a repository-free
|
||||
workflow independently. Record exact limitations; no production configuration or
|
||||
external posting is authorised by this prompt.
|
||||
Use an isolated authenticated private-repository equivalent. Demonstrate
|
||||
dashboard configuration, actual daemon clone, permitted push/PR execution where
|
||||
the test workflow calls for it, credential rotation and refused unauthorised
|
||||
operations. Show that another org and an ungranted agent cannot use the same
|
||||
connection. Inspect worker handoff/logs to confirm tokens do not leak. Run a
|
||||
repository-free workflow independently. Record exact limitations; no production
|
||||
configuration or external posting is authorised by this prompt.
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
||||
# Migrate automation resources to organisation ownership
|
||||
|
||||
Read `00-start-here.md` and `GUIDELINES.md`. Work against
|
||||
`archie-core-3z4fd.8`. Read prior identity/connection changes before deciding what
|
||||
remains; do not duplicate their resources or migrations.
|
||||
Read `00-start-here.md` and `GUIDELINES.md`. Work against `archie-core-3z4fd.8`.
|
||||
Read prior identity/connection changes before deciding what remains; do not
|
||||
duplicate their resources or migrations.
|
||||
|
||||
## Outcome
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,28 +16,28 @@ Inspect the control plane's instanceOnlyKinds, runtime layering, org model
|
||||
policy, provider/model selection, workflow definitions/enablement, schedules,
|
||||
channel settings, event sources/bindings, execution profiles and task/container
|
||||
policies. Inspect all runtime consumers and authorization paths before changing
|
||||
scope. Use the ownership table in `00-start-here.md` as the approved target.
|
||||
Do not mechanically remove kinds from instanceOnlyKinds and declare completion.
|
||||
scope. Use the ownership table in `00-start-here.md` as the approved target. Do
|
||||
not mechanically remove kinds from instanceOnlyKinds and declare completion.
|
||||
|
||||
## Rules and implementation requirements
|
||||
|
||||
1. Resolve organisational resources from the task/request's authoritative org
|
||||
context. Do not trust a submitted org field, retain a root context by accident,
|
||||
or query a different service's tables.
|
||||
context. Do not trust a submitted org field, retain a root context by
|
||||
accident, or query a different service's tables.
|
||||
2. Preserve the distinction between installed instance capability, organisation
|
||||
configuration and organisation permission to use shared infrastructure.
|
||||
Existing org model policy must remain effective. Instance infrastructure
|
||||
limits remain enforceable even when organisations configure automation.
|
||||
3. Keep workspace semantics narrow: group organisation work/resources and inherit
|
||||
organisation permission initially. Do not invent a second workspace policy
|
||||
system or weaken existing explicit restrictions.
|
||||
3. Keep workspace semantics narrow: group organisation work/resources and
|
||||
inherit organisation permission initially. Do not invent a second workspace
|
||||
policy system or weaken existing explicit restrictions.
|
||||
4. Establish deterministic ownership for existing records before migration.
|
||||
Preserve valid instance defaults only where the model explicitly allows
|
||||
inherited infrastructure defaults. Do not copy secrets or permissions into
|
||||
every tenant. Ambiguous ownership must be visible, never guessed.
|
||||
5. Make migrations safe to resume and maintain atomicity where records must agree.
|
||||
An interrupted migration must not silently lose settings or broaden access.
|
||||
Regenerate affected contracts and update every reader/writer/fixture.
|
||||
5. Make migrations safe to resume and maintain atomicity where records must
|
||||
agree. An interrupted migration must not silently lose settings or broaden
|
||||
access. Regenerate affected contracts and update every reader/writer/fixture.
|
||||
6. Saved org settings need functioning runtime consumers, apply status and
|
||||
dependency failure handling. Watches/caches must be keyed by organisation as
|
||||
well as resource/revision wherever shared processes consume multiple tenants.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
||||
# Implement navigation and contextual setup from working contracts
|
||||
|
||||
Read `00-start-here.md` and `GUIDELINES.md`. Work against
|
||||
`archie-core-3z4fd.1`. Verify its connection and ownership prerequisites before
|
||||
starting. The old page-rearrangement proposal is rejected, not a UI specification.
|
||||
Read `00-start-here.md` and `GUIDELINES.md`. Work against `archie-core-3z4fd.1`.
|
||||
Verify its connection and ownership prerequisites before starting. The old
|
||||
page-rearrangement proposal is rejected, not a UI specification.
|
||||
|
||||
## Outcome
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -17,38 +17,43 @@ without guessing which settings page owns the problem.
|
||||
or refetch scoped state and prevent stale responses from contaminating it.
|
||||
2. Instance administration is a separate administrator destination for
|
||||
infrastructure and instance limits. Personal login security, API tokens and
|
||||
preferences live in the account menu. Do not recreate a catch-all Access page.
|
||||
preferences live in the account menu. Do not recreate a catch-all Access
|
||||
page.
|
||||
3. Connections are discoverable organisation resources. A repository opens its
|
||||
connection; a workflow shows the execution identity/resources it needs; a
|
||||
failed task links to an authorised recovery action. Show names with stable
|
||||
references, without duplicate organisation labels or unexplained internal IDs.
|
||||
references, without duplicate organisation labels or unexplained internal
|
||||
IDs.
|
||||
4. Setup is contextual. A repo-required workflow offers missing connection,
|
||||
repository, identity or model configuration where needed. A repository-free
|
||||
workflow never demands GitHub. Chat channels and a global default model are
|
||||
not universal setup prerequisites. Do not add a mandatory global wizard.
|
||||
5. Readiness comes from backend capability diagnostics for the selected org,
|
||||
identity, workflow and resource. Distinguish saved/applied/verified/failed.
|
||||
Do not infer readiness from nonempty fields, task counts or a resolved secret.
|
||||
Do not infer readiness from nonempty fields, task counts or a resolved
|
||||
secret.
|
||||
6. Recovery consumes structured service errors. The browser must not classify
|
||||
root causes using error-string patterns or display actions the user cannot
|
||||
perform. Preserve task context when moving to configuration and returning.
|
||||
7. Preserve the prior working settings draft/save flow, readable width, review
|
||||
diffs, workflow validation and truthful loading/error states. Do not reintroduce
|
||||
native navigation prompts that discard drafts or collisions with the chat FAB.
|
||||
diffs, workflow validation and truthful loading/error states. Do not
|
||||
reintroduce native navigation prompts that discard drafts or collisions with
|
||||
the chat FAB.
|
||||
8. Keep technical implementation details out of normal product copy. Explain
|
||||
connection/account/permission problems in terms useful to the operator, not
|
||||
daemon config keys, NATS subjects or secret plumbing.
|
||||
|
||||
## Acceptance evidence
|
||||
|
||||
Drive the real local UI: create or select an org, configure the private-repository
|
||||
connection, choose a valid execution identity, verify repository access, start a
|
||||
workflow, encounter and recover a controlled access failure, then retry. Also run
|
||||
repository-free automation without forge setup. Verify a second org cannot see
|
||||
or select the first org's resources, including after switching org during an
|
||||
in-flight fetch. Check administrator, ordinary member and personal account views,
|
||||
loading/error states, keyboard access and a narrow viewport. Capture evidence,
|
||||
regenerate embedded UI output and run the exact final tree's project gate.
|
||||
Drive the real local UI: create or select an org, configure the
|
||||
private-repository connection, choose a valid execution identity, verify
|
||||
repository access, start a workflow, encounter and recover a controlled access
|
||||
failure, then retry. Also run repository-free automation without forge setup.
|
||||
Verify a second org cannot see or select the first org's resources, including
|
||||
after switching org during an in-flight fetch. Check administrator, ordinary
|
||||
member and personal account views, loading/error states, keyboard access and a
|
||||
narrow viewport. Capture evidence, regenerate embedded UI output and run the
|
||||
exact final tree's project gate.
|
||||
|
||||
Do not claim a successful user journey based solely on mocked screenshots or
|
||||
fixture state. Leave unmet criteria explicitly open in the issue.
|
||||
@@ -13,34 +13,39 @@ AGENTS.md files first; the maintainer's current instructions take precedence.
|
||||
- Trace the complete affected path: UI, API, service contract, authorisation,
|
||||
persistence, runtime consumer, retries, fixtures and generated artifacts.
|
||||
- Name the smallest complete change. Reuse existing resource, secret-reference,
|
||||
authorisation, apply-status and service-contract mechanisms. If a new mechanism
|
||||
or a change exceeding roughly 100 lines is needed, assess simpler alternatives
|
||||
and record why they fail. This assessment does not mean asking again for an
|
||||
already approved direction.
|
||||
authorisation, apply-status and service-contract mechanisms. If a new
|
||||
mechanism or a change exceeding roughly 100 lines is needed, assess simpler
|
||||
alternatives and record why they fail. This assessment does not mean asking
|
||||
again for an already approved direction.
|
||||
- Treat file names and line references in these prompts as investigation leads.
|
||||
Verify the current source; do not implement from stale notes alone.
|
||||
|
||||
## Implementation boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
- Preserve service isolation, durable acknowledgement and local failure. An
|
||||
unavailable peer must not terminate unrelated services or discard accepted work.
|
||||
unavailable peer must not terminate unrelated services or discard accepted
|
||||
work.
|
||||
- Enforce organisation ownership and operation permissions on the server. Hidden
|
||||
UI controls are not an authorisation boundary. Caller-supplied organisation or
|
||||
identity values are not trusted facts.
|
||||
- Keep requesting actor, execution principal, external account and commit author
|
||||
distinct. Never infer authority from a display name or a matching account name.
|
||||
distinct. Never infer authority from a display name or a matching account
|
||||
name.
|
||||
- Never fall back to root credentials or broad grants when resolution fails.
|
||||
Never grant every existing organisation access to migrated global resources.
|
||||
- The model never runs Git. Daemon credentials never enter agent containers,
|
||||
task briefs, browser responses or logs. Task-scoped grants expire/revoke when
|
||||
execution ends. Task briefs remain under `.git/task.json`.
|
||||
- Persist settings through the control plane and implement their runtime consumer
|
||||
in the same slice. Do not ship parse-only fields, decorative readiness badges,
|
||||
restart instructions or a server-login workaround as completion.
|
||||
- Persist settings through the control plane and implement their runtime
|
||||
consumer in the same slice. Do not ship parse-only fields, decorative
|
||||
readiness badges, restart instructions or a server-login workaround as
|
||||
completion.
|
||||
- Remove obsolete paths only after migrating their data and callers. No parallel
|
||||
identity authority, duplicated ownership model or indefinite compatibility shim.
|
||||
- No new service, binary, generic framework, broad cleanup or speculative feature.
|
||||
File unrelated discoveries as issues instead of fixing them in passing.
|
||||
identity authority, duplicated ownership model or indefinite compatibility
|
||||
shim.
|
||||
- No new service, binary, generic framework, broad cleanup or speculative
|
||||
feature. File unrelated discoveries as issues instead of fixing them in
|
||||
passing.
|
||||
|
||||
## Verification and delivery
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -48,12 +53,13 @@ AGENTS.md files first; the maintainer's current instructions take precedence.
|
||||
fixing it. Cover changed security, workflow and SQL semantics as required by
|
||||
AGENTS.md. Do not add tests of constants, wiring or struct shapes.
|
||||
- Verify through real API/runtime/browser paths when the acceptance requires
|
||||
them. State Store fixtures and mocks must be labelled; they do not prove actual
|
||||
private Git access, credential rotation or successful agent execution.
|
||||
them. State Store fixtures and mocks must be labelled; they do not prove
|
||||
actual private Git access, credential rotation or successful agent execution.
|
||||
- Do not open a real database or require Docker in unit tests. Use the isolated
|
||||
integration/e2e environment for real service verification.
|
||||
- Follow current project instructions for framework/library documentation. Never
|
||||
send secrets, production identifiers or credential contents to documentation tools.
|
||||
send secrets, production identifiers or credential contents to documentation
|
||||
tools.
|
||||
- Regenerate protobuf and embedded UI assets when their sources change; do not
|
||||
hand-edit generated output. Run appropriate targeted checks, then `task check`
|
||||
on the exact final tree before committing. Never run concurrent full gates.
|
||||
@@ -63,5 +69,5 @@ AGENTS.md files first; the maintainer's current instructions take precedence.
|
||||
remains unverified, record exactly what and why; leave the issue open. Never
|
||||
describe a partial implementation as end-to-end completion.
|
||||
- Report what changed, what was verified and the material remaining limitation.
|
||||
Keep useful progress updates concise. Ask only for unresolved product decisions
|
||||
or explicitly restricted external/destructive actions.
|
||||
Keep useful progress updates concise. Ask only for unresolved product
|
||||
decisions or explicitly restricted external/destructive actions.
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user